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Preface  
The motivation for the present report is to understand consumer risk perception and 
food choice in relation to food-related health risks. In particular, a choice experiment 
is performed to elicit consumers’ willingness to pay for food safety and animal wel-
fare. Expert information is provided as an integrated part of the experiments in order 
to understand how information affects preferences and choices. The report is part of 
the research project “Information, Risk perception and Consumer behaviour” financed 
by the Danish Research Agency under a FELFO programme focusing on food re-
search.  
 
The report is the result of a cross-disciplinary collaboration involving researchers 
from The Institute of Food and Resource Economics at the Royal Danish Veterinary 
and Agricultural University (FOI/KVL), National Environmental Research Institute 
(NERI), and the Danish institute of Food and Veterinary Research (DFVF). The re-
port has been prepared by senior researcher Tove Christensen (FOI), research analyst 
Morten Mørkbak (FOI), and research analyst Line Block Christoffersen (FOI), senior 
researcher Berit Hasler (NERI) and research analyst Thomas Lundhede (NERI). 
Chapter 2 of the report, which includes facts related to food safety and animal welfare 
of different production systems, has mainly been carried out by project worker Lone 
Jannok Porsbo (DFVF). We want to thank executive director Mette Wier (akf) for in-
spiring discussions in preparing the survey, senior researcher Jørgen Dejgård Jensen 
(FOI) for his help with structuring the report, academic worker Carey Smith (NERI) 
for linguistic proof reading and secretaries Jytte Loupis and Inger Sommer for editing 
the final report.  
 
 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics, May 2006. 
  
 
Søren E. Frandsen 
Director General 
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Dansk sammendrag  
Baggrund og formål 
Op gennem 80’erne og 90’erne har vi oplevet en øget interesse for fødevaresikkerhed 
hos forbrugere, politikere og eksperter. Dette kan ses som en del af en generel stig-
ning i interessen for kvaliteten af fødevarer, men skyldes også en stigning i antallet af 
fødevarebårne sygdomstilfælde i samme periode. I 2004 blev mellem 18.000 og 
74.000 danskere syge som følge af campylobacter infektioner og dermed overhalede 
campylobacter salmonella, som den mest almindelige årsag til fødevarebårne syg-
domstilfælde i Danmark. Samtidig er der ofte omkostninger forbundet med at produ-
cere fødevarer med øget sikkerhed. Da prisen ligeledes er en vigtig parameter i for-
brugernes indkøbsbeslutninger, er det derfor væsentligt at undersøge i hvilken grad 
den øgede interesse for fødevaresikkerhed udmønter sig i en øget betalingsvilje.  
  
Nærværende analyse er motiveret af et ønske om at forstå forbrugernes opfattelse og 
værdisætning af fødevarebårne sundhedsrisici – samt analysere hvordan disse påvir-
kes af ekspert information. Denne viden er et vigtigt bidrag til formulering af fødeva-
resikkerhedspolitiske virkemidler, der kan reducere fødevarebårne sundhedsrisici 
gennem information eller markedsbaserede instrumenter (så som mærkning af føde-
varer, prisdifferensiering via afgifter og tilskud etc.). Vi fokuserer på fødevaresikker-
hed ved kyllinger, repræsenteret ved bakterien campylobacter, og dyrevelfærd, repræ-
senteret ved produktionsmetode. Kyllinger menes at være hovedårsagen til humane 
tilfælde af campylobacter infektioner. Fødevaresikkerhed er en egenskab ved selve 
produktet (det er ikke synligt, men kan måles), mens dyrevelfærd er knyttet til pro-
duktionsprocessen (og er hverken synlig eller målbar i selve produktet). For den gen-
nemsnitlige forbruger er værdien af disse egenskaber en tillidssag, idet egenskaberne 
ikke kan identificeres – ikke engang efter at produktet er konsumeret. Dette fører os 
frem til projektets hovedformål: 
• At estimere betalingsviljen for øget dyrevelfærd forbundet med dyr, der har 
adgang til friland i forhold til et konventionelt (indendørs) produktionssystem, 
samt betalingsviljen for at fjerne risikoen for at blive smittet med campylobac-
ter. 
• At analysere hvordan ekspertinformation påvirker forbrugerens præferencer og 
risikoopfattelse. 
• At identificere eventuelle samfundsmæssige gevinster forbundet med at give 
forbrugeren fuld information, via f.eks. offentlige kampagner eller mærknings-
ordninger. 
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• At undersøge om risikoopfattelse og effekt af ekspertinformation varierer på 
tværs af forbrugergrupper. 
 
Metode og data 
Vi benytter valghandlingseksperimenter (på engelsk ’choice experiments’) til at esti-
mere forbrugernes betalingsvilje for henholdsvis øget dyrevelfærd og for at undgå 
campylobacter. Valghandlingseksperimenter er baseret på spørgeskemaundersøgelser, 
som dækker et repræsentativt udsnit af befolkningen. Vores datasæt består af 2300 
respondenter (ACNielsen 2005). Metoden kan benyttes til at udlede forbrugerens præ-
ferencer for et givent produkt og dets karakteristika, samt identificere hvilke variable, 
der har indflydelse på forbrugerens valg (Louviere et al. 2000). Ved yderligere at for-
syne forbrugeren med ekspertinformation, som en integreret del af eksperimentet, til-
lader metoden os at analysere hvordan ekspertinformation påvirker forbrugerens fø-
devarevalg. Den efterfølgende modellering og estimering er baseret på en multino-
mial probit model. 
 
Resultater 
Vores hovedresultater kan kort opsummeres som følger: Information om campylobac-
ter påvirker ikke betalingsviljen for hverken fødevaresikkerhed eller dyrevelfærd. In-
formation om dyrevelfærd øger betalingsviljen for dyrevelfærd mærkbart, men har 
kun en indirekte effekt på fødevaresikkerhed via påvirkning af den vægt prisen til-
lægges. Forbrugerne er villige til at betale for henholdsvis fødevaresikkerhed og dy-
revelfærd og hvis begge egenskaber tilbydes samtidig, øges betalingsviljen mærkbart. 
Disse resultater kvantificeres og uddybes i nedenstående tekst og opsummeres i tabel 
0.1. Betalingsviljeestimaterne præsenteres som den ekstra værdi en gennemsnits for-
bruger er villig til at betale for en kylling indeholdende den givne attribut i forhold til 
den pris han vil give for en konventionelt produceret kylling, der ikke er kontrolleret 
for campylobacter.  Beskrivelsen foregår i 3 trin. 
  
1) Hvad er betalingsviljen, når der ikke skeles til forskelle i information?  
2) Hvordan påvirkes betalingsviljen af information? 
3) Hvordan er samspillet mellem betalingsviljen for dyrevelfærd og fødevare-
sikkerhed? 
 
I første trin skelner vi ikke mellem valg foretaget med eller uden information om de 
pågældende attributter. Vi finder, at en gennemsnits forbruger oplever højere nytte 
ved køb af en frilands – og/eller campylobacterfri kylling. I kroner og ører betyder 
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det, at forbrugeren er villig til at betale en merpris i størrelsesorden kr. 25 for såvel en 
frilands kylling som for at undgå campylobacter risiko. 
 
I andet trin analyserer vi, om værdien af henholdsvis fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevel-
færd ændres, når forbrugeren får information om egenskabernes karakter. Vi ser at 
opdrætsinformation næsten fordobler betalingsviljen for dyrevelfærd, mens campylo-
bacter information ikke påvirker forbrugerens opfattelse af hverken dyrevelfærd eller 
fødevaresikkerhed. Mere præcist finder vi, at den ekstra betalingsvilje for en frilands 
kylling stiger fra kr. 20, når forbrugeren ikke har fået information om opdrætsform til 
kr. 42, når forbrugeren havde fået information om opdrætsform. Dette skal sammen-
lignes med en gennemsnitlig betalingsvilje på kr. 25, når man ikke skelner mellem 
forskelle i information. Forbrugerne er således villige til at betale op til kr. 22 for at få 
information om opdrætsmetoden. Betalingsviljen for fødevaresikkerhed stiger smule, 
når forbrugeren får information om opdrætsmetode – det er en indirekte påvirkning 
som følge af en generel ændring i prisfølsomheden. Opdrætsinformationen reducerer 
forbrugernes prisfølsomhed, hvilket kan ses som et tegn på at forbrugerne lægger 
mindre vægt på prisen og mere vægt på dyrevelfærd, når de ved mere om de forskel-
lige opdrætsmetoder.   
 
Den bedste beskrivelse af betalingsviljen fåes ved at inddrage samspillet mellem dy-
revelfærd og fødevaresikkerhed (trin 3). Hermed har vi mulighed for at analysere, om 
værdien af øget dyrevelfærd afhænger af, om produktet også kan tilbyde øget fødeva-
resikkerhed. Vi finder følgende resultater. Når der ikke gives information om dyrevel-
færd, er den gennemsnitlige forbruger villig til at betale en merpris på kr. 13 for en 
frilands opdrættet kylling, kr. 16 for en campylobacterfri kylling, og kr. 43 for en kyl-
ling, der både er campylobacterfri og opdrættet på friland sammenlignet med hvad 
man vil betale for en standardkylling. Med opdrætsinformation er de tilsvarende mer-
betalingsviljer estimeret til kr. 34 for en frilands opdrættet kylling, kr. 19 for en cam-
pylobacterfri kylling og kr. 70 for en kylling indeholdende begge karakteristika.  
 
Forbrugernes præferencer er således tydeligvis ikke additive for de to kvalitetsattri-
butter. Det ses nemmest ved først at kigge på en situation uden opdrætsinformation. 
En gennemsnits forbruger er ikke bare villig til at betale kr. 20 mere for en frilands 
opdrættet kylling – men derimod kun kr. 13 mere hvis kyllingen ikke er mærket cam-
pylobacterfri, og kr. 43 mere hvis kyllingen er mærket campylobacterfri. Ligeledes er 
den ekstra betalingsvilje for campylobacterfrie kyllinger ikke bare kr. 22, men kr. 16 
når kyllingen er produceret i et konventionelt indendørs staldsystem og kr. 43, når 
kyllingen kommer fra en frilands produktion. Den direkte sum af betalingsviljerne for 
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fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd er kr. 29 (16+13), men når kyllingen opfylder beg-
ge egenskaber samtidig er den samlede mer-værdi af fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevel-
færd kr. 43 per kylling. Dette indikerer at der er en ekstra betalingsvilje på kr. 14 per 
kylling, hvis den indeholder begge attributter.  
 
Samme mønster ses i situationen med opdrætsinformation. Den gennemsnitlige for-
bruger er ikke bare villig til at betale kr. 42 ekstra for en frilands kylling sammenlig-
net med en kylling produceret konventionelt - han vil kun betale kr. 34 for en frilands 
kylling, hvis den ikke er kontrolleret for campylobacter, men kr. 70 hvis kyllingen 
både er produceret på friland og campylobacterfri.  
 
Tabel 0.1. Betalingsvilje estimaterne fra de forskellinge modeller 
 
 Trin 1 
 
Betalingsvilje for dy-
revelfærd og fødeva-
resikkerhed 
Trin 2 
 
Betalingsvilje for dy-
revelfærd og fødeva-
resikkerhed når for-
skelle I information 
inddrages 
Trin 3 
 
Betalingsvilje når samspil 
mellem dyrevelfærd og 
fødevaresikkerhed ind-
drages 
Dyrevelfærd 
 20 13 
Dyrevelfærd 
 (med opdrætsinformation)  
 
 
25 
 
 
42 34 
Fødevaresikkerhed 
 22 16 
Fødevaresikkerhed 
 (med opdrætsinformation) 
 
 
 
23 
 
 26 19 
Dyrevelfærd og fødevare-
sikkerhed 
 
 43 
Dyrevelfærd og fødevare-
sikkerhed 
(med opdrætsinformation)  
 
 70 
 
Note: Tabellen viser hvor meget den gennemsnitlige forbruger er villig til at betale ekstra for de pågældende 
egenskaber I forhold til en konventionelt produceret kylling der ikke er kontrolleret for campylobacter.  
 
 
Ligeledes er værdien af opdrætsinformation på kr. 22 et gennemsnit af en værdi på kr. 
21, når kyllingens campylobacter indhold ikke er kendt og kr. 27, når kyllingen er 
campylobacterfri. 
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I relation til prioritering mellem fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd finder vi, at der 
stort set er samme betalingsvilje for fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd, når forbru-
gerne ikke har fået information om opdrætsmetode, mens betalingsviljen for dyrevel-
færd næsten fordobles i forhold til fødevaresikkerhed, når forbrugerne har fået infor-
mation om opdrætsmetode.  
 
Konklusion og perspetivering 
Markedsimplikationer 
I undersøgelsen fandt vi en gennemsnitlig betalingsvilje på kr. 43 for en campylobac-
terfri frilands kylling i forhold til en konventionelt opdrættet kylling, der ikke er kon-
trolleret for campylobacter. Betyder dette resultat at værdien af det danske kyllinge 
marked kan stige med kr. 43 for hver kylling, der sælges, hvis man fokuserer på fri-
lands campylobacterfrie kyllinger alene? Ikke direkte. For ikke at drage forhastede 
konklusioner, nævnes nedenfor en række elementer som bør indgå i beslutningerne. 
 
Betalingsviljeestimaterne er baseret på en situation, hvor campylobacterfrie kyllinger 
er nemt tilgængelige for forbrugeren – og samtidig bliver forbrugeren instrueret om 
kun at have fokus på fødevaresikkerhed, dyrevelfærd og pris, når de skal træffe deres 
valg. Dette afspejler ikke helt, hvad der foregår i en faktisk købssituation, hvor disse 
karakteristika ikke nødvendigvis er til stede på samme synlige måde. Samtidig er der 
et utal af produkt karakteristika, som forbrugeren yderligere skal tage stilling til, hvil-
ket kan medføre at karakteristika som fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd bliver tilsi-
desat eller måske helt glemt.  
 
Den nuværende merpris for en campylobacterfri kylling er kun på et par kroner per 
kg. Sammenlignes dette med resultaterne fra vores undersøgelse, tyder det på, at der 
er et stort potentiale i at øge markedet af campylobacterfrie kyllinger. Yderligere 
forskning i årsager til den store forskel mellem hvad folk siger, og hvad de gør, vil 
være utrolig værdifuld. 
 
I undersøgelsen spurgte vi respondenterne om deres næste valg af kylling (en margi-
nal vurdering) – vi bad dem ikke om at vurdere samtlige valg af kyllinger ud i al 
fremtid. Man kunne forvente at respondenten ville reducere deres betalingsvilje, hvis 
det var blevet klargjort at deres valg skulle dække et mere eller mindre permanent 
skift i deres køb af kyllingeprodukter - ikke bare den næste kylling. Et permanent 
skift ville klart have større budgetmæssige konsekvenser og muligvis medføre at for-
brugerne ville købe færre kyllinger og/eller substituere over til en anden form for kød, 
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hvis prisen var for høj. De aggregerede markedseffekter forventes derfor at være min-
dre end de marginale effekter.    
 
Den ikke-liniære sammenhæng mellem fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd indikerer et 
potentiale i produktion af en vare indeholdende begge karakteristika i stedet for at 
producere to varer med hver deres kvalitetsegenskab.  Vores resultater indikerer yder-
ligere, at sådanne nicheproduktioner er stærkt afhængige af informationer til forbru-
geren vedrørende produktet.  
  
Sidst kan nævnes, at det ikke er forbrugerens efterspørgsel, der bestemmer hvad der 
står på hylderne i supermarkedet – det er detailhandlen. Vi har estimeret efterspørgs-
len fra forbrugerne, men i det moderne marked mødes forbrugerne og producenterne 
sjældent direkte. Producenterne er ofte repræsenteret ved producent organisationer, 
som koordinerer produktionen. Forbrugernes efterspørgsel er afhængig af de varer 
som er tilgængelige for dem i butikkerne. Detailhandlen vil selvfølgelig prøve på at 
efterkomme forbrugernes efterspørgsel, men samtidig har de også deres egen agenda, 
nemlig at maksimere egen profit. Derfor skal forbrugernes betalingsviljer gennem et 
filter (som er detailleddets præferencer) før de når producenterne (organisationer). 
Derfor kræves mere viden om hvordan forbrugernes erklærede præferencer opfattes af 
detailleddet, før vi kan evaluere vores resultaters betydning for selve markedet. 
 
Politiske implikationer 
Set fra en politisk synsvinkel, er der en stor forskel på fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevel-
færd. Fødevaresikkerhed påvirker direkte de offentlige sundhedsudgifter, mens der 
ingen direkte effekter eller omkostninger er for samfundet ved dyrevelfærd. Derfor er 
den økonomiske interesse for offentlige myndigheder ikke så direkte, når der ses på 
dyrevelfærd, som ved fødevaresikkerhed. 
 
Vores resultater indikerer at der er et potentielt marked for sikre fødevarer, hvis for-
brugeren har en reel valgmulighed. Som situationen er i dag ved mange forbrugere 
slet ikke, hvilke afvejninger de faktisk foretager sig i deres daglige indkøb (eksem-
pelvis svarede kun godt halvdelen, at frilands kyllinger har større risiko for at inde-
holde campylobacter end konventionelle kyllinger). F.eks. er en salmonellafri kylling 
måske ikke altid mærket salmonellafri fordi en sådan mærkning vil lede opmærksom-
hed hen mod produkter som ikke er mærket. En mulig kilde til den tilsyneladende for-
skel mellem hvad folk siger, og hvad folk gør, kan derfor ligge i, at de ikke reelt har 
mulighed for at gøre det, de siger. Vores undersøgelse peger på, at fødevarerisici kan 
reduceres ved at forsyne produkterne med mærkater, som gør det muligt for forbru-
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gerne at vælge campylobacterfrie kylllinger. Vi fandt dog ingen velfærdsøkonomisk 
gevinst ved yderligere at informere forbrugerne om campylobacter. Ligeledes fandt 
vi, at mærkning af produkter med høj dyrevelfærd kunne give en velfærdsøkonomisk 
gevinst, og at der ved en samtidig informationskampagne om dyrevelfærd kunne op-
nåes en yderligere velfærdsgevinst1. Vi så, at betalingsviljen varierer mellem forbru-
gertyper. Tilgengæld fandt vi ikke nogen systematisk forskel i betydningen af infor-
mationen mellem forbrugertyper, så en evt. målretning af informationsindsatsen bør 
baseres på andre kilder.  
 
Vores resultater indikerer, at givet de rette omstændigheder er forbrugerne villige til 
at betale for fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd. Det er dog ikke den eneste mulighed 
for at få et marked for disse karakteristika. Offentlige myndigheder kan via skatter på 
varer forbundet med fødevarerisici og/eller subsidier på sikre fødevarer påvirke de 
relative priser, og derved ændre både efterspørgsel og udbud af sikre fødevarer.  
 
Generalisering 
De blandede resultater af effekten af expert information er ikke overraskende. Dette 
skal ses i lyset af, at den generelle litteratur om risikoopfattelse antyder, at der er for-
skel på forbrugernes og eksperternes risikoopfattelse (Sunstein, 2002; Williams & 
Hammit, 2001). Selvfølgelig er det muligt, at den manglende effekt af at give respon-
denterne campylobacter information kan tilskrives selve den information, der blev gi-
vet (vi testede én type campylobacter information, hvor vi beskrev sygdomsforløb og 
risiko og gjorde det klart for respondenten at fødevaresikkerhed kunne opnåes ved 
andre tiltag end campylobacterfrit kød, så som at forbrugeren kunne have en bedre 
køkkenhygiene). Den manglende effekt kunne dog også relateres til det faktum, at fø-
devaresikkerhed er en attribut, med karakter af såvel et privat gode som offenligt go-
de. Den manglende effekt af information om campylobacter kunne indikere at forbru-
gerne har en stærk opfattelse af, hvad der påvirker deres eget helbred (den private del 
af egenskaben), og at denne opfattelse ikke let kan ændres. For dyrevelfærd, som er et 
offentligt gode, fandt vi, at jo mere forbrugerne vidste om forskellene mellem produk-
tionssystemerne, des mere var de villige til at betale for en forbedring af dyrevelfær-
den. Det kan ligeledes henføres til den specifikke information, der blev givet (de pro-
duktionsmæssige forskelle blev nævnt, mens det var lagt over til forbrugeren at relate-
re dem til forskelle i dyrevelfærden). Det er dog også en mulighed at forfølge oven-
stående fortolkning vedrørende offentlig og private egenskaber. Herved kan den store 
                                                 
1 Forudsat at mærknings- og informationsomkostninger er mindre end den fundne mer-
betalingsvilje. 
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effekt af opdrætsinformation relateres til at dyrevelfærd er et rent offentligt gode, 
hvorom forbrugerens præferencer lettere kan påvirkes.  
 
I nærværende undersøgelse værdisatte vi fødevaresikkerhed i relation til at undgå 
campylobacter i en hel fersk kylling. Samtidig gav 42% af respondenterne udtryk for, 
at deres tidligere kendskab til salmonella havde påvirket deres valg. Hayes et al. 
(1995) fandt lignende resultater, hvor folk ikke skelnede mellem forskellige bakteriel-
le risici. Endvidere refererer et sociologisk studie til, at når folk diskuterer zoonoser, 
så er det generelt indenfor en salmonellaramme, mens andre zoonoser som eks. cam-
pylobacter tilsyneladende ikke er noget folk er bevidste om (Lassen et al., 2002). På 
en side gør den manglende skelnen mellem forskellige bakterier det lettere at genera-
lisere resultaterne til at omfatte andre fødevarerisici, på den anden side vanskeliggøres 
hele spørgsmålet om additivitet af forskellige fødevarerisici. Der er en stigende inte-
resse og fokus på forskning vedrørende generalisering og overførsel af værdisæt-
ningsresultater fra et studie til andre områder (på engelsk ’benefit transfer’) (Arrow et 
al. 1993; Desvousges et al. 1992) og jo flere byggesten vi kan sørge for, desto bedre 
vil den overordnede økonomiske vurdering blive. Derfor er case studier nyttige og 
vigtige. En videre forskning i, hvordan resultater kan generaliseres, vil være meget 
værdifuld. 
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English summary 
Background and objectives 
Citizens, public decision-makers as well as experts have shown an increasing interest 
in food safety issues. This interest first emerged in the 1980s, but remains a hot issue. 
This can be seen as part of a general increase in attention towards quality characteris-
tics, but is also caused by the increased number of food-borne zoonotic infections that 
have been registered over the period. In 2004, in Denmark, there were between 
18,000 and 74,000 human cases of campylobacter infection, the most common zoono-
tic infection.  
 
The motivation for the present study is to understand consumer risk perception and 
food choice in relation to food-related health risks – and how choices and preferences 
are influenced by expert information. The focus is on the attributes of food safety and 
animal welfare, represented by campylobacter contents and methods of breeding 
chicken, respectively. Chicken meat is believed to be the main source of campylobac-
ter infection. Food safety is a characteristic that appears in the product itself – it is not 
visible, but can be measured. Animal welfare, on the other hand, is linked to the pro-
duction process only and is not a characteristic of the product itself. For the typical 
consumer, these characteristics are credence attributes. The pricing of such attributes 
is subject to informational problems and the attributes do not have a market price that 
can be used to reflect their values. Therefore, identifying whether there is a willing-
ness to pay for food safety and investigating the effect of information are important 
inputs in defining food safety policy and in finding ways to reduce the food hazards 
through provision of information or market-based instruments (such as labelling of 
safe products, the distortion of prices through taxes or subsidies). More specifically, 
the objectives are to: 
• Estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for animal welfare achieved via outdoor 
production systems, and ensure food safety by avoiding campylobacter risks. 
• Focus, in particular, on how information on expert advice, based on scientific 
risk assessment, influences preferences and risk perception.  
• Identify the possible welfare gains of providing full information to consumers 
by means of public campaigns and labelling. 
• Investigate how risk perception and the effect of information vary across con-
sumer types. 
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Method and data 
A prospective analysis was performed, using choice experiments to measure con-
sumer valuation of animal welfare and campylobacter-free products. Furthermore, by 
providing information as an integrated part of the experiments, the approach allowed 
measurement of the way in which information on expert-based risk assessment influ-
ences choice behaviour. The choice experiment method can be used to elicit con-
sumer preferences and identify variables influencing consumer choice through sur-
veys (Louviere et al, 2000). A questionnaire was designed consisting of a choice ex-
periment part and a part where the respondent was asked to state attitudes towards 
foods, in general, and food safety and animal welfare in particular. A sample of 2,300 
respondents was used (ACNielsen, 2005). The data are analysed using a multinomial 
probit model. 
 
Results  
In short, it was found that campylobacter information did not affect the willingness to 
pay for either food safety or animal welfare and that breeding information had great 
effect on the willingness to pay for animal welfare, but only a slight indirect effect on 
food safety through changes in the price sensitivity. Furthermore, a significant will-
ingness to pay for food safety and animal welfare was revealed, the values of the two 
attributes, were found to be interrelated. The monetary values are presented in Table 
0.2. Next, we present the results more intuitively and in greater detail. The willing-
ness to pay (WTP) estimates are described in three steps,  
 
1) WTP when differences in information are disregarded 
2) The effect of information  
3) The interaction between food safety and animal welfare 
 
When no distinction was made as to whether the choices were made with or without 
information about the attributes (Step 1), an average consumer gains positive utility 
when buying an outdoor-bred chicken or when buying a campylobacter-free chicken. 
In monetary terms, the price premium for an average consumer was estimated to be 
around 25 DKK for an outdoor-bred chicken as well as for avoiding campylobacter.  
 
The information on the respective attributes was then incorporated (Step 2). Breeding 
information was found to be of importance to the consumer – but not campylobacter 
information. Inclusion of information regarding breeding methods almost doubles the 
utility of the animal welfare attribute, in relation to inclusion of information on cam-
pylobacter or not receiving any information at all. In monetary terms, it means that 
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the willingness to pay for animal welfare is not simply 25 DKK – it is 42 DKK when 
breeding information is provided and 20 DKK when information is not provided. In 
other words, when consumers buy outdoor-bred chicken, they are willing to pay up to 
22 DKK for breeding information. Food safety is not directly affected by breeding 
information but an indirect effect is apparent through changes in price sensitivity. 
Providing breeding information reduces consumers’ price sensitivity. This can be in-
terpreted as consumers placing less importance on the price and more emphasis on 
animal welfare when they have more information with regard to the differences in the 
respective breeding systems. The lower price sensitivity causes a slight increase in the 
willingness to pay for food safety when breeding information is provided. The rela-
tive valuations of food safety and animal welfare are thus affected by breeding infor-
mation. Without breeding information, the willingness to pay for food safety and 
animal welfare are very similar. However, after breeding information is provided, the 
value of animal welfare is almost twice as high as food safety.  
 
The best description of consumer behaviour is obtained when the interaction effect of 
the two attributes is included and when a distinction is made between attributes with 
and without breeding information (Step 3). In short, it is found that the willingness to 
pay estimates when no breeding information is provided, are 13 DKK for outdoor-
bred, 16 DKK for campylobacter-free chickens and 43 DKK for both attributes. With 
breeding information, the willingness to pay estimates are 34 DKK for outdoor-bred, 
19 DKK for campylobacter-free chickens and 70 DKK for both attributes. This dem-
onstrates a very clear indication of consumers preferences being non-additive in qual-
ity attributes – this result should be investigated further for other quality attributes as 
well.   
 
An average consumer is not just willing to pay 20 DKK for an outdoor-bred chicken 
(without breeding information). The willingness to pay is 13 DKK when the chicken 
has no campylobacter label and 43 DKK when the chicken is campylobacter-free. 
Similarly, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter (without breeding in-
formation) of 22 DKK is actually an average over 16 DKK when the chicken is raised 
indoors and 43 DKK when the chicken is raised outdoors. The direct sum of the will-
ingness to pay for food safety and animal welfare is 29 DKK, but when food safety 
and animal welfare are offered jointly, the value amounts to 43 DKK. This means that 
there is an extra willingness to pay of 14 DKK per chicken above the willingness to 
pay for the individual attributes. This result is not driven by information because we 
consider the case without breeding information – the result is simply driven by the 
non-linearity of consumers’ preferences for food safety and animal welfare.  
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Similar non-linearity applies when breeding information is provided. An average con-
sumer is not simply willing to pay 42 DKK for an outdoor-bred chicken compared 
with an indoor-bred chicken – the average willingness to pay for outdoor chicken is 
34 DKK when the chicken has no campylobacter label and 70 DKK when the chicken 
is campylobacter-free. Moreover, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter 
is not simply 26 DKK – it is 19 DKK when the chicken is raised indoors and 70 DKK 
when the chicken is raised outdoors.  
 
The monetary values of information change when the joined combinations of animal 
welfare and food safety are included. The value of breeding information when buying 
outdoor-bred chicken is not simply 22 DKK2– the value of information is 21 DKK 
when the chicken’s campylobacter contents are not known and it is 27 DKK when the 
chicken is campylobacter-free.  
 
Table 0.2. Willingness to pay estimates for the different models 
 
 Step 1 
 
WTP for food safety 
and animal welfare 
Step 2 
 
WTP including differ-
ences in breeding 
information 
Step 3 
 
WTP including differences 
in breeding information 
and interaction between 
food safety and animal 
welfare 
Animal welfare 
 20 13 
Animal welfare 
(with breeding information)  
 
 
25 
 
 
42 34 
Food safety 
 22 16 
Food safety 
(with breeding information) 
 
 
 
23 
 
 26 19 
Animal welfare and food 
safety 
 
 43 
Animal welfare and food 
safety 
 (with breeding informa-
tion)  
 
 70 
 
Note: The table shows additional willingness to pay per whole chilled chicken with various attributes com-
pared with a standard chicken (indoor-bred and not labelled campylobacter-free). 
 
                                                 
2 The value of information when buying outdoor bred chicken of 22 DKK is calculated as 22=42–20 
DKK (see Table 0.2). 
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Individual characteristics were found to affect willingness to pay. For example, it was 
found that knowledge of campylobacter (or salmonella) did not result in differences in 
willingness to pay for food safety but consumers with personal experience with cam-
pylobacter had larger willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter. Similarly, peo-
ple who consider their health to be poor showed increased willingness to pay for food 
safety. Consumers with higher education and preferences for organic products did 
show significantly higher willingness to pay for animal welfare than other consumers. 
 
Conclusions and perspectives 
Market implications 
An average willingness to pay of 43 DKK per chicken for avoiding campylobacter in 
an outdoor-bred chicken was found. Does that mean that the value of the Danish 
chicken market could be increased by 43 DKK for each chicken sold by focusing ex-
clusively on outdoor-bred campylobacter-free chickens? Before jumping to any con-
clusions in this regard, a range of elements should be considered. 
 
The results are created in a situation where a campylobacter-free chicken is readily 
available and accessible and the consumer is instructed to focus on food safety, ani-
mal welfare, and price. This contrasts with a real market situation where these condi-
tions are not necessarily present and where there is a myriad of trade-offs to be made. 
Furthermore, the trade-offs are at times not even known, due to lack of information. 
For example, a salmonella-free chicken is not always labelled because it might draw 
too much attention towards the food risks associated with other products that are not 
labelled. Hence, the willingness to pay for food safety and animal welfare has been 
derived under certain specific conditions. 
 
Today, the price premium for a campylobacter-free chicken is only a few DKK per 
kg. A comparison with the willingness to pay results from the analysis indicates a 
great potential for increasing the market for campylobacter-free chickens. Further re-
search into the underlying reasons for such a discrepancy would be very valuable.  
 
The consumers were asked to assess their next choice of chicken (a marginal valua-
tion task) – all future choices of chicken were not assessed. Hence, when consumers 
consider the budgetary effects of paying 43 DKK more for not just the next chicken 
but all chicken they buy, they may wish to reduce their consumption of outdoor-bred 
campylobacter-free chickens and buy other chicken products – or substitute chicken 
with other types of meat. Therefore, the aggregate market implications can be ex-
pected to be lower than the marginal effects.      
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Another market implication of our results is that the non-linearity of attribute values 
indicates that their might be niche production opportunities in producing goods with 
specific bundles of characteristics – such as campylobacter-free chicken with im-
proved living conditions. Additionally, our results indicate that survival of these niche 
productions might depend on information provision.  
 
Finally, consumers do not determine demand – the supermarkets do. We have esti-
mated the demand from consumers. However, in the modern markets, the consumers 
and producers seldom meet. Producers are represented by producer organisations who 
coordinate production. Consumers’ demand depends on what they can buy in the 
shops. Of course, the retailers will try to satisfy consumer demand – but they also 
have their own agenda of maximising profits. Therefore, consumers’ willingness to 
pay have to go through a filter (which is the preferences of the retailers) before they 
reach the producers (organisations). Hence, before we can assess the market implica-
tions of our results, more needs to be known about how consumers’ stated behaviour 
is perceived by retailers/main supermarkets.  
 
Policy implications 
From a policy point of view, a major difference between food safety and animal wel-
fare is that the externality element in food safety affects public health costs whereas 
there are no direct expenditures related to animal welfare. Therefore, economic inter-
est on the part of the public authorities is not as outspoken with respect to animal wel-
fare as with food safety.  
 
The present results indicate that food risks can be reduced by providing labels that al-
low consumers actually to choose campylobacter-free and/or animal welfare chicken. 
No welfare gains in providing information about campylobacter were found but the 
results indicate a substantial additional welfare gain in providing animal welfare in-
formation that supports the labelling3. Willingness to pay varied across consumer 
types, but no systematic differences were found across consumer types in relation to 
how information affects the willingness to pay. Hence, advice for targeting informa-
tion campaigns cannot be provided on the basis of the analysis.  
 
The results indicate that, given the right circumstances, consumers are willing to pay 
for food safety and animal welfare. But this is not the only way to secure provision of 
these attributes. Public authorities can affect the relative prices by issuing taxes on 
                                                 
3 Provided that labelling and information costs are less than the differences in willingness to pay. 
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goods associated with food risks and/or subsidies on safe food products. Thereby, the 
public costs of food risks are internalized and the relative prices make it easier (rela-
tively cheaper) for consumers to choose a low risk product. 
 
Generalisation 
The mixed results on the effects of expert-based information are not surprising in the 
light of the general literature on risk perception that suggests a disparity between con-
sumer risk perception and scientific risk assessment (Sunstein, 2002; Williams & 
Hammit, 2001). Of course, the lack of effect of campylobacter information can be at-
tributed to the specific piece of information that is provided (only one type of campy-
lobacter information was tested where the symptoms and risks of campylobacteriosis 
were described and it was emphasised that food safety can be achieved by means 
other than use of campylobacter-free meat – by good kitchen hygiene). It could, how-
ever, also be related to the fact that food safety is an attribute with private as well as 
public good characteristics. The lack of effect from providing campylobacter informa-
tion could indicate that consumers have strong beliefs about factors that affect their 
own health and that these beliefs are not easily changed. Animal welfare, on the other 
hand, is a pure public good. The more consumers knew about the differences between 
production systems, the more they were willing to pay for improvements. Again, this 
could be due to the specific piece of information that is provided (only differences in 
production systems are described leaving it to the consumers to link these to differ-
ences in animal welfare). However, it could also indicate that consumers do not have 
strong prior beliefs about the public good and that their preferences towards public 
characteristics are more easily affected than their preferences towards private charac-
teristics.  
 
Food safety related to avoiding campylobacter in one whole chilled chicken was val-
ued. At the same time, 42 % of the respondents stated that previous knowledge about 
salmonella affected their choices and similar results are found in Hayes et al. (1995). 
More knowledge about how consumers perceive different food risks is valuable. 
 
There has been an increasing focus on research with regard to how to transfer benefits 
(Arrow et al. 1993; Desvousges et al. 1992) and the more building bricks that can be 
provided, the better overall economic assessment will be. Case studies, therefore, 
provide an important input. Further research in how to generalise results would be 
highly valuable. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background  
The interest in food related issues 
Food consumption has always been a matter of keen interest and concern. Histori-
cally, concern has focused on securing sufficient intake of food in order to avoid mal-
nutrition and starvation. Food risk was associated with the risk of not having enough 
food, as is still the case in many parts of the world. In industrialised countries, how-
ever, the focus on the consumption of food has changed dramatically and is now 
rather a question of how to limit the intake of food in order to avoid obesity4, while at 
the same time securing a safe and nutritious, and of course well-tasting, diet. Food 
safety, today, is a matter of foods being free from a range of attributes and character-
istics, such as microbiological bacteria (e.g. salmonella, campylobacter), natural tox-
ins, chemicals and medical residuals. For some consumers, absence of genetically 
modified organisms, growth hormones and radiation are also important attributes for 
their associations of “food safety” (see Andersen & Christensen, 2004). Some food 
quality attributes are related to the product itself (such as taste, texture, nutrition, con-
venience, food safety, packaging, etc.) and some attributes are related to the produc-
tion process (such as animal welfare, environmental impact, production organisations, 
being free from genetically modified organisms5) (Jensen, 2002).  
 
Danish consumers focus on the price of food products, but at the same time the inter-
est in food safety appears to be on the increase, and one interesting question is if this 
interest forms part of a general increase in attention to quality characteristics? An in-
teresting research question is to what extent the increase in the interest in food safety, 
animal welfare, environmentally friendly production methods, etc. is reflected in 
higher willingness to pay for food products with these attributes?   
 
More specifically, the issue is one of assessing the private and the public preferences, 
and demand for these quality attributes. It is possible to reduce several of the risks 
(and thereby create a supply of these attributes), but an important obstacle is that 
products ensuring attributes such as regard for the environment or which are residue-
free, GMO-free, salmonella and campylobacter-free, etc. are more costly compared 
                                                 
4 And the obesity-related increased risk of illness. 
5 Organic product qualities are related to the production process (organic rules concerning animal 
welfare, exclusion of GMOs, environmentally regard, etc.) as well as to the final product (absence 
of chemicals, medical residuals). 
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with conventional products. Therefore, an essential concern is the extent to which 
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for goods which offer these attributes.  
 
Choice is complex  
Choosing the food products that provide the highest individual welfare is not neces-
sarily an easy task. When consumers choose the food products to put in their shop-
ping basket, they implicitly or explicitly assess some or all attributes of all products – 
the assessment being dependent on the characteristics of the goods. One important at-
tribute is the price of the product, but also risk perception, cultural and socio-
demographic factors, as well as practical matters such as availability, visibility in the 
shop, and time available for shopping, are all important determinants of food choice. 
On one hand, the consumer lacks information about the attributes that are not visible. 
On the other hand, the cognitive burden of digesting the available information con-
cerning qualities, risks, prices, etc., while encompassing the range of available rele-
vant products, can be enormous. Last but not least, the consumer must perform trade-
offs between different desirable attributes – partly due to the budget constraint and 
partly due to the trade-off involved in the choice between different products. One ex-
ample is the choice between different meat products – the consumer can choose be-
tween beef, veal, pork, lamb and chicken, and further between meat of different quali-
ties and with different attributes – as discussed above. If a consumer chooses to buy 
chicken, the choice between products involves a trade-off between food safety, price, 
and animal welfare. The consumer can choose between organic and conventionally 
bred chickens, and between products that are labelled campylobacter- and salmonella-
free or not labelled at all, etc. Organic chickens have outdoor access and more space 
than chickens bred in an indoor production system, so the animal welfare of this pro-
duction system is likely to be better. At the same time, organic chickens have a higher 
prevalence of Campylobacter compared with chickens bred indoors. The choice be-
tween conventionally bred chicken and organic chicken, therefore, involves a trade-
off between food safety, animal welfare and price. Today, researchers as well as the 
relevant authorities have limited knowledge on how consumers understand and act 
upon complex situations with multidimensional risks, incl. making trade-offs between 
various risk types. These issues provide interesting research questions, where the an-
swers can be used to guide the authorities on how best to inform consumers. 
 
This study 
The focus of the present study is how interest for food safety and animal welfare is 
reflected in consumers’ willingness to pay for these attributes when they purchase 
fresh chicken meat. The willingness to pay (WTP) estimates are elicited by the stated 
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preference method, choice experiments (CE), as this method allows for presentation 
of food safety and animal welfare choices in a trade-off, including the trade-off with 
price, i.e. the choices resemble the choices consumers make in their everyday life.   
 
Food safety concerns are exemplified by whether or not the chicken is campylobacter-
free, while animal welfare is represented by breeding method.  Food safety is a char-
acteristic that appears in the product itself – it is not visible but can be measured. 
Animal welfare, on the other hand, is linked to the production process only and is not 
a characteristic of the product itself. None of these attributes are traded as individual 
goods – you can not buy one bag of food safety or a pint of animal welfare – but they 
appear in a variety of animal products.  
 
Food safety and microbiological concern 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the number of food-borne zoonotic infections in-
creased and led to an increased awareness of microbiological food safety. Figure 1 
shows the development in the number of human infections for the most important 
zoonoses in Denmark (Salmonella, Campylobacter and Yersenia). Historically, Sal-
monella has been the most common bacterial zoonosis in Denmark, and therefore the 
most well known. Since 1999, however, this dubious honour goes to Campylobacter 
instead. In 2004, the number of human incidences registered was 3,724, which corre-
sponds to an incidence of 69 registered cases per 100,000 inhabitants, twice as high as 
that for salmonellosis6. The main source of Campylobacter is believed to be chicken. 
The number of cases of campylobacter infection indicates considerable societal costs. 
Identifying whether or not there is a willingness to pay for campylobacter-free prod-
ucts and investigating the effect of information are necessary inputs to finding ways 
in which to reduce the number of campylobacter infections.   
 
Animal welfare 
Animal welfare is one of many food quality attributes. In order to assess policy issues, 
such as potential market failures related to externalities in production and informa-
tional asymmetries, it is useful to distinguish between animal health and animal wel-
fare. Animal health will typically affect the production value of the animal, as healthy 
animals gain more weight, produce more milk, etc. Hence, taking animal health into 
account in production decisions is in the farmers own economic interest. This com-
patibility between public and private preferences for animal health implies that the 
consumer can trust the farmer to produce healthy animals, hence informational 
                                                 
6 Anonymous (2005) p. 10 & 18 Epi-News, no. 9 (2005). 
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asymmetries do not constitute problems. With respect to animal welfare, on the other 
hand, a clear discrepancy exists between consumers and farmers preferences and per-
ceptions of animal welfare. The differences in preferences arise primarily because 
farmers do not necessarily have economic incentives to secure high animal welfare. 
For example, it is a good investment to increase animal welfare to some extent but 
perhaps not to the extent consumers perceive as “good” animal welfare. Therefore, 
animal welfare will only be “produced” by the farmer if he is induced to do so – ei-
ther by regulation or by a premium which the consumer is willing to pay for the at-
tribute. Describing animal welfare is a rather complicated matter because it includes 
objective measures of production-related differences, as well as more qualitative per-
ceptions of how humans evaluate how different production systems influence animal 
welfare. Furthermore, humans can have some ideas on how the preference structure of 
the animals might be. The complexity in assessing human evaluations (including our 
interpretation of animal evaluations) of animal welfare is captured in the paradox that, 
in our part of the world, the phrase “humane treatment” is most often used in relation 
to animals. In this study, the objective characterisations will be concentrated upon. 
 
Economic valuation  
The most common way of exchanging goods and services in modern society is 
through the market. Market prices reveal consumers’ demand. Whenever a good has a 
market price, this can be used directly to determine its value – provided that the mar-
ket satisfies certain efficiency requirements. The efficiency requirements include, 
among other things that no individual firms exercise market power, there is a suffi-
cient number of market participants, there is full information about the products and 
there are no regulatory distortions. In such a setting, the market price equals the mar-
ginal value of the good (cf. Russell & Wilkinson, 1979). Goods that are traded readily 
in the markets include standard versions of products such as milk, butter, and meat 
products, where only price determines the quantity demanded. 
 
Other goods or attributes are not, or are only indirectly, traded in a market (recrea-
tional sites, pollution, animal welfare, food safety, service). Goods that are not, or 
only indirectly, traded in markets are termed non-market goods. A good being indi-
rectly traded means that it is not traded as an individual good but it appears as one of 
many goods in a compound good that is sold in the market. In example, free range 
pigs are often marketed under the slogan that they provide better living conditions for 
the animals and taste better. Hence, the value of animal welfare of this good can only 
be indirectly extracted from the market price by adjusting for taste-effects. Animal 
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welfare is also traded indirectly as one of many characteristics of organically pro-
duced, but organic broilers are also characterised by a variety of other attributes7. 
 
If a market is too small, then non-economic factors such as availability, shelf-placing 
and, simply, knowledge of the existence of the food product can dominate to such an 
extent that it is not possible to provide a reliable estimate for demand. When the mar-
kets are too inefficient8 to provide reliable values by means of market data analyses, 
stated preference methods provide alternative ways of determining the preferences, by 
using the hypothetical willingness to pay for the attributes/non-market goods. Exam-
ples are salmonella- and/or campylobacter-free broilers. These chickens are marketed, 
but the Danish markets for these products are rather small. Stated preference methods 
have been used in environmental economics in recent decades and are also increas-
ingly accepted in the political arena, in for example USA (cf. Hahn, 2000). Also 
within food economics, there are several recent examples of the application of stated 
preference techniques, although application in food safety policy is still to come. 
These techniques are in rapid development and provide ample opportunities for re-
search. Stated preference methods comprise the well known contingent valuation 
method (CVM) and the more recently developed family of choice modelling tech-
niques, which include the method choice experiments (CE). 
 
Risk perception and information  
An important reason why food safety attributes, such as absence of bacteria and pesti-
cides or good conditions for the animal concerned, are not traded is that they are all 
credence attributes, meaning that the value of these attributes cannot be discerned 
even after consumption. The pricing of such attributes is subject to informational 
problems in terms of general uncertainty (none of the parties know the exact values of 
the attributes) as well as asymmetric information (one party – typically the producer, 
has superior information about the true value of the attributes and has the economic 
incentive to use this information for private profit).  
 
The problem concerning lack of full information – apart from the moral aspect that 
somebody might be cheated – is explained as follows. From an economic point of 
                                                 
7 Therefore, the market price for organic broilers can not be used as indicator for the market price of 
animal welfare. Instead, the market price of organic chicken can be used as an upper limit of the 
value of animal welfare 
8 The efficiency requirements include that no individual firms exercise market power, there are suf-
ficiently many market participants, there is full information about the products, no regulatory distor-
tions etc In such a setting, the market price equals the marginal value of good, Russell.& Wilkinson 
(1979). 
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view, there is a potential economic welfare benefit in having an informationally effi-
cient market. In other words, if consumers are willing to pay more for specific attrib-
utes, there may be a societal value associated with providing reliable and independent 
information – that is, giving consumers a choice among different levels of risk at dif-
ferent prices may be economically efficient (cf. Beales et al., 1981). Thus, providing 
extra information, ensuring freedom of choice, represents a potential welfare gain.  
 
In relation to food safety there is an additional argument for public intervention – 
there are externality effects of  consuming food with risk attached that cause extra 
costs to society (in terms of hospital expenses, lost productivity in labour markets, 
etc). To provide effective information, the public sector needs knowledge of consum-
ers’ perception of risk and how this affects actual consumption. Understanding risk 
perception is important for eliciting willingness to pay – for using information as a 
policy tool.  
 
In order to analyse the demand response to expert-based information, different types 
of information (labelling, advertising, information from government, researchers, the 
industry, welfare/environmental groups, education, relative prices) have been charac-
terised. In particular, focus is given to the distinction between labelling and informa-
tion. Mazzocchi and Traill (2005) suggest the following categorisation of policy 
measures to rebalance diets. The policy measures are categorised according to how 
they intervene with market forces. 
 
• Policies which actually change consumer preferences (information cam-
paigns, educational programmes in schools) 
• Policies aimed at a better informed choice without directly affecting the 
preferences (labelling rules, nutritional information on menus) 
• Market policies affecting actual choice without intervening on the prefer-
ences (taxes and subsidies) 
• Supply side policies affecting availability (limiting access to unhealthy food 
through food standards, fortification and supplementation, regulate catering 
in schools) 
 
In our study, the focus is very narrowly on how demand for food safety and animal 
welfare, respectively, is influenced by expert-based information. According to the 
above categorisations, our descriptions of attributes (such as “outdoor-bred”, “indoor-
bred”, “campylobacter-free”) are clearly labels aimed at helping consumers to distin-
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guish between the various chicken products, whereas the information provided in the 
choice experiment aims to change the consumers’ preferences. 
 
Former valuation studies on animal welfare and food safety 
In the vast amount of literature on economic valuation, some studies concerning ani-
mal welfare and food safety have been identified, as well as a few where the value of 
both attributes is estimated.  
 
With respect to animal welfare, Carlsson et al. (2003) found a significant willingness 
to pay for eggs from free-range versus cage- (battery) production (using a CE analy-
sis). Carlsson et al. (2004b) (also a CE analysis) analysed the willingness to pay for 
animal welfare related to the use of mobile abattoirs relative to the transportation of 
farm animals to slaughter houses. They found that willingness to pay a premium for 
mobile abattoirs depended on whether it was being analysed for beef, pigs, or chicken 
products. Burgess et al. (2004) found a willingness to pay for improved welfare for 
chickens, laying hens, dairy cows and pigs. Their results are not significantly depend-
ent on whether double-bounded CVM or paired comparisons were used as elicitation 
methods. Bennett (1996) found a significant willingness to pay for increased animal 
welfare in egg production (using CVM). Furthermore, the main concerns with respect 
to animal welfare in livestock production are (listed in decreasing order): housing and 
confined living conditions, feed and medicine, livestock transport and livestock mar-
kets, and then the slaughtering process. Bennet & Blamey (2003) found that the will-
ingness to support the phasing out the use of battery cages for egg production in the 
European Union exceeds the costs of phasing out the use of battery cages, over a 12-
year period (using CVM).  
 
The willingness to pay for microbiological food safety is analysed in Goldberg & 
Roosen (2005). They found that consumers are willing to pay for reducing the risks of 
salmonella and campylobacter (using CE) with the willingness to pay for reducing 
salmonella risks being a little higher than for reducing campylobacter risks.  
 
Hayes et al. (1995) used experimental auctions for sandwiches to evaluate the will-
ingness to pay for safer food in relation to five different pathogens salmonella, cam-
pylobacter, staphylococcus aureus, trichinella spiralis and clostridium perfringens. 
The respondents were given a test sandwich with unspecified risk of getting ill (a 
“normal” sandwich) and then offered to buy stringently screened sandwiches with a 
risk of 1 in 100 million chance of suffering from the pathogen in question from eating 
the sandwich. Hayes et al. (1995) conclude that in their sample, the consumers under-
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estimate rather than overestimate the risk of food-borne illness. Afterwards, the re-
spondents were given information about the risk of the sandwiches in terms of the 
probability and severity and asked to bid again – this increased the willingness to pay 
estimates slightly.   
 
Choice experiments (CE) used in former studies in other areas 
CE has frequently been used in the evaluation of choices involving consumer goods, 
transportation, tourism, environmental questions and health-related questions and is-
sues (Hensher et al., 1999; Alpizar et al., 2003). Hobbs (2005) estimate willingness to 
pay for food safety, traceability and information about the farm from where the prod-
uct originated from, and found that Canadians are willing to pay a premium of 15-20 
% for food safety. Consumers’ evaluation of food safety in relation to GMOs is inves-
tigated in a number of studies, see Hu et al. (2004), Burton et al. (2004), Carlsson et 
al. (2004a), James & Burton. (2003) and Kontoleon & Yabe (2003). CE studies on 
other topics include Alfnes & Rickertsen (2004) on consumer attitudes toward beef 
tenderness labelling, Boxall et al.  (2003) on valuing aboriginal artefacts, Hensher & 
Reyes (2000) on “trip chaining” as a barrier to the propensity to use public transport, 
the economic valuation of out-of-hours care and screening methods is examined in 
Ryan & Miguel (2003), Scott (2002) and McIntosh (2002). Danish studies using CE 
include Hasler et al. (2005) where groundwater protection versus water purification 
was investigated, Bech et al. (2005) on eliciting women's preferences for a training 
programme in breast self-examination, Bech et al.  (2004) on the examination of stu-
dents’ job expectations for future job possibilities, Gyrd-Hansen & Søgaard (2001) 
analysing public preferences for cancer screening programmes and Boiesen et al. 
(2005) on valuation of the Danish heaths. See, furthermore, Bjørner et al. (2004) for a 
contingent ranking study on biodiversity and health related to changes in the use of 
pesticides by the agricultural sector, Olsen & Lundhede (2005) on valuing forest at-
tributes, Lundhede et al. (2005) on valuing the restoration of a nature area, Olsen et 
al. (2005) on valuing alternative paths for a motorway in the western part of Den-
mark, Ladenburg et al. (2005) on valuing the externalities of off-shore wind farms 
and Fardan et al. (2005) on valuing the effect of restoring Lake Fure in northern Zea-
land.  
 
Other valuation studies of the effects of information 
There exists a large field of qualitative, sociological studies of risk perception, infor-
mation and consumer behaviour. Some of these studies point out important results re-
garding information provision and risk perception, indicating that public authorities 
play a key role in information provision regarding credence goods, as public informa-
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tion is generally trusted (Nayga et al., 2002; Banerjee and Solomon, 2003, Hobbs, 
2005). For issues subject to public concern, the government may have an incentive to 
provide information to consumers by e.g. financing information campaigns, consumer 
education, promoting and certifying labels, etc. Information such as expert advice 
based on scientific risk assessment is central in this regard. Sunstein (2002) and Wil-
liams & Hammitt (2001) suggest a disparity between consumer risk perception and 
scientific risk assessment and point out a need to improve the understanding of how 
consumers create their risk perceptions, the extent to which it is influenced by expert-
based information provision and how risk perception affects actual demand. Uncer-
tainty with respect of food quality and safety hinders consumers’ attempts to match 
food choices with preferences. Furthermore, food quality and safety issues have re-
ceived intensive mass media coverage in recent years. This has led consumers and 
agri-food chain stakeholders to change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. There 
has also been a growing interest, not only in the role and mechanisms of information, 
but also in the evaluation of the various techniques and vehicles for spreading infor-
mation. Much effort has been devoted to evaluating the effects of advertising and me-
dia coverage of food quality and safety issues; investigating the role of trust and 
credibility of information sources; and analysing consumer interest in, and use of, 
available information cues. Verbeke (2005) found that information provision can be 
successful only if it meets the informational needs of the target audience. The provi-
sion of ever more and too detailed information entails the risk of information over-
load, resulting in consumer indifference or loss of confidence. Instead, segmentation 
and targeted information provision are proposed as potential solutions to market fail-
ure from information symmetries.  
 
Much of today’s information about food quality and safety can be classified as risk 
information that aims at reducing consumers’ uncertainty when making purchasing 
decisions. Current failures of risk information to achieve its goals may stem from 
gaps in relation to understanding the relationship between individual perceptions, in-
formation processing and behaviour (Langford et al 1999). Research has shown that 
lay persons tend to assess relative food risks differently from the expert opinion on 
the same risks (Lazo et al., 2000; and Hansen et al., 2003). Providing (Marette et al. 
1999) or withholding (Mazzocchi et al 2004b) food quality or safety information to 
consumers may result in considerable welfare effects.  
 
An increasing number of market-based studies and valuation studies have been per-
formed on how advertising and public information affect consumer behaviour and 
consumers’ preferences, cf. Smed & Denver (2005), Bonnet & Simioni (2001), and 
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Grunert (2005). Only two quantitative studies were found using stated preference 
methods to address the issue of how information affects consumer behaviour. Both 
use price auctions as valuation method. Hayes et al. (2002) analyse how positive and 
negative information, respectively, affect the demand for irradiation of food – they 
found that the effect of negative information dominates over positive information. 
Rozan et al. (2004) analyse how information about food safety affects consumers’ 
willingness to pay for certified food products (checked for heavy metal content) ver-
sus non-certified products (unknown content of heavy metal). They found that new 
information, damaging for non-certified products, induces a decrease in the purchase 
price for non-certified products but not a significant increase in the purchase price for 
certified products.  
1.2. The objectives of the study 
The motivation for the present study is to understand consumer risk perception and 
food choice preferences in relation to food-related health risks – and how these pref-
erences are influenced by expert information. Thereby, it is hoped that the foundation 
for using information provision as a policy tool can be improved. More specifically, 
the objectives are to: 
• Estimate the willingness to pay for animal welfare achieved by means of out-
door production systems, and ensure food safety by avoiding campylobacter 
risks. 
• Focus particularly on how information on expert advice based on scientific risk 
assessment influences preferences and risk perception.  
• Identify the possible welfare gain of providing full information to consumers 
by means of public campaigns and labelling. 
• Identify whether risk perception and the effect of information varies across 
consumer types. 
 
Focus is on eliciting values and trade-offs between two specific attributes: food safety 
(represented by campylobacter contents in fresh chicken) and animal welfare (repre-
sented by breeding methods in chicken production). If information affects consumers’ 
willingness to pay for these credence characteristics, a societal value of information 
has been found.   
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1.3. Method 
A prospective analysis is undertaken, using choice experiments to measure consumer 
valuation of various product attributes, such as animal welfare and campylobacter-
free products. By, furthermore, providing information as an integrated part of the ex-
periments, the approach allows measurement of how information containing expert-
based risk assessment influences choice behaviour. 
 
The choice experiment method can be used to elicit consumer preferences and iden-
tify variables influencing consumer choice behaviour. The values of the relevant at-
tributes are estimated by designing a choice task asking the respondents to choose be-
tween a set of alternatives, where each alternative is characterised by a different price 
and different levels of the attributes (Louviere et al., 2000). Choice experiments have 
become increasingly popular as a valuable tool for elicitation and analysis of prefer-
ences for mainly two reasons (cf. Foster and Mourato, 2002). The first reason is their 
ability to handle multidimensional risks and situations where trade-offs between these 
risks are prevalent. Secondly, respondents are asked to make choices between alterna-
tives, instead of being asked to carry out the much more complex task of assigning a 
value to various attributes or risks, as is the case in traditional economic valuation 
studies.  
1.4. Organisation of the report  
In Chapter 2, the scientific facts are described concerning campylobacter risks and 
animal welfare related to different breeding systems in chicken production. This chap-
ter provides the basis for the expert information used in the questionnaire. Chapter 2 
also contains short descriptions of the costs of human infections of campylobacterio-
sis and of the markets for different chicken products. Chapter 3 provides the theoreti-
cal foundations for our analysis. A short description of the range of available valua-
tion methods is presented, whereas the method selected in this study, the choice ex-
periment method, is described in greater detail. Data are described in Chapter 4. 
Firstly, the specific research problem is formulated and the design of the question-
naire is discussed, such that the information retrieved can be used to analyse and an-
swer our research objectives. Secondly, analysis is made of how representative the 
response sample is of the population, and how the 2,000 respondents are distributed 
according to personal attitudes towards food safety, animal welfare and food choice, 
in general. Hence, Chapter 4 provides valuable background information on the sample 
population. The econometric analyses and results are discussed in Chapter 5. Sections 
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5.2 to 5.4 describe the estimation process in terms of statistical significance of attrib-
utes and their marginal utilities. Those results that are formulated as willingness to 
pay estimates are presented in two parts. Estimates of the willingness to pay and ef-
fect of information for an average consumer are presented in Section 5.5. Estimates of 
how willingness to pay and effect of information vary across socio-demographic vari-
ables and personal attitudinal variables are presented in Section 5.6. Chapter 6 con-
tains a discussion of the results.  
 
The appendices document the analyses. Appendix B contains an overview of the lit-
erature with respect to economic valuation of the willingness to pay for food safety 
and animal welfare, and over the literature concerning how information affects will-
ingness to pay. The literature surveyed is also summarised in Tables B1-B4. Appen-
dix C contains illustrative tables of the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 4. 
Appendices D-G are linked to the econometric estimations carried out in Chapter 5.  
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2.  Food safety and animal welfare 
In the present section, a short description of food safety issues related to campylobac-
teriosis is provided. Furthermore, two types of poultry production (organic and con-
ventional indoor production systems) are described with special emphasis on issues 
that relate to animal welfare. Finally, a short description is made of the market condi-
tions for chicken products in Denmark, with special emphasis on the two issues men-
tioned – food safety and animal welfare.   
2.1. Campylobacter   
Development in Campylobacter9
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the number of food-borne zoonotic infections in-
creased and sharpened awareness of microbiological food safety. Figure 2.1 shows 
the development in the number of human infections caused by the most important 
zoonotic agents in Denmark (Salmonella, Campylobacter and Yersinia).  
 
                                                 
9 Campylobacter, Salmonella, etc. are written in italics since this chagper is based on experts from 
natural science, where this notation is standard.    
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Historically, Salmonella has been the most common bacterial zoonosis in Denmark 
(and therefore most well known) but since 1999, this dubious honour is attributed to 
Campylobacter. In 2004, the number of human cases registered through the labora-
tory notification system was 3,724 of campylobacteriosis, which corresponds to an 
incidence of 69 registered cases per 100,000 inhabitants. This is twice as high as for 
salmonellosis10 11. 
 
The actual number of campylobacteriosis and other zoonoses is generally thought to 
be considerably higher – several sources estimate that the actual numbers are between 
5 and 20 times higher.12. This would imply that, in 2004, there were actually between 
18,000 and 74,000 cases of campylobacteriosis in Denmark. 
                                                 
10 Anonymous (2005) p. 10, 18 and Epi-News, no. 9 (2005) 
11 In 2004, 1,538 cases (28 registered cases per 100,000) of salmonellosis were reported 
12 According to Korsgaard et al (2005), European and American studies have estimated that the ac-
tual numbers of infections are 5 – 20 times higher than the recorded cases. The Danish ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries estimate the actual number of cases to be 10-15 times higher than 
the registered number (www.fvm.dk); in Taenk og test (2001) the estimate is up to 25 times 
higher; and in EFSA (2005) p. 18, a factor 7 to 100 times higher is reported.     
Figure 2.1. The number of human infections caused by the most common zoono-
tic agents, in Denmark ,1980-2004 
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Source: www.dfvf.dk  
Note: Registered number of cases. 
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Symptoms of campylobacteriosis 
Campylobacteriosis is a bacterial disease which can be seen in all age groups in in-
dustrialised countries. The symptoms are described in Box 2.1. Campylobacteriosis is 
a zoonotic infection, i.e. an infection that may be transmitted directly from animals to 
humans. Zoonotic infections such as campylacteriosis may arise following ingestion 
of contaminated foodstuffs or water, or from contact with infected animals. 
 
Box 2.1. Symptoms of campylobacteriosis 
 
Common symptoms: Campylobacter is usually associated with mild to severe infection of the gastrointestinal 
system, resulting in watery and frequently bloody diarrhoea, fever, abdominal pain and cramps, nausea, and 
vomiting.  
Many cases are asymptomatic and usually self-limiting. The infection is clinically indistinguishable from in-
fections caused by other zoonotic agents such as Salmonella and Shigella. However, when groups of pa-
tients are compared, those with campylobacter enteritis experience more severe abdominal pain, which can 
be so sever that they are transferred to hospital with suspected appendicitis (Skirrow, 1998). A definite diag-
nosis can only be made by detecting Campylobacter in clinical specimens (Annex, 2004).  
 
Duration: From 1 to 7 days and in 20% of the cases the illness lasts for more than a week (Annex, 2004).  
 
Incubation period: From 1 – 7 days.  
 
Occasional symptoms: Some patients suffer rigors, high fever, and even delirium; children may have febrile
seizures (Skirrow, 1998). More invasive disease such as systemic infection occurs in less than 1% of the 
patients with C. jejuni infections. Campylobacteriosis has been associated with chronic sequela that include
reactive arthritis, inflammation of the liver and kidney..A rare complication of Campylobacter infection is Guil-
lain-Barré syndrome, an acute flaccid temporal paralysis of the peripheral nervous system that occurs ap-
proximately 2 weeks after the initial illness develops. The immune system is "triggered" to attack the body’s
own nerves, and can lead to paralysis that lasts several weeks and usually requires intensive care. It is es-
timated that approximately one in every 1,000 reported campylobacteriosis cases leads to Guillain-Barré 
syndrome (Annex, 2004). A fatal outcome is rare and is usually confined to elderly or very young or the im-
muno-compromised, suffering from an invasive infection (Annex, 2004). Rare manifestations of C. jejuni in-
fections include meningitis endorcarditis and septic abortion. 
 
Increased risk: Elderly, very young or people with underlying illness or with decreased immunity as, for ex-
ample, people with immoglobulin deficiencies. 
 
An analysis of mortality associated with infections caused by Salmonella, Campylobacter, Yersinia enteroco-
litica and Shigella was carried out by Helms (2004). The study adjusted for pre-existing illness and showed 
that the relative mortality, within one year, was 3.10 times higher in patients compared with a matched sam-
ple of the general Danish population (Helms, 2004). The relative mortality within 30 days of infection was 
high in all four bacterial groups. Furthermore, an excess long-term mortality was seen from six months to 
e year after a Campylobacter infection (Helms, 2005). on
   
 
 
Sources of human infections 
Campylobacter was first associated with human illness in 1972, but had been known 
by veterinarians since the early 1900s as causing spontaneous abortions in cattle and 
sheep (Skirrow, 1998). The genus Campylobacter contains 16 species. Although most 
of the species have been isolated from humans, the most important for public health 
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are the thermophilic Campylobacter, predominantly C. jejuni and C. coli (Neimann, 
2001, On, 2001).  
 
Campylobacter is widespread in nature – the principal reservoirs being the alimentary 
tracts of wild birds and domesticated animals, especially poultry (Skirrow, 1998). As 
a result of the widespread occurrence of Campylobacter spp. in nature and in animals, 
the bacteria can readily contaminate various foodstuffs. Campylobacter spp. may be 
transferred to humans by direct contact with contaminated animals or animal car-
casses or indirectly through ingestion of contaminated food or drinking water. In in-
dustrialised countries, campylobacteriosis is mainly a food-borne disease.  
 
Poultry meat products appear to be a major source of campylobacteriosis through 
cross-contamination to ready-to-eat foods and hand-to-mouth during food prepara-
tion, and to a lesser extent through consumption of undercooked poultry meat (Annex, 
2004). Barbecuing poultry, pork and beef has been shown to be risk behaviour. Other 
sources include meat from pigs and ruminants, raw milk, and drinking water13 
(Neimann et al., 2003). In Denmark, the incidence of Campylobacter in humans has a 
distinct seasonal distribution, with a summer peak in June-September (Annual Report, 
2004), which corresponds to the seasonal distribution of campylobacter in the chicken 
flocks and also with the barbecuing season.   
 
Data on travel history is currently not reliably recorded in the surveillance system; 
therefore, the true incidence of people infected outside Denmark is unknown. It is es-
timated that approximately one third of cases are travel related (Annual Report, 
2004).  
 
The infective dose seems to be low, and infection has been induced by as little as 500 
bacteria (Skirrow 2000). Freezing is known to decrease the number of Campylobacter 
bacteria considerably, but does not eliminate them completely. Campylobacter are 
sensitive to heat and irradiation and will readily be inactivated during cooking. 
 
                                                 
13 The consumption of raw or inadequately heat-treated cow’s milk has caused major outbreaks of 
Campylobacter enteritis both in England and in the US (Skirrow, 1998). 
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Costs of Campylobacteriosis 
Campylobacteriosis represents an important public health problem with a consider-
able socio-economic impact in the EU (EFSA, 2005). The overall social costs of de-
creased life quality caused by illness are very difficult to assess. However, it is possi-
ble to obtain an impression of the magnitude of the costs by considering the public 
health costs, including the costs of health services and the costs of lost productivity14. 
This method of estimating benefits of food safety is called the cost-of-illness method. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the public health costs do not include cost of 
illness in terms of pain and suffering, lost leisure time, the cost of preventive actions, 
resources spent on research, etc. (Buzby et al., 2005). Furthermore, social and psycho-
logical expenses are typically not included in the economic calculations. The clinical 
manifestations directly and instantly affect the quality of life among patients and their 
surroundings, which often will be the closest family. Infected children need to be 
looked after for a shorter or longer period and they might have quarantine from the 
school or day-care until a negative stool sample is available. If a member of the fam-
ily is hospitalised it will cause anxiety, especially if the member is a child or an eld-
erly member of the family. Zoonotic infections can be difficult to treat medically, 
which also can be psychologically demanding for the family and other surroundings. 
 
In 2001, 4,620 cases of campylobacteriosis were registered. Of these, 80% was as-
sumed to be food-borne. Based on assumed registration rates of 5%-20%, there were 
18,000 – 74,000 cases of food borne related Campylobacter infections in 2001. The 
total estimated amount of days lost through illness was 87,000 – 253,000 days. In 
2001, the cost for one hospitalised patient with gastroenteritis was estimated to be 
19,804 DKK, and the costs of an operation were estimated to 75,940 DKK. These 
costs do not include costs arising in connection with GP consultations, laboratories, 
medication or lost working days. Based on this information, Korsgaard et al. (2005) 
estimate the public health costs of hospital expenses and lost productivity due to cam-
pylobacteriosis to between 88 and 235 million DKK. 
 
Another way of measuring costs of illness is to use disease-adjusted life years (DA-
LYs). Although the incidence of sequela is comparatively low in terms of disease 
burden, campylobacteriosis sequela are important measured as DALY’s. A study by 
Havelaar et al. (2000) estimated the Dutch health burden from campylobacteriosis to 
be 1,400 DALYs, of which acute gastroenteritis constituted 440, residual symptoms 
                                                 
14 Lost productivity is often approximated by using the value of lost earnings. 
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of Guillain-Barre´syndrome 340, with the remainder being linked to increased mortal-
ity. 
 
So even though the pathological picture of campylobacteriosis can be light for the in-
dividual, the picture for society as a whole must be considered important. 
 
How to avoid campylobacteriosis  
Campylobacteriosis can be avoided with good kitchen hygiene. The Danish Con-
sumer Council formulated a list of advice in “Think” (2001) and advice is also found 
on www.foedevarestyrelsen.dk  (Danish Veterinary and Food Administration). Good 
kitchen hygiene involves:  
• Bringing the chicken quickly into the fridge in the home (correct storage) 
• Cooking and boiling the chicken until the meat juice is clear – all bacteria die 
at 75 degrees Celsius  
• Keeping raw and cooked food separate 
• Using different chopping boards for different purposes and washing hands and 
knives thoroughly 
• Using paper for wiping up meat juices – never a kitchen cloth or towel that is 
used for other purposes 
• Wash kitchen cloths and towels at a minimum of 60 degrees Celsius 
 
It appears that young people between 20 and 30 are particularly exposed to the infec-
tious disease, and the reason is bad kitchen hygiene. The Danish Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries has launched a campaign to inform young people about the 
importance of good hygiene in the kitchen. The campaign used advertisements in 
youth magazines, radio advertising, banner advertising on the Internet, posters at edu-
cational establishments and in gentlemen’s lavatories at cafés and cinemas. Consum-
ers could also find food hygiene advice on flyers at most convenience stores 
(www.fvst.dk, 2005).  
  
Action plans towards monitoring and control 
In 2003, the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries adopted a strategy 
against Campylobacter, which as a first step focused on Campylobacter in broilers 
(Anonymous, 2004). The strategy was developed in collaboration between the Danish 
Food and Veterinary Administration (DVFA), The Danish Institute for Food and Vet-
erinary Research (DFVF), the Danish Consumer Council and the Danish Poultry Meat 
Association (DPC). It is a voluntary strategy and no regulations concerning Campylo-
bacter have been prepared. The plan includes three steps: 
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• Reducing the prevalence of Campylobacter infected flock entering slaughter-
houses by improving biosecurity and hygiene measures at the farm. In 1998, 
an economic incentive was introduced by the industry rewarding farmers 
supplying campylobacter-free chicken. The bonus was increased in 2003 to 
around 25,000 DKK per campylobacter-free flock.  
• Reducing the number of Campylobacter in broiler meat after slaughter. In 
2003, it was attempted to allocate negative flocks to production of fresh 
chilled products and positive flocks to production of frozen products. Two of 
the main slaughterhouses (Danpo and Rose Poultry) practise logistic slaugh-
tering i.e. campylobacter-positive flocks are sent to one slaughterhouse and 
campylobacter-free flocks are sent to another slaughterhouse. 
• Preventing cross-contamination in domestic kitchens by educating consum-
ers. A campaign directed towards younger people was implemented in 2003. 
 
Effect of the action plan 
 A reduction in campylobacter-free flocks has been detected from 43% in 2002 to 
27% in 200415. Further, a reduction in human infections was seen from 2002 to 2003, 
but it increased again in 2004, so the picture is not clear16. The reduction in human 
cases is likely to be due to the allocation of campylobacter-free chicken to chilled 
products, although the separation is not completely consistent and that the effect of 
this allocation is strengthened by the lower prevalence of positive flocks. 
 
The prevalence of Campylobacter has a distinct seasonal distribution– in July and 
August 2004, more than 50% of the flocks were Campylobacter positive while the 
average over the year was 27%17. Therefore, it is has not been possible in a voluntary 
action plan to freeze 100% of positive flocks. Freezing a chicken product decreases 
the number of Campylobacter bacteria considerably, but does not eliminate them. In 
2004, around 18% of the chilled products in the two major slaughterhouses were 
Campylobacter positive (a little lower prevalence for frozen chicken products).18
 
                                                 
15 Anonymous (2005), Figure 19. 
16 Anonymous (2005), Figure 15. 
17 Anonymous (2005), Figure 17. 
18Anonymous (2005), Figure 18. 
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Campylobacter vs. Salmonella  
As Campylobacter and Salmonella are the two major sources of food borne zoonoses 
in Denmark, it is difficult to describe Campylobacter without comparison with Sal-
monella. Some of the similarities and dissimilarities are gathered in Table 2.1 
 
Table 2.1. Similarities and dissimilarities of Campylobacter  vs. Salmonella 
 
 Campylobacter Salmonella 
Human infection symptoms See Box 2.1 Similar 
Guillain-Barré syndrome is only 
seen in connection with Cambylo-
bacter infections 
Registered number of hu-
man infections in 2004 in 
Denmark 
 69 per 100,000 inhabitants 28 per 100,000 inhabitants 
Main source of infection Broilers Eggs, pork and broilers   
 
Infection dose Small Large 
Robustness Not robust - bacteria die in dry 
surroundings as for instance 
on egg shells 
Robust 
 
Percentage flocks infected 
in 2004 (average over all 
production types). 
27% 1.5% in broilers productions  
0.8% in eggs production19
 
Source of animal infections Primary sources not well 
known. Faecal contamination 
of the environment may be 
spread by insects such as flies, 
by equipment, boots if biosecu-
rity measures are not enforced. 
Same as campylobacter. Further-
more, contamination from parent 
flocks is a main source of infection  
Action plans Voluntary agreement between 
DPC and DFVA 
Legislation implemented and en-
forced by DFVA 
Handling advice to consum-
ers 
Keep risk foods cool, separate 
and cook well 
Keep risk foods cool, separate and 
cook well 
  
 
                                                 
19 Anonymous (2005) p. 13. 
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2.2. Animal Welfare 
The focus of this study is on poultry production. This can be divided into production 
of broilers and table eggs. There are two main types of production systems in broiler 
production20 (organic and indoor productions) whereas there are 4 main production 
types in the table egg production (organic, free-range, barn yard, and battery 21). No 
broilers are produced in batteries but there are other differences between organic and 
conventional indoor breeding systems – some of them are highlighted in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. Broiler production – different systems 
 
 Organic Conventional (indoor breeding) 
Live broilers per m2 indoor 10 broilers or 21 kg live 
weight 
20-23 (or max 44 kg per m2). From 
1. January 2006, it is max. 40 kg 
Outdoor access Yes from 6 weeks of age No 
”Life time” At least 81 days 38-42 days 
Requirement of organic food At least 80% No 
Genetically modified fodder al-
lowed 
No Yes 
Light in barn Daylight Light programme 
Requirement of access to sand 
bathing  
Yes No 
Requirement of perches (”sidde-
pinde”) 
Yes No 
Requirement for use of slow 
growing breed 
Yes No 
Batteries used No No 
Size of outdoor area ?? 0 
Max. flock size 4,800 40,000 or no limit 
 
Source: www.okologi.dk. 
 
 
 
As Table 2.2 shows, significant differences in the production systems are apparent– 
but the consequences for animal welfare are not clear. The breeds used for conven-
tional broiler production can, under favourable conditions, grow to around 2 kg in 40 
days. As a consequence of such rapid growth, more than 20% suffer from leg prob-
                                                 
20 There is a ‘Bornholmer’ chicken, where the chickens are older (and thereby larger)  when slaugh-
tered. A few smaller farm-outlets sell ‘free-range’ chickens where outdoor access is part of the 
brand (Frilandskyllingen). Furthermore, the productions of ‘fritgående kylling’ which has outdoor 
access and more space than the standard barn yard chicken and ‘skrabekylling’ which has more 
space than the barn yard chicken – have been shut down.   
21 In Danish: økologisk, fritgående, skrabekyllinger, bur. 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 45
lems. In contrast, slow growing races, such as the ones used in organic farming, grow 
to only a fourth of that weight in 40 days. In order to prevent too fast a weight gain, 
the authorities introduced “The light programme”. This programme restricts the num-
ber of hours that light may be turned on in the broiler houses. This provides the 
broiler with a number of hours for rest. However, if the resting period is too long the 
animals may suffer from acid burns on their footpads, i.e. lesions/burns of the skin 
underneath the feet, because they stand in the same spot for too long. Approximately 
30% of the birds experience feet-problems. Organic broilers have more space than 
conventionally bred broilers which reduces cannibalism and feather pecking. Also, 
beak trimming is not allowed which would seem to bee a humane restriction. How-
ever, the banning of beak trimming in organic chickens results in higher mortality in 
organic flocks due to increased cannibalism.  
 
Overall, it is generally believed that organic chickens have higher welfare than con-
ventionally-bred chickens, taking into consideration the pros and cons in both produc-
tion systems. Table 2.3 describes some of the pros and cons with respect to animal 
welfare of the two different production systems, and is followed by a more detailed 
description of the differences. 
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Table 2.3. The welfare implications of organic broilers compared to conventional 
broilers 
 
 Pros (advantages) of organic produc-
tion 
Cons (disadvantages) of organic pro-
ductions 
Stocking density  Due to the lower stocking density in 
organic broiler production, compared 
with conventional production, the ani-
mals have more individual space, 
which, in turn, results in lower levels 
of stress. Stressed animals may se-
crete more bacteria than non-stressed 
animals.  
Due to more space for movement, 
cannibalism is less frequent. 
The natural flock size for chickens is 10 
– 14 individuals per flock. So even 
though the stocking density in organic 
poultry is low compared with conven-
tional production, the flock size is un-
naturally large and will influence natural 
behaviour.   
Outdoor access Access to outdoor areas supports the 
physiological and natural behaviour 
pattern of the animals. The birds can 
sand bathe, scrape and have free 
movement, which among other things 
prevents leg problems. 
Higher prevalence of pathogenic 
zoonoses, e.g. Salmonella and Campy-
lobacter. 
Free-range system Free movement supports natural and 
physiological behaviour  
 
Bedding Quality of bedding is of great impor-
tance for the welfare poultry, since the 
animals spend their entire life in con-
tact with bedding. The bedding sup-
ports the instinct for scraping and 
pecking. 
Poor bedding quality is recognised as a 
welfare problem in modern broiler pro-
duction. The quality of bedding affects 
the environmental situation of the birds 
by influencing e.g.: Dust levels, air hu-
midity levels and occurrence of ammo-
nia burns. 
 
Perches Part of natural behaviour for some 
breeds of poultry. 
Good potential for reducing bird den-
sity at floor level and reducing ammo-
nia burns. 
Can cause breast blisters in some 
breeds of poultry.  
A breast blister is a lesion of the skin on 
the breast, varies in size and is full of 
fluid and blood.  
Beak trimming Beak trimming is not allowed. Beak 
trimming is painful for the chicken and 
prevents natural behaviour, such as 
pecking in the earth for food. 
In conventional production systems, 
beak trimming is used to reduce feather 
pecking, pecking and cannibalism. This 
measure for reducing pecking etc. is not 
allowed to use in organic productions.  
 
 
Feed 
Organic feed is produced in consideration of the environment, without use of fertilis-
ers and pesticides. GMO feed is not allowed in the production of organic poultry. 
Whether these feed parameters are pros or cons must be a matter of the consumers’ 
individual principles, since there is no proven impact on the well being of the poultry. 
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Perches 
According to the Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal 
Welfare of the European Union 2000, the chickens rarely use the perches. With 
higher densities the perches are used but, whereas some birds use them frequently, 
others never use them at all. A large individual variation in the use of the perches can 
be related to leg weakness. The use of the perches commences at the age of 6 weeks 
or older (42 days) (Anonymous, 2000). Perches have a good potential for reducing 
bird density at floor level and reducing ammonia burns on the footpads.  
 
In Denmark, organic poultry has access to perches. However, the higher incidence of 
breast blisters in organic poultry, caused by perches, may bring their advantages into 
question. According to a study, carried out by senior-scientist Birte Lindstrøm Niel-
sen, Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the incidence of breast blisters was es-
timated as affecting 7% of organic poultry production. Although the study did show 
that breast blisters might be associated with perches, the study also found that a high 
frequency of breast blisters is more likely related to breed and sex of the poultry. 
Some slow growing breeds are more likely to develop breast blisters than others 
(Nielsen, 2004). This might cause problems in organic production, where slow-
growing breeds are used. 
 
Light programs and leg problems 
Traditionally, broilers have been reared in near continuous light in order to maximise 
food intake and daily weight gain. In 1999, periods of darkness were introduced in the 
poultry houses. Investigations showed that the legs of the poultry would grow 
stronger if the poultry were allowed to rest. Before 2001, prior to the implementation 
of “The light programme”, there were no regulations concerning periods of darkness 
in Danish poultry production.     
 
In 1999, 30% of broilers had leg problems, 5.8% (7.9 millions broilers) were unable 
to walk on their own. In 2005, these figures were reduced to 13% with leg problems, 
of which 0.5% (653,000 broilers) had difficulty standing up. Within 38 – 40 days a 
conventional broiler grows from an initial 40 grammes to a final slaughter weight of 2 
kg. Under more normal conditions (e.g. organic production), this takes approximately 
80 days (Danish Agricultural Advisory Service, 2001). The rapid growth rate has a 
significant impact on the skeleton of the broilers. It is obvious that rapid growth rate, 
which is a result of genetic selection, along with intensive feeding and management 
systems, are the main causes of various skeletal disorders and metabolic diseases. 
These factors all influence the mortality rate within poultry flocks (Anonymous, 
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2000). A clear relationship was found between body weight and mortality, in particu-
lar in relation to mortality caused by the Sudden Death Syndrome (SDS). Slow grow-
ing breeds show lower mortalities as compared to conventional broilers, when reared 
under similar conditions. Various management factors, such as lighting programmes 
and feeding measures can reduce early growth and obviously reduce the level of mor-
tality in conventional broilers (Anonymous, 2000). According to Danish Agriculture 
and The Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences22, however, longer periods of dark-
ness can, in fact, increase the stress level of the broilers. The broilers will become so 
stressed by hunger, from not eating during the dark period, that fighting over the feed 
leads to increased pecking and scratching.  
  
Stocking density 
Stocking density has become a major issue in the debate on broiler welfare. Very high 
density may not only influence the welfare of the birds through physical restriction of 
movement, but also through the quality of bedding in the broiler house. Poor bedding 
quality, high ammonia levels and heat also have an impact on welfare. In order to en-
sure optimal climate within the broiler houses, ventilation must be adjusted according 
to stocking density (Anonymous, 2000).  
 
Bedding and ammonia burns 
In the Danish broiler production, bedding is not renewed during the broiler’s lifetime. 
In general, high stocking density can lead to wet bedding and high ammonia concen-
trations, which in turn can lead to ammonia burns, contact dermatitis and breast blis-
ters. The wet bedding can also lead to parasitic infestation (Anonymous, 2000). Good 
management procedures ensuring dry bedding have been shown to reduce ammonia 
levels and mortality in the flocks. Ammonia burns are very painful for the broilers, as 
it causes open wounds underneath the footpads of the birds. The constant level of 
ammonia will continue to burn the wound, preventing healing and cause secondary 
bacterial infections of the feet.  
 
Ammonia is formed during decomposition of uric acid; has a sharp and pungent 
odour; and can irritate eyes, throat and mucous membranes in both humans and farm 
animals. Although it is lighter than air, it rises slowly through the building, eventually 
to be removed through the ventilation system. Ammonia levels are affected by a 
                                                 
22 www.dansklandbrug.dk, 13.02.2006, www.agrsci.dk, 13.02.2006. 
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number of factors, such as temperature, ventilation rate, humidity, stocking density, 
bedding quality, and feed composition (Anonymous, 2000). 
 
Light programmes and ammonia burns 
The natural sleeping pattern of broilers requires the birds to have a continuous dark 
period of no less than 4 – 6 hours per 24 hours (www.agrsci.dk, 13.02.2006). Leg 
problems can be reduced with 4 hours continuous darkness. However, there is no 
benefit in increasing this period to 8 hours of darkness. On the contrary, both Danish 
and Dutch studies shows have shown that longer periods of darkness will increase the 
risk of ammonia burns and other problems associated with ammonia (www.agrsci.dk, 
13.02.2006). 
2.3. Market conditions 
The consumption of chicken has increased rapidly over recent decades – from around 
6 kg in 1973 to 15 kg per inhabitant in 2002 (Graversen, 2003). The development in 
budget shares for the four main categories of chicken products (chilled, frozen, proc-
essed or whole) over the period 1997-2001 is shown in Figure 2.2. The largest in-
crease is seen for chilled processed chicken meats (GFK 2001). The imports cover an 
increasing share of the Danish consumption – more than 25 % in 2004 (Dansk Slag-
teri Fjerkræ 2005 and Statistics Denmark).  
 
Only a very small part of the market (less than 1%) consists of production with spe-
cial emphasis on animal welfare – the main markets are standardised chicken prod-
ucts. This is in sharp contrast to the egg sector where around 60% are battery eggs 
whereas the remainder are the result of special production systems (Graversen, 2003). 
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Figure 2.2. Budget shares of chicken meat products, in Denmark,1997-2001 
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One of the main chicken slaughterhouses, Lantmännen Danpo23, has introduced the 
following special production features to the market: 
• In 1995, a chicken with more living space and a longer life24. This “welfare 
chicken” never became a success and was redrawn from the market again in 
2001.  
• In 1996, a Salmonella-free chicken.  
• In 2000, a Salmonella- and Campylobacter-free chicken (frozen). 
• In 2003, a Salmonella- and Campylobacter-free chicken (chilled). 
 
Today, all Danpo chickens are Salmonella-free, but only 1%  are also Campylobacter-
free.  
 
An overview of the relationship between the prices of different products is provided 
in Table 2.4 (based on scanner data from COOP over the period 2000-2002). It can be 
seen that the price premium for a campylobacter–free chicken is just over 2 DKK, 
                                                 
23 There are two main chicken slaughter houses in Denmark who cover 98% of the markets: Rose 
Poultry and Rose Poultry and Lantmännen Danpo. 
24 In Danish, “skrabekyllingen”. 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 51
which is not very much. The price premium for an organic chicken on the other hand 
is considerable.   
 
Table 2.4. Average demand for chicken 
 
 Price per kg (DKK) Share of poultry budget 
Whole frozen 21.96 11.5 
Cut frozen 29.52 33.5 
Whole chilled 32.11 12.6 
Cut chilled 66.66 36.4 
Campylobacter-free (whole frozen) 25.25 4.3 
Organic 56.64 0.8 
Barn yard (withdrawn from market 
in 2001) 37.90 0.9 
Total  100 
 
Source: Jensen et al. (2004), Table 4.13 based on scanner purchase data from COOP in the period 2000-
2002. COOP includes OBS, Kvickly, SuperBrugsen, DagliBrugsen, LokalBrugsen and Irma. The price rela-
tions between (see also Baltzer, 2004, for a market analysis on chicken products based on COOP scanner 
data). 
 
 
 
Based on these market observations, it can be concluded that the markets for food 
safety and animal welfare exist. However, the markets are probably too small to se-
cure a pricing mechanism that ensures that the market prices reflect the actual con-
sumers’ willingness to pay. Hence, a stated preference analysis will support the in-
formation provided by the market analysis. 
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3. Economic valuation of non-market goods 
3.1. Introduction 
The central purpose of the theory of consumer choice is to explain the allocation of 
the consumer’s income (or wealth) among the myriad of commodities which may be 
purchased in an advanced economy. The classical consumer theory of the nineteenth 
century was built on the assumption that each consumer associates, with any given 
consumption bundle, the corresponding degree of satisfaction, or utility, which results 
from the consumption of that bundle. The problem of consumer choice may then be 
interpreted as the maximisation of the consumers’ utilities, subject to the constraint 
that the consumers do not spend more income than they possess (Russell & Wilkin-
son, 1979, p.26).   
 
This problem is often written in mathematical terms, where utility is a real valued 
function U of a bundle of consumption goods X=(x1, …, xN) that is maximised subject 
to a budget constraint (price vector P of the goods X and Y is income). This can be 
written as: 
 
Max U(X) 
 
Subject to PX ≤ Y 
 
Hence, the consumer’s problem is to find the optimal consumption bundle X*. Differ-
ent prices, will lead to different optimal consumption bundles. In particular, the func-
tion that describes the optimal consumption bundles as a function of prices X*(P) is 
called a demand function. Typically, the demand for a good x* is a decreasing func-
tion of its own price. When the market for a good has settled in equilibrium, where 
supply equals demand, then the marginal willingness to pay for a good equates to its 
market price. However, when a good is not traded in the market, other methods for 
eliciting consumers’ preferences are required. This chapter focuses on valuation of 
non-marketed goods.  
 
Economists have developed a whole array of techniques to estimate economic values 
of goods that are not, or are only indirectly, sold on markets. The techniques can 
roughly be divided into revealed preference methods (see Section 3.2) and stated 
preference methods (see Section 3.3). The focus here is on stated preference methods 
and, in particular, choice experiments, i.e. the method that has been chosen for valu-
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ing animal welfare and food safety in the present study. In Section 3.4, the theoretical 
foundation for estimating consumer behaviour and eliciting willingness to pay esti-
mates using choice experiments is described. Section 3.5 contains a detailed descrip-
tion of the choice experiments method. Discussions of choice experiments can 
roughly be divided into topics related to the design of the experiment and to the data 
analysis. Attention has been focused on describing the design phase, which is con-
cerned with producing reliable data. The most important issues are discussed, starting 
with the choice of attributes, followed by a discussion of the experimental design 
which covers the phase from attributes to alternatives. Finally, the phase from alterna-
tives to choice sets is discussed. The data analysis, which aims at extracting as much 
information and as reliable estimates as possible from the data25, is discussed in Chap-
ter 5 and in Appendix G. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the different economic 
valuation methods that are touched upon in this chapter. 
 
Figure 3.1. Overview of economic valuation methods 
 
 
Source: Inspired by Garrod & Willis (1999). 
 
                                                 
25This involves choice of econometric model and estimation procedure.  
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3.2. Revealed preference methods 
Revealed preference methods are based on market data. As consideration is given to 
characteristics that are not, or only indirectly, traded, these data will provide indirect 
information about the characteristics in question. The methods reveal how much con-
sumers indirectly value the non-market good. The travel cost method is one of these 
methods, using the expenses for the complementary good “travel” to estimate a de-
mand curve for the good in question (e.g. a recreational site). The maximum costs that 
individuals are willing to spend on obtaining a certain good are used to estimate a trip 
generating function, from which the value of the good is derived. The hedonic price 
method is based on the consumer theory of Lancaster, which states that any good can 
be described in terms of its attributes and the levels that these take (Lancaster, 1966). 
Typically, in hedonic pricing, the compound good used is houses and the good to be 
valued is an environmental issue. For discussion of the methods, see for example Gar-
rod & Willis (1999) and Bateman et al. (2002).  
 
Experimental auctions are a valuation method whereby a group of people is given an 
endowment of money or goods. Subsequently, an experiment is performed where a 
real auction takes place. In a typical experimental auction setup, the participants bid 
to obtain a good. The basic idea is that the highest bidder wins the auction and pays a 
price that is determined exclusively from the bids (Kimenju et al., 2005). Experimen-
tal auctions can be designed in different ways using more refined bidding mechanisms 
such as sealed bids, second highest sealed bids, etc. For use and discussion of the 
method, see Hayes et al. (2002), Hayes et al. (1995), Rozan et al. (2004) or Kimenju 
et al. (2005). Auctions differ from other methods (both revealed and stated) in the 
way that the consumer actively participates in the price setting. In Figure 3.1, an ex-
perimental auction is categorised as a revealed valuation method according to Garrod 
& Willis (1999). The present authors argue that it could just as well have been catego-
rised as a stated valuation method, because although the transactions are real – they 
are performed in a controlled setting where the researcher must expect the consumers 
to have a different focus than in a normal shopping situation. 
  
The Averting Behaviour approach places a monetary value on an externality by ob-
serving the costs people are willing to incur in order to avoid any negative effects 
(Garrod & Willis 1999). With respect to food safety, an averting behaviour could be 
the costs in terms of extra kitchen hygiene and the care that a consumer would have to 
exercise in order to avoid infections from an infected product. It could also be the ex-
tra costs of buying a product free from harmful bacteria. 
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Pros and cons of revealed preferences 
Revealed preference methods have the obvious advantage over stated preference 
methods of being based on actual choices and observations in the market. However, 
as a drawback, revealed preference methods are only suited for estimating the use 
value of goods. The non-use values such as existence, bequest and option values can 
not be valued through the markets for related goods26, except for experimental auc-
tions where the good can be characterised by both use- and non-use values. Another 
limitation of revealed preference methods is that they are only suited for valuing ex-
isting attributes. When no related goods exist in the market or when the markets do 
not fulfil the above-mentioned requirements, stated preference methods provide alter-
native ways of determining the demand for the attributes/non-market goods. 
3.3. Stated preference methods 
Stated preference methods can be used to estimate the demand for non-market goods 
by examining consumers’ stated (expressed) preferences. These can be expressed us-
ing surveys by post, phone, personal interview, electronic mail/internet, etc. A com-
mon feature and advantage of stated preference methods, is that respondents can be 
presented with a hypothetical scenario, which is designed to the exact purpose of the 
analysis (cf. Kuhfeld 2004 etc.). Thereby, a direct measure can be obtained of the 
value that consumers place on a particular attribute/product. The stated preference 
methods include the contingent valuation method (CVM) and the discrete choice 
modelling (DCM) method (Garrod & Willis 1999; Bateman et al. 2002; Alpizar et al.  
2003). These methods are described in the text below, with special emphasis on de-
scribing the characteristics of a special case of discrete choice modelling, namely 
choice experiments (CE).  
 
Contingent Valuation (CVM) 
In CVM, a good is described in a scenario and the respondents are asked to state their 
willingness to pay for the good. There are several ways to set up the contingent valua-
tion format according to the recommendation (see, for example, Arrow et al. 1993). 
By means of open-ended formats, respondents are asked to state their maximum will-
ingness to pay, in contrast to the closed-ended formats, where the respondents are 
presented with prices which they have to accept or reject. Several other closed-ended 
elicitation formats have been developed, and among these the payment card method 
                                                 
26 Non-use values of environmental goods are often related to some element of irreversibility in the 
availability of the good (if a species is extinct then it is not possible to value it in the future). 
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has become rather popular (Ready et al. 2001), where the respondents are presented 
with a card with a range of prices and asked to choose the price they are willing to 
pay.  
 
At present, the most preferred method among researchers using CVM is the closed-
ended dichotomous choice approach in which respondents decide whether or not they 
would purchase a good at some offered price (Burton et al.2004). By varying the price 
of the good across sub-samples of respondents, a demand curve for the commodity is 
estimated. In order to extract additional information from the respondents, a double-
bounded dichotomous choice model is sometimes used. This setup basically consists 
of two dichotomous choice sets where the second choice set depends on the respon-
dent’s answer to the first. If the respondent is willing/not willing to pay the suggested 
amount, the second payment choice includes a higher/lower price. This second bid 
can also be presented in an open-ended format. For further discussion of the different 
questionnaire techniques, see Smith (1997).  
 
An open-ended CVM analysis provides the researcher with a point estimate of the 
maximum willingness to pay (and thereby the demand) for a good for each respon-
dent. CVM with closed-ended questions provides a range of price estimates which 
can be transformed into willingness to pay estimates.  
 
In CVM, preferences for a good are valued, or the preferences for specific attributes 
of a good instead of the compound good, by posing additional questions concerning 
how the consumer values individual attributes of the compound good. However, the 
preferences for the attribute and the compound good are not stated simultaneously and 
such a procedure increases the risk of obtaining higher values for the attributes than 
for the entire good itself, which is known as an embedding effect. Embedding is a po-
tential problem for all stated preference methods (Garrod & Willis 1999; Bennett & 
Blaney 2003). Valuing different attributes and/or different levels of the attributes re-
quires a new (similar) CVM study to be undertaken. Hence, it is expensive to estimate 
the value of different product attributes using CVM. Therefore, CVM is not suited to 
valuation of individual attributes or to estimate trade-offs between them.  
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Discrete Choice Modelling (DCM) 
Discrete choice modelling is a common term for choice experiments (CE), contingent 
ranking, contingent rating and paired comparison models27. Any closed ended ques-
tion format is, in principle, a discrete choice problem. The dichotomous choice ver-
sion of CVM is the simplest form of the discrete choice models (Smith 1997). How-
ever, there are two fundamental differences between CVM and discrete choice model-
ling. The first being, that choice modelling is based on the consumer theory of Lan-
caster (1966) as the hedonic pricing method. This means that a good is explicitly de-
fined by its attributes and each combination of attribute levels describes a different 
good. Secondly, discrete choice modelling is based on a systematic choice design that 
involves a systematic changing of attribute levels. Thereby, it is possible to estimate 
the value of the different attributes associated with a particular good (Bennett & 
Adamovicz 2001; Carlsson et al.  2003).  
 
The most popular discrete choice model is CE, in which the respondents are simply 
asked to choose between alternatives in sets of choices. In contingent ranking, the re-
spondents are asked to rank each alternative within each choice set. Ranking is a more 
complex task for the respondent – but also a task that reveals more information about 
the alternatives than CE. For a discussion of contingent ranking experiments, see Fos-
ter & Mourato (2002). In contingent rating, the respondent is asked to rate all alterna-
tives which might involve two alternatives having the same rating (Boyle et al., 2001 
and Bateman et al,. 2002). Paired comparison is a discrete choice version where the 
respondent is not only asked to choose the most favourable alternative but also by 
how much it is preferred in example on a scale like weakly preferred, strongly pre-
ferred, etc. (Bateman et al., 2002).  
 
Pros and cons of different choice modelling methods 
CE has been chosen for the present survey for a number of reasons: 
1) The ability to handle multidimensional risks and situations where trade-offs 
between these risks are prevalent.  
2) Respondents are asked to make choices between alternatives instead of being 
asked to do the much more complex task of assigning a value to various at-
tributes, or risks, as was the case in the original contingent valuation studies 
(James & Burton, 2003).  
                                                 
27 These models are also called attribute-based methods (Holmes & Adamovicz, 2003). Also the 
term conjoint analysis is sometimes used because it is required that respondents consider multiple 
attributes jointly.   
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3) CE is very suitable for our purposes because the focus in the study is on at-
tributes rather than compound products. By using CE, values for each attrib-
ute, as well as marginal rates of substitution between non-monetary attrib-
utes, can be obtained.  
4) Attributes can be presented in any specific context depending on the purpose 
of the experiment. For example, attributes can be linked to a private good as 
well as to a change in policy. By forcing the respondents to focus on specific 
attributes (i.e. by keeping all other attributes unchanged across alternatives), 
it is possible to analyse attributes which individuals normally do not focus 
on, but which are important in a political or social welfare perspective (James 
& Burton, 2003; Alpizar et al.,  2003).  
 
Furthermore, there are some general advantages of choice experiments, compared 
with other discrete choice methods, and discrete choice methods, compared with con-
tingent valuation methods, that strengthened our choice.  
 
For example, CVM is found to suffer from embedding effects in the sense that re-
spondents’ willingness to pay found in different CVM studies cannot be added in or-
der to determine the value of an aggregated good (e.g. The value of protect-
ing/restoring 10 lakes is not the added value of protecting/restoring 10 separate lakes) 
(Carson et al., 2001). Discrete choice methods reduce the problem of embedding 
when valuing attributes of a good, because the method and how the different attrib-
utes are linked is less transparent (Carlsson et al., 2004b; Ryan & Wordsworth, 2000).   
 
Another advantage of DCM compared with CVM is the systematic design, which im-
plies that DCM produces more information than, for example, CVM in relation to 
identifying values for individual attributes and cross effects between attributes.  
Within DCM, the choice task in CE is found to be less difficult than the tasks of rank-
ing rating and comparing.   
 
According to economic theory, CE is the only discrete choice method that can pro-
duce willingness to pay estimates that are consistent with the usual measures of wel-
fare changes such as compensating and equivalent surplus/variation. Basically, it only 
requires that an opt-out option is included in the CE. Also within the contingent rank-
ing method, it is possible to include a status quo option in order to interpret the results 
in standard welfare economic terms. However, if a respondent chooses the status quo 
as first choice in the ranking exercise, then the ranking of the remaining alternatives 
reflects a conditional demand. One solution is just to discard the subsequent ranking, 
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once the status quo option has been chosen, although much information is then lost 
(Bateman et al. 2002; Hanley et al.  2001). In the contingent rating method, two alter-
natives might obtain the same rating, but because the rating method does not involve 
a direct comparison between the two alternatives, there is no relation between the ex-
pressed ratings and the economic choices. Ratings and paired comparisons data are 
more difficult to translate into welfare economic terms. Strong assumptions about the 
cardinality of the rating scale have to be made to use a transformation function (Han-
ley et al. 2001, Bateman et al.  2002).  
 
There are also disadvantages in using DCM. Burton et al. (2004) conclude that there 
is a limit to how much information respondents can meaningfully handle while mak-
ing a choice. Also, learning - or fatigue effects can occurs leading to seemingly irra-
tional choices, as the choice depends not only on the choice set but on when in the 
choice experiment the particular choice set is presented. This is a potential problem 
for all stated preference methods, but especially for discrete choice methods, because 
there are always multiple choice sets and they are often presented to the respondent in 
a more complicated way than in a CVM question. 
 
Identification of relevant attributes and levels is another challenge in discrete choice 
models. Not just one realistic level must be identified, as in the CVM, but several lev-
els have to be found in order to estimate the value of the attributes in question. If the 
most relevant attributes for defining a particular good are not identified, this could re-
sult in biased estimates, due to for example an embedding effect (Bennett & Ada-
mowicz, 2001).The problem can be reduced by use of pre-questionnaire analysis and 
focus groups, see for example Powe et al. (2005).  
 
Carlsson et al. (2004c) argue that also individuals who do not consume these goods 
might have preferences towards or against the good. The preferences of this group of 
individuals cannot be included in a survey. Therefore, this may result in an underes-
timation of the benefits (Carlsson et al., 2004c). This is a general critique of the stated 
preference methods when valuing market goods and should be kept in mind when  
drawing conclusions based on economic valuation data. Bennett (1995) also discusses 
the issue of how to include the demand of non-users in the valuation of non-market 
goods in relation to animal welfare.  
 
The choice experiment method is described in greater detail in the following section 
and a general discussion of the choice experiment method is found in, for example, 
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Bateman et al. (2002), Louivere (2001), Louviere et al. (2000), Lancsar & Savage 
(2003), Hanley et al. (2001), Caussade et al. (2005), and Alpizar et al. (2003). 
3.4. The theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation for using choice experiments for economic valuation is 
based on Lancaster’s consumer theory and random utility theory. A short presentation 
of the two theories is given below. 
3.4.1. Lancaster’s consumer theory 
Lancaster’s Consumption Theory (LCT) also provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding consumers’ choice of goods. The main difference from the conven-
tional theory is that LCT assumes that a good is a bundle of attributes or characteris-
tics and, therefore, the consumer demands attributes. In traditional theory, on the 
other hand, the consumer is assumed to demand goods per se (Lancaster, 1966). 
 
In LCT, consumer preferences are defined in relation to bundles of characteristics and 
the demand for goods is a derived demand. Consumption is the activity of extracting 
characteristics from goods (Gravelle & Rees, 1992). According to Lancaster, the util-
ity that individual i achieves from good j (Vij) is the sum of the utilities obtained from 
each of the K characteristics sijk for k=1,...K. Assuming linearity, the indirect utility of 
alternative j for individual i is: 
 
KijKjijjijij sssV βββ +++= ..........2211 (3.1) 
 
where skij is the level of attribute k in alternative j faced by individual i, and K is the 
number of attributes. Each attribute sk for k=1,..,K, can take on Lk possible values cor-
responding to the predetermined attribute levels. 
 
The parameter βkj represents the weight by which attribute k in alternative j is valued 
(Holmes and Adamovicz (2003) denote βkj a preference parameter associated with 
attribute k in alternative j). For simplicity, it is assumed that the weight βk is inde-
pendent of alternative j.  
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3.4.2. Random utility theory 
Random utility theory (RUT) derives from Luce (1959) and McFadden (1973). The 
hypothesis of random utility theory is that individuals make choices according to a 
deterministic part that depends on the attributes of the alternative along with some 
degree of randomness (a random component). Allowing Uij to represent the utility 
function, Vij is the deterministic component and εij is the stochastic component (noise) 
of the individual’s choice, i refers to individuals and j to alternatives (Hanley et al., 
2002). Then individual i’s utility of alternative j can be written as:  
 
ijijij VU ε+=       (3.2) 
    
The RUT formulation of utility in Equation (3.2) also corresponds with the notion that 
the researcher only has partial knowledge of the real structure of individuals’ prefer-
ences. Using this formulation, Uij represents the true but unobserved indirect utility 
function, Vij is the observed component, and εij is the unobserved component of the 
individual’s choice. The latter is assumed to behave stochastically, because it repre-
sents the researcher’s uncertainty about the choice (Holmes and Adamovicz, 2003, p. 
188). 
 
For convenience, it is assumed that the observed part of the individual’s utility func-
tion is additively separable and linear in attributes. Assuming further that alternative j 
is described by K attributes, the observed component can be inserted in LCT in the 
equation (3.1), and the utility of individual i of alternative j can be written as: 
 
ijKijKijijij sssU εβββ +++= ..........2211 (3.3) 
 
or using vector notation, the utility can be written as  
 
 
  (3.4) 
ijijij sU εβ += '  
 
where β’ is a K dimensional vector of attribute preference parameters. 
  
Interactions between attributes 
If interactions between attributes are included in the experimental design, the utility 
function can be specified as (Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003, p 189): 
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Individual specific variables 
Lancaster’s theory is based on the assumption that a good is completely characterised 
by its characteristics. However, the utility that an individual retrieves from a good de-
pends not only on its attributes but also on socio-demographic characteristics as well 
as the personality of the individual, social norms, etc. Hence, a model that describes 
consumer behaviour should also include variables that are not related to attributes, but 
to individuals (socio-demographic or attitudinal variables).  
 
Let us now assume that the utility of alternative j is a linear function of not only K at-
tributes related to alternative j (sjk) but also M individual characteristics (yim),  sij = 
(sj1, …, siK; yi1,.., yiM). Hence, the random utility function can be written as:  
 
(3.6)    
ij
M
m
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jkjkij ysU εδβ ++= ∑∑
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where βj is the preference parameter for attributes and δm is the preference parameter 
for individual characteristics. Of course, the interaction model (3.5) and the model 
which includes individual specific variables (3.6) can be combined. 
3.4.3. Willingness to pay 
An important issue in economic analysis of consumer choice behaviour is to obtain 
estimates of the willingness to pay estimates for certain attributes. If the random util-
ity function is assumed to be additively separable and linear in attributes, then the es-
timated preference parameter for attribute k (βk) represents the marginal utility of at-
tribute k. Furthermore, marginal rates of substitution between any two attributes m 
and k can be computed as the ratio of the parameter estimates MRSkm= βk/ βm. The 
parameter estimate of the price attribute βp has a special status since MRSkp is the 
marginal value of attribute k per DKK. This ratio between the β coefficients is known 
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as the implicit price (Hanley et al. 2002) - also denoted as the willingness to pay. This 
can easily be shown when the unobserved utility is formulated as:   
 
ijKjiKpijpkijkijij ssssU εββββ +++++++= ......................11 (3.7) 
.
 
Then, the marginal utility of attribute k is calculated as: 
    
 (3.8) kkijij sU β=∂∂ /
 
 
And the implicit value or willingness to pay is calculated as:  
 (3.9)             
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If interaction effects are present between attributes k and m, then the marginal utility 
of attribute k depends on the level of attribute m, for example: 
   
 (3.10) mijkmkkijij ssU ββ +=∂∂ /
 
3.4.4. From choice experiments to probabilistic utility 
Due to the stochastic component in the utility function, a choice cannot be predicted 
with certainty, but only as a probability, hence the utility function is probabilistic 
(Garrod & Willis 1999). An important step in the analysis of the choice experiment is, 
therefore, the relation between the utility individual i obtains of a given choice n (Uin) 
and the probability that this choice is made (Pin). The RUT provides a theoretical 
foundation for linking the choice experiment data with consumer behaviour based on 
utility maximising behaviour. 
 
The probability that individual i prefers alternative n to any alternative j in the choice 
set, can be expressed as the probability that the utility associated with alternative n 
exceeds the utilities associated with all other alternatives s (McFadden, 1973):  
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 ( )[ ]njUUPP ijinin ≠∀>=  
                               ( ) ( )[ ]njVVP ijijinin ≠∀+>+= εε       
    ( )∫ ≠∀+>+= nnijijinin dfnjVVI εεεε )(  (3.11) 
 
There are many ways of stating the choice probabilities. Equation 3.11 links the ob-
served characteristics of the chosen alternative (Vin) and the not-chosen alternatives 
(Vij) to the probability that alternative n is chosen. The last equation shows that the 
probability of individual i choosing alternative n can be written in terms of integrating 
over an indicator function which is 1 if the statement in the brackets is true and 0 oth-
erwise, and a density of the error term f(εn). The exact appearance of the above equa-
tion depends on the distribution of the random component/error term f(εn) (Train, 
1986; McFadden, 1973). A short description of the typical distributions used in dis-
crete choice modelling is provided in Appendix G. 
3.5. Description of the choice experiment method 
3.5.1. Terminology 
In the present chapter, the CE method is described in greater detail, as it represents 
the method used in this study. The basic terms involved in CE include choice sets, al-
ternatives, attributes and attribute levels. An example of a choice set is provided in 
Figure 3.1. There are three alternatives: chicken 1, chicken 2, and neither of these (i.e. 
an opt-out alternative). The two real alternatives are characterised by three attributes: 
breeding method, campylobacter content, and price. These attributes can have differ-
ent values (attribute levels) as, for example, a chicken can be bred outdoors or in-
doors, and can be labelled campylobacter–free or have no information concerning 
campylobacter content.   
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Figure 3.2. An example of a choice set 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   Chicken 1                Chicken 2            None of these 
Breeding method                        Outdoor in a field     Indoor in a barn  
Labelled campylobacter-free       Not labelled              Labelled  
Price                                            64 DKK                    55 DKK  
I prefer (choose only one) 
Attribute Alternative Attribute levels 
 
 
The design phase covers the process from formulating (“designing”) alternatives and 
combining them to form choice sets. The design of choice sets involves trade-offs be-
tween statistical efficiency of experimental design, information extraction and consid-
erations concerning respondents’ cognitive abilities. The literature contains several 
design guidelines concerning the number of choice sets in a survey, number of alter-
natives in a choice set, number of attributes in each alternative and number of attrib-
ute levels. Guidelines also exist on how to describe the attributes and attribute levels, 
and how to group alternatives into choice sets and choice sets into blocks. Also, 
choosing whether and how to include cheap talk and opt-out options, etc. are issues of 
importance for obtaining reliable data. Design characteristics of other studies are pre-
sented in tables in Appendix B1-B3.  
3.5.2. Attributes 
The attribute levels should be realistic and vary over intervals which respondents are 
expected to have preferences towards. This reduces the risk of biased estimates due to 
protest answers (Ryan & Wordsworth 2000; Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001). On one 
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hand, the larger the number of attributes and attribute levels, the more information 
can be extracted from the survey. On the other hand, the cognitive burden for respon-
dents increases with the number of attributes and their levels. It is shown that reduc-
ing the complexity may increase the response rate (Bateman et al., 2002). Further-
more, the minimum sample size required to achieve statistically significant estimates 
increases exponentially with the number of attributes and attribute levels (Bateman et 
al. 2002). Often, the number of attributes is restricted to a relatively small number 
such as 4, 5 or 6 (Garrod & Willis, 1999; Bateman et al., 2002).  
 
To identify the relevant attributes used to describe a product, focus group interviews 
are very useful and can be conducted face to face or by telephone (Krueger, 1988). 
Former studies can also be used in this process.   
 
If the purpose of the survey is to elicit willingness to pay estimates, it is vital that a 
price attribute is included and, in particular, that the upper limit of willingness to pay 
is included in the range of price levels. If the upper level is not included in the design 
(that is, the respondents choke price is not reached) then the price coefficient obtained 
will be too small (Bateman et al. 2002; Rowe et al. 1996). Bennett & Adamowicz 
(2001) and Bateman et al. (2002) recommend the use of a pre-test to determine price 
levels. Rowe et al. (1996) recommend that the maximum level of the price attribute is 
determined by use of a payment card. 
3.5.3. Experimental design (from attributes to alternatives) 
The design of experiments is concerned with how attributes and attribute levels are 
combined into alternatives. The larger the number of attributes and the larger the 
number of levels per attribute, the larger the experimental design will be. Experimen-
tal designs provide the means to select subsets of the total set of possible alternatives 
in an experiment (questionnaire) in a strategically efficient manner. Basically, there 
are two types of experimental design that combine attributes to alternatives: full facto-
rial design and fractional factorial design (Bateman et al. 2002). The underlying de-
sign for combining the attribute levels can be found with help from different software 
packages, for instance SAS. 
 
Full factorial design 
A full factorial design combines every level of each attribute with every level of all 
other attributes (in Cochrane and Cox, 1957 according to Holding & Adamowicz, 
2003, p. 179). In our example, a good is described with 3 attributes with respectively 
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2, 2 and 8 levels. A full factorial design gives 2*2*8 = 32 possible combinations of 
alternatives. 
 
A full factorial design has many virtues. It is orthogonal, meaning that each of the 
variables has zero correlation with any one of the other variables. This implies that 
the influence of any of the attributes on the respondents’ choices can be identified and 
measured and that all estimates are unbiased and statistically efficient. In a full facto-
rial design, all main effects, and higher-order interactions, are estimable and uncorre-
lated (Kuhfeld, 2004). A main effect is a simple effect of an attribute without consid-
eration of the levels of the other attributes. Let us consider the experiment in the pre-
sent study, where utility of a product is explained by 3 attributes: food safety, animal 
welfare and price. The main effect of food safety is the marginal utility of food safety, 
regardless of the level of animal welfare and price levels. An interaction effect exists 
if the marginal utility of food safety depends on the level of animal welfare. For ex-
ample, if the marginal utility of food safety is higher for a high level of animal wel-
fare then the attributes are complementary attributes, whereas if the marginal utility of 
food safety is lower for higher levels of animal welfare they are substitute attributes 
(Holmes & Adamovicz, 2003, p. 182)28.  
 
Often, however, it is practically impossible to use the full factorial design. Having, for 
instance, 8 attributes with respectively 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 6 levels, amounts to 20,736 
possible alternatives. It is simply not possible to include them all in a survey. 
 
Fractional factorial design 
With a fractional factorial design it is possible to create a design with fewer alterna-
tives, but at the cost that some information is lost and, therefore, some interaction ef-
fects are no longer estimable. In a fractional factorial design, the selections of combi-
nations can be made in such a way that the most important effects can be estimated 
(typically the main effects and some cross effects). A difficulty in using a fractional 
factorial design is that interactions between attributes, for which inclusion in the 
analysis is desired, need to be anticipated in the design phase. This is due to the nec-
essary to include a sufficient number of alternatives to make the effect estimable. If 
existing interactions are not anticipated and identified, then some effects may become 
confounded (aliased), which is when two effects are not distinguishable from each 
other (Kuhfeld 2004). Focus groups or other pre-analyses can be used to shed some 
                                                 
28 In a model with interactions, brand preferences are different at different price levels and the price 
effects are different for different brands (Kuhfeld et al., 1994). 
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light on possible interaction effects (Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003, p. 182). Louviere 
(1988)29 suggests that more than 80% of the respondents’ behaviour can be explained 
by main effects. And, in most cases, the fractional factorial design ensures orthogo-
nality (Kuhfeld 2004).  
 
Unrealistic alternatives 
Full, as well as fractional factorial, designs can result in implausible alternatives 
(Bateman et al. 2002) and this might cause problems in consumer surveys. It can be 
useful to exclude unrealistic alternatives from the full or the fractional factorial de-
sign, as unrealistic alternatives might increase the risk of non-serious answers. Let us 
refer to the present example of utility of a product with the attributes food safety, 
animal welfare and price. An unrealistic alternative that should be excluded could be 
one that combines the minimum price with maximum levels of food safety and animal 
welfare. The cost of eliminating alternatives from the design, however, is that the de-
sign is no longer orthogonal (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 264) and, thereby, unavoidable 
correlation between the parameter estimates is introduced (Kuhfeld 2004). 
3.5.4. From alternatives to choice sets 
Number of choice sets and number of alternatives in a choice set 
First, the issue of choosing the optimal number of choice sets and the optimal number 
of alternatives in each choice set is discussed. There are no stringent optimality crite-
ria to solve this problem, but some guidelines are available.  
 
Once an experimental design has been chosen, the next step is to package the alterna-
tives and present them to the respondents (Bateman et al. 2002, p. 265). If a full facto-
rial design is chosen, often there will be too many alternatives to deliver a manage-
able task for each respondent. One extreme is to present each respondent with all al-
ternatives in a single choice set and let each respondent make only one choice. In our 
example with food safety, animal welfare and price, there are 32 alternatives – and we 
would let each respondent pick just one out of these 32 alternatives. The other ex-
treme is to include only 2 alternatives in each set and let each respondent make sev-
eral binary choices. In the above example, each respondent would be asked to choose 
the most preferred alternative 16 times (32 alternatives would be combined into 16 
choice sets). The first solution would require enormous cognitive burden to assess 32 
alternatives in one choice task, whereas in the second solution, the individual choices 
                                                 
29 According to Bateman et al., 2002, p. 264. 
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would be simpler, but there would be a risk of fatigue (or learning) effects during the 
process of choosing 16 times.  
 
The options are either to reduce the number of attributes and/or levels offered, or to 
group the attributes into subsets and construct a smaller design for each set. A third 
solution is to split the full number of choice sets into blocks and offer each respondent 
only one block. Thereby, only a few alternatives need to be included in each choice 
set. The two latter solutions require larger sample sizes, for instance if a statistical 
significant estimate requires 500 respondents, then splitting the design into three 
blocks requires 1,500 respondents (Bateman et al. 2002 p. 267).  
 
What is the optimal combination of number of alternatives in a choice set and number 
of choice sets to present to each respondent? There is no straightforward answer, 
merely some guidelines. More familiar subjects may allow more choice tasks per re-
spondent and more complex subjects constrain the number of choice sets to the re-
spondent. If a choice set involves only few attributes and attribute levels, the respon-
dent is able to manage more choice sets. For a discussion of the optimal complexity of 
choice experiment, see Caussade et al. (2005). Here, the authors describe the com-
plexity of an experiment by five design dimensions: number of available alternatives, 
number of attributes used to characterise the alternatives, number of choice situations 
presented to the respondent, number of attribute levels and the variation range for 
those levels. The design dimensions are varied in a systematic fashion, according to a 
first experimental design hierarchy. They conclude that all five design dimensions af-
fect the choice consistency. However, they do not find systematic effects on willing-
ness to pay estimates.  
 
For further discussion of choice set design, see Ryan & Wordsworth (2000), Hensher 
et al.(1999), Blamey et al. (2001), Carlsson & Martinsson (2003), Carson et al.  
(1994), Kuhfeld (2004), Batsell & Louviere (1991), Anderson & Wiley (1992) and 
Huber & Zwerina (1996).  
 
Criteria for optimal designs 
For real-life experiments involving human objects, an optimal design is a trade-off 
between statistical efficiency, cognitive ability and survey budgets. In order to make 
these trade-offs operational, 4 criteria (level balance, orthogonality, minimal overlap 
and utility balance) are used to generate optimal utility-neutral choice designs (Huber 
& Zwerina 1996). In practice, it is not possible to satisfy all criteria and several defi-
nitions of efficiency have been developed that include the above criteria in different 
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ways. Below, the criteria and the different types of efficiency measures are discussed 
briefly and arguments are presented for the choice of design in the current analysis. 
 
Level balance 
A design is balanced when each attribute level occurs equally often within each at-
tribute. This implies that the intercept is orthogonal to each effect. The level balance 
criterion requires that the levels of each attribute occur with equal frequency in the 
design. So, if an attribute has three levels, each level has to appear in 1/3 of the alter-
natives (Huber & Zwerina 1996).  
 
For studies involving human subjects, achieving at least nearly balanced design is an 
important consideration. If one level occurs more than other levels, respondents may 
try to read something into the study and adjust their response in some way. Alterna-
tively, respondents who see one level more often may respond differently than those 
who see another level more often. One design strategy is to choose the most balanced 
design from the top five efficiency scored designs.  
 
Orthogonality 
When every pair of levels occurs equally, often across all pairs of attributes, the de-
sign is said to be orthogonal or, put another way, a design is orthogonal when the joint 
occurrence of any two levels of different attributes appears in profiles with frequen-
cies equal to the product of their marginal frequencies (Addelman, 1962). This ver-
sion of orthogonality implies level balance. Another way in which a design can be or-
thogonal is when the frequencies for level pairs are proportional instead of equal, but 
such a design will not be balanced, one level can occur twice as often as the other 
(Kuhfeld 2004). 
 
When a linear model with normal error terms is fitted with an orthogonal design, the 
parameter estimates are uncorrelated, which means each estimate is independent of 
the other terms in the model. Furthermore, orthogonality usually implies that the coef-
ficients will have minimum variance – though there are exceptions to this rule 
(Kuhfeldt et al. 1994). In field trials in natural science experiments, orthogonal design 
is the standard design criteria. Orthogonal designs are often practical for main effects 
models when the number of attributes is small and the number of levels of each at-
tribute is small. However there are some situations in which orthogonal designs are 
not practical, such as when: 
? not all combinations of factor levels are feasible or make sense 
? alternative specific factors are present 
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? interactions within each alternative are present 
? the desired number of runs is not available for an orthogonal design 
? a non-standard model is being used, such as a model with interactions 
or polynomials (Kuhfeld, 2004)30.  
 
In a linear design, an optimal design must fulfil two criteria to be D-efficient: level 
balance and orthogonality (Carlsson & Martinsson 2003). If the model used is non-
linear instead of linear, also criteria of minimal overlap and utility balance have to be 
fulfilled to secure D-efficiency (Huber & Zwerina, 1996). 
 
Minimal overlap  
If the attribute levels for an attribute are held constant in a choice set, then no statisti-
cal information about this attribute is obtained. Maximum information for a choice set 
is obtained by ensuring no overlap. That is, minimal overlap in attribute levels in pair-
wise comparisons.  
 
Utility balance 
The utility that individuals derive from an alternative is considered to be associated 
with the levels of the attributes of the alternative (Carlsson and Martinsson 2003). 
Utility balance requires that the utility of each of the alternatives in a choice set is 
equal to any other. This criterion ensures that the respondents are forced to make 
marginal trade-offs and, thereby, allows maximal information about the preference 
structure to be extracted from the choice task. 
 
Design 
 
Orthogonal and D-optimal design 
Traditionally, orthogonal designs where the levels of each attribute vary independ-
ently have been preferred in experiments. The main reason for this is likely to be that 
the parameter estimates of a linear model are uncorrelated when using an orthogonal 
design (Carlsson & Martinsson, 2003).  
 
A choice experiment should avoid dominant or inferior attributes and it is important 
that the alternatives are credible. Orthogonal designs disregard this aspect of design 
and only ensure that the effects of the different attributes can be estimated independ-
ently of each other. A D-optimal design explicitly considers the importance of the 
levels of the attributes and ensures that the alternatives in the choice sets provide 
                                                 
30 Kuhfeld use the %MktEx macro to find the good efficient experimental design. 
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more information about the trade-off between the different attributes. The D-optimal 
design, however, still relies on prior information on the distribution of the parameters. 
The D-optimal design is very sensitive to biased information from pilot studies, but 
also the orthogonal design needs prior information of the attributes in order to select 
attribute levels in a way that no attribute becomes either superior or inferior to the 
other (Carlsson & Martinsson, 2003).   
 
A common measure of efficiency, which relates to the covariance matrix, is D-
efficiency. Several other efficiency measures can be used (A-, G-efficiency), but D-
efficiency is the less computationally burdensome. The D-optimal design is created 
with the software package SAS, using the search algorithm presented in Kuhfeld 
(2004)31.  
 
Cyclical design 
A cyclical design is a simple expansion of the orthogonal design, but it can only be 
used in the case of a generic model, i.e. where the parameters of the attributes have 
the same impact on utility, independent of the alternative (which is the case in the 
present analysis) (Carlsson & Martinsson 2003). The procedure is first to allocate 
each of the alternatives from a full/fractional factorial design to different choice sets. 
Attributes of the additional alternatives are then constructed by cyclically adding al-
ternatives into the choice set, based on the attribute levels. The attribute level in the 
new alternative is the next higher attribute level to the one applied in the previous al-
ternative. If the highest level is attained, the next attribute level is set to its lowest 
level (Bunch et al., 1996). The cyclically generated alternatives are favourable be-
cause they represent the perfect level balance and orthogonality, and the symmetry of 
the design causes minimal overlap (Huber & Zwerina 1996). However, utility balance 
is not secured. 
 
Comparing designs 
Carlsson and Martinsson (2003) compare different design approaches for stated pref-
erence surveys. They concentrate on the orthogonal design and D-optimal design, 
with and without prior information of the parameters. Using simulations, they find 
that the choice of design technique affects the precision in the estimates. They 
strongly recommend researchers to use the D-optimal design with prior information 
of the parameters as it performed much better than the other design approaches. How-
                                                 
31 The code can be downloaded at: /ftp://ftp.sas.com/techsup/download/technote/ts643/ See Carlsson 
& Martinsson (2003) p. 293. 
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ever, this is not surprising as knowledge concerning the true parameters is used, 
thereby yielding better estimates of marginal WTP. If prior information is not used, 
however, then the cyclical design is preferred over both the orthogonal design and the 
D-optimal design.  
3.5.5. Opt-out  
An important feature in the design of a CE is whether the respondent should be given 
the opportunity of not choosing one of the presented alternatives in the choice sets 
(that is, to opt-out of the experiment). A major argument in favour of including an 
opt-out alternative in the choice set is that if the choice situation reflects a real-life 
situation where it is possible to opt-out, then it is necessary to include an opt-out in 
order to interpret the results within a welfare economic framework. If such an opt-out 
alternative is not included in the choice sets, respondents are being forced to choose 
an alternative which they may not desire at all. This could lead to overestimation of 
the probability of choosing one of the alternatives (Boyle et al. 2001) and, in turn, will 
lead to inaccurate estimates of consumer welfare. As a result, a status quo alternative 
or an opt-out option is usually included in each choice set (Bateman et al.  2002; Kon-
toleon & Yabe 2003).  
 
Moreover, an opt-out option might reduce the problem of protest answers. Typically, 
protest answers are identified through follow-up questions and deleted from the data, 
see, for example, Bennett & Adamowicz (2001) and Ryan & Wordsworth (2000) (for 
further insight with regard to protest answers, see Chapter 4).  
 
However, at times it is rather complicated to include these options in the design in a 
meaningful way, and to include them in the estimation procedures. Therefore, a con-
siderable number of studies discuss the opt-out alternative. In some situations, an ob-
vious opt-out choice is the status quo situation (environmental policy issues often in-
clude a status quo). When valuing consumer’s buying behaviour, the status quo is 
sometimes interpreted as a similar good that is usually purchased; see, for example, 
Burton et al. (2004), Mazzanti (2003), and Haaijer et al. (2001). Another way around 
the opt-out problem is found in Carlsson et al. (2004b). The authors, here, do not in-
clude the opt-out alternative, but instruct the respondents only to answer the CE if 
they actually consume the good.  
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For further discussion of the opt-out alternative, see Ryan & Skåtum (2004), Ruby et 
al. (1998), DeShazo et al.(2004), Adamowicz et al. (1997) and Banzhaf et al. (2001) 
and Appendices D and E. 
3.5.6. Cheap talk 
Cheap talk is used to describe some information to the respondents in which they are 
reminded about the fact that individuals often act differently towards a hypothetical 
scenario in a questionnaire than they would in a real situation where they were faced 
with the same problem. Such a reminder is found to reduce the risk that respondents 
state a higher willingness to pay than they would in a real situation, due to some kind 
of moral satisfaction (warm glow). Carlsson et al. (2004c) evaluate the use of cheap 
talk. In two experiments on the choice of consumer goods, the estimated marginal 
willingness to pay for food was found to be lower in the survey version where cheap 
talk was included. Hence, Carlsson et al. (2004c) conclude that the hypothesis of a 
hypothetical bias for marginal willingness to pay in choice experiments cannot be re-
jected. See also Carson et al. (2001) and Cummings & Taylor (1999). 
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4. Data 
The data was collected through a questionnaire survey in January and February 2005. 
A detailed description of how the questionnaire is designed is found in Section 4.1, 
followed by a description of the actual questionnaire in Section 4.2. An overall de-
scription of the data is given in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 contains descriptive statistics 
(and checks for representativity) with respect to socio-demographic variables and, fi-
nally, Section 4.5 focuses on describing data with respect to attitudes. Relevant 
graphs and tables are provided in Appendix C. 
4.1. Designing the questionnaire 
The questionnaire is designed to produce data for improving the understanding of 
consumer risk perception and food choice in relation to food-related health risks – and 
how these are influenced by expert information. More specifically, the objectives are 
restated here as to: 
• Estimate the willingness to pay for outdoor production systems (animal wel-
fare) and avoiding campylobacter risks (food safety) 
• Focus particularly on how information containing  expert advice based on sci-
entific risk assessment influences risk perception  
• Identify the possible societal value (welfare gain) of providing information to 
consumers by means of e.g. public campaigns or labelling 
• Identify how risk perception and the effect of information changes across con-
sumer types. 
 
The questionnaire consists of a choice experiment and questions concerning back-
ground information. Basically, the choice experiment is used to elicit estimates of the 
average willingness to pay for the attributes and the average effect of information. 
The background information is used for consistency checks, to elicit risk perception 
and to elicit the respondents’ prior information levels, thereby, determining the 
“news” value of the information that is provided in the questionnaire.  
 
Designing an experiment involves choosing how many attributes and attributes levels 
to include and how to describe them, as well as choosing the number of choice sets 
that each respondent is given and the number of alternatives in each choice set. 
 
The following were considered important in design of the analysis: 
• Limiting the complexity of the experimental design as much as possible.  
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• Employing a full factorial design, the main reason being that there was very 
little prior knowledge of potential cross effects. Therefore, a fractional facto-
rial design that included the relevant cross effects was not an option. 
• Extraction of a limited amount of information with many repetitions rather 
than much information from fewer respondents32; the reason being that few, 
but statistically significant, results were desired rather than many, but insig-
nificant, results. 
• Scientific documentation of the information provided by the analysis and re-
alistic attribute levels. 
 
The most important considerations regarding designing the present choice experiment 
are described below in relation to the above-mentioned criteria – from choosing a 
product, attributes and their level to choosing the experimental design and the final 
statistical design. Finally, the design used in this survey is presented. 
4.1.1. Choice of product and attributes 
The choice of product is evidently important due to the hypothetical nature of the ex-
periment. Furthermore, the product can be described through a number of attrib-
utes/characteristics which are presented to the respondents in order to value the 
good/product in question. 
 
Attributes  
Risk is a difficult characteristic to assess. Hence, we have chosen only three attributes 
to achieve our objective33. There are many different kinds of food-related risk. Further 
risk can be formulated in terms of the risk suffering an infection or a mortality risk. 
The risks include undesirable effects of pesticide application such as pesticide resi-
dues in food products, undesirable effects of GMO application, undesirable risk from 
medicine usage and microbiological risks such as BSE, campylobacter and salmo-
nella. In general, risk expressions can be hard to understand (Jensen et al. 2004). 
Therefore, a great effort was made to formulate a food-related health risk that was 
easy to describe and to provide information about (Bennett & Adamowicz 2001).  
                                                 
32 This decision led to the choice of an Internet-based survey where the time it takes to fill out the 
survey should not exceed 15 minutes as compared to a postal or personal interview survey where 
the survey is not limited in the same way. The advantage of the Internet-based survey is that it is not 
as expensive, so a larger number of respondents can be included. Also, the time dimension is an ad-
vantage of the Internet-based survey, as the results can be in a database within 14 days.  
33 Normally, the number of attributes is restricted to a relatively small number such as 4, 5 or 6. 
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Common knowledge in the population about campylobacter is smaller than that on 
BSE, GMO and salmonella (Jensen et al. 2004). Most people have knowledge about 
salmonella through the media and public campaigns, which creates an attitude to-
wards salmonella that can be hard to change (Lassen 2004). Also, BSE has received 
massive coverage in the media. The hypothesis, here, is that information on salmo-
nella or BSE would not produce any changes. Furthermore, BSE is a complex issue to 
explain and provide information on. GMO application is a controversial item and the 
scientific documentation for whether GMO constitutes a risk or not for the human 
health is not yet clear. For that reason GMO products were not selected for the present 
analysis.  
 
Salmonella exists in all forms of eggs and in chicken meat, whether produced as free-
range, organic or conventional. Eggs are an attractive product as far valuing attributes 
is concerned, because there is little difference in eating quality between the different 
types of eggs. However, there is no clear link to the production method and the scien-
tific documentation for the biological relation is uncertain. For that reason, and be-
cause of the expected beforehand attitude towards salmonella, salmonella was re-
jected as the food-related health risk.  
 
There are no campylobacter in eggs – but there are in chicken meat. There is scientific 
evidence that all outdoor free-range chickens contain campylobacter, whereas only 
one third of the chickens raised indoors have campylobacter34. Hence, choosing be-
tween chickens raised outdoors versus indoors involves a real choice with regard to 
campylobacter content. As a result, campylobacter risk was selected as the food safety 
attribute. In choosing campylobacter, an effect of information on consumer behaviour 
was hoped to be revealed. 
 
Furthermore, animal welfare is included as an attribute. Animal welfare is a pure pub-
lic good, whereas food safety can be assigned as a semi-public good. By including 
both types of good, the way in which respondents value and make trade-offs between 
pure public and other goods can be examined. Furthermore, animal welfare is ex-
pected to be an attribute where people have pre-determined attitudes, just as with, for 
instance, GMO. In this way, the opportunity presents itself for testing the influence of 
information about an unknown attribute (campylobacter) and a known attribute (ani-
mal welfare).  
                                                 
34 Source. Homepages of Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries 2002 www.fvm.dk and The 
Danish Poultry Council 2004 www.danskfjerkrae.dk  
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Product 
It is easier for a respondent to decide on a product described in terms of attributes, 
than to express preferences on the attributes themselves (Burton et al. 2004). In 
choosing which product to link the attributes to, it is important that the respondents 
know and buy the product. This can reduce the opt-out percentage (Bennett & Ada-
mowicz 2001). Chicken meat is, therefore, considered to be a good with which almost 
everyone is familiar with and uses in their everyday life.  
 
More specifically, we have chosen a 1,300 gramme chilled chicken as product, al-
though chicken breast fillets are more commonly used in everyday cooking (budget 
shares: 17% whole chilled chicken, 13% whole frozen, 41% chilled processed and 
29% frozen processed chicken (GFK 2001)). Our argument is that a whole chicken is 
sold campylobacter-free, whereas breast fillets are not. In our follow-up questions, 
respondents are given an opportunity to express whether they usually buy breast fil-
lets, whole chickens or whether they do not buy chicken meat at all. Thereby, the size 
of the problem can be identified and respondents who do not usually buy the product, 
and thereby could create bias in the responses, could potentially be removed from the 
sample (Bennett & Adamowicz 2001).  
 
Attribute levels 
Two attribute levels have been chosen for animal welfare and campylobacter risk, re-
spectively, and eight levels for price. These levels are divisible by two, which makes 
it easier to construct a design ensuring orthogonality (Kuhfeld 2004).  
 
The description of the attributes and attributes levels is provided by experts from the 
relevant scientific disciplines. As an indicator of animal welfare, two different breed-
ing methods are used – one where chickens have outdoor access and the other where 
chickens are kept indoors at all times (in the questionnaire they are referred to as out-
door versus indoor breeding35). These levels are easy to explain, both in the text 
with/without information and in the attribute presentation itself. It is the general sci-
entific opinion that chickens raised outdoors with more space, etc. are better off than 
chickens raised in conventional breeding systems. However, there are unfortunate 
side effects such as more peeling and higher mortality in organic production. There-
fore, the link between breeding method and animal welfare is not quite clear. The 
                                                 
35 The description of outdoor breeding is similar to the requirements in organic production systems 
with respect to outdoor access, space, life time, dust bathing (for a full description, see Appendix 
A). However, the term organic is not mentioned in the survey in order to avoid confusion of 
whether the respondent interpret other organic elements into the animal welfare attribute. 
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problem was dealt with by not including these side effects of organic farming. Fur-
thermore, animal welfare is not mentioned in the choice experiments in order to allow 
respondents to create their own links between breeding methods and animal welfare. 
These choices of information provision might result in a too positive description of 
outdoor breeding.  
 
For the campylobacter attribute, the levels and the way in which the attribute should 
be described were more difficult. The levels of the attributes should vary across inter-
vals that are realistic and over which we expect respondents to have preferences 
(Ryan & Wordsworth 2000; Bennett & Adamowicz 2001). From the use of focus 
groups and pre-tests, it was decided to express the campylobacter attribute either as 
being labelled campylobacter-free or having no label. A more specific labelling could 
be the difference between organically produced chicken and conventionally produced 
chicken. However, organic labels have a strong position in consumers’ minds. Hence, 
such labels can prompt respondents to select their preferred alternative on the basis of 
the label alone (Bennett & Adamowicz 2001).  
 
The attribute levels are formulated in a slightly skewed manner. The campylobacter 
attribute is formulated as a label whereas the animal welfare attribute is formulated as 
a description. The intention of this was not to identify the difference between calling 
information a label and a description/declaration of the good, but was a result of a de-
sire to mimic, as far as possible, a real shopping situation. In Denmark, there is a 
campylobacter-free label, whereas production information is provided as information 
on the package. Some might argue, that it can bias the results that one attribute is a 
label and the other not – however, the assumption is that it makes no difference as far 
as the respondents are concerned.  
 
Description of the attribute levels as “with campylobacter” or “campylobacter-free” 
was considered. However, this wording has at least two drawbacks: 1) By using the 
description “with campylobacter”, too great a focus is placed on this attribute com-
pared with the real-life situation, where this label does not exist. 2) It is not true that 
every chicken not labelled “campylobacter-free” contains campylobacter, so it would 
be directly misleading to label a chicken “with campylobacter” 3) Realism is lost in 
the choice experiment with the wording “with campylobacter” because it is not possi-
ble for the consumer to go to a supermarket and buy a chicken labelled “with campy-
lobacter”. Instead the risk levels was described in the terms of “campylobacter-free” 
and “not controlled for campylobacter”.  
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The price levels were determined based on the pre-test, as recommended by Bennett 
& Adamowicz (2001) and Bateman et al. (2002). The pre-test comprised asking 30 
friends and 150 students about their maximum willingness to pay for a 1,300 gramme 
chilled chicken, free of campylobacter and produced as outdoor free-range. A pay-
ment card was used, where the respondents were asked to select their maximum will-
ingness to pay. The payment card contained twelve different prices in a range from 
DKK 40 to DKK 280. The range where created exponentially as recommended by 
Rowe et al. (1996). From the pre-test, a maximum willingness to pay of 110 DKK 
was detected and, therefore, used as the upper level in the experiment. An exponential 
response scale has the advantage that the intervals between any two values increase at 
an increasing rate, thereby avoiding identical intervals (Ryan & Wordsworth 2000). If 
the interval between the levels is identical, say 20 DKK, there is a risk that respon-
dents make trade-offs based on the interval (at 20 DKK) and not the price, itself, and 
potentially create a bias. In the choice experiment, however, it was decided not to use 
the exponential scale as this scale may have resulted in too many low values and only 
few high values with very large differences in interval between the values. Instead, 
the price levels were modified, still keeping the differences in intervals and the de-
tected maximum willingness to pay.  
 
Dominant alternatives 
Before it can be identified whether one alternative dominates in a choice set, the at-
tribute levels need to be ranked. 
 
With respect to price, it can be assumed with confidence that decreasing utility is as-
sociated with increasing levels of the price attribute. This is equivalent to an assump-
tion that, where the other attributes are held constant, the consumers would prefer a 
lower price of a chilled whole chicken to a higher price (i.e. a chicken is a normal 
good).   
 
Similarly, with respect to campylobacter, it was assumed with confidence that ranking 
the attribute levels such that all else being held constant, consumers would prefer to 
avoid campylobacter.  
 
With respect to animal welfare, the same degree of confidence in ranking the attrib-
utes was not apparent. The expectation is that most people will find that animal wel-
fare associated with outdoor production methods is clearly better than with indoor 
mehtods, while others will find the differences so small that they are not worth con-
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sidering36. Others again may find that indoor production systems are, in fact, better 
than outdoor production systems. In the final ranking, the production systems were 
ranked such that outdoor production is better than indoor production.  
4.1.2. Information provision and attribute description  
How can the attributes be described without providing information about them? The 
“basic” information provided includes whether the chicken has been bred inside a 
barn or outdoor in the field (animal welfare attribute), but not what consequences this 
has for the chickens’ welfare. The expert information describes differences in the 
breeding methods including information about the difference in space (m2 pr. 
chicken), circadian rhythm, natural behaviour patterns (e.g. dust bathing) and length 
of life. Expert information about food safety (campylobacter risk) is twofold. It in-
cludes typical as well as rarer symptoms, the general risk of campylobacter infection 
and a short instruction on how to prevent a campylobacter infection with good kitchen 
hygiene. 
4.1.3. The design 
Three attributes (animal welfare, campylobacter content and price) with 2, 2 and 8 
levels, respectively, provide a full factorial design of 21*21*81 = 32 possible alterna-
tives. 
 
A respondent choosing a dominant alternative does not provide any information on 
trade-offs between attributes. Nevertheless, it might be better still to keep the domi-
nant alternatives than to exclude them. Firstly, this makes us able to test for consis-
tency. The second reason is that eliminating dominant alternative would give a less 
efficient design.  
 
Before designing the choice sets, the two extreme alternatives respectively as these 
were bound to dominate, i.e the alternative with the lowest price and the highest lev-
els of food safety and animal welfare, and the alternative with the highest price and 
the lowest levels of food safety and animal welfare.  
 
                                                 
36 Finding from focus groups. 
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A full factorial design37 involves only 16 choice sets. Initially, a cyclical procedure 
was used to pair the alternatives into choice sets, but, after reviewing the design, it 
was found that the design contained too many dominant alternatives. Instead, a D-
optimal full factorial design was finally selected, with 16 choice sets containing 2 al-
ternatives (an opt-out alternative was then added to each choice set). Dominant alter-
natives were also apparent in the D-optimal design. Instead of removing the remain-
ing dominant alternatives, however, the levels of the animal welfare attribute and the 
food safety attribute were swapped (Huber & Zwerina 1996), producing just 3 domi-
nant alternatives in 16 choice sets. These dominant alternatives were then used for a 
consistency test, so each respondent received one or two choice sets with a dominant 
alternative during the 8 choice tasks. 
 
As the questionnaire is relatively time-consuming, each respondent was only offered 
4 choice sets without information and 4 choice sets with information. This was 
achieved by dividing our design into 4 blocks (A,B,C,D) with 4 choice sets in each. 
No respondent received exactly the same block, with and without information. This 
was ensured in order to reduce the risk of respondents simply repeating their choices 
from before the information was provided.  
4.2. Structure of the questionnaire 
Below the structure of the questionnaire is described and explained. The structure of 
the questionnaire can be roughly divided into 5 parts –  
1) Introduction 
2) Choice experiment without information,  
3) Attitudinal questions regarding foods in general  
4) Choice experiment with information (2 splits) and,  
5) Attitudinal questions regarding foods and socio-demographic variables.  
 
The entire questionnaire is found in Appendix A, and the Q-numbers below refer to 
the question number in the questionnaire.   
 
                                                 
37 The full factorial design still consists of 32 alternatives as the above-mentioned 2 alternatives are 
replaced by two alternatives that are used twice. 
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Re 1. Introduction 
 
General introduction  
The questionnaire begins with a short introduction to the survey and the overall pur-
pose of the project in order to inform the respondents and gain their confidence. Fur-
thermore, the introduction contains a paragraph where the respondents are reminded 
of their budget constraint and that they should act as they would in an everyday shop-
ping situation, to help ensure the respondents answer as honestly and realistically as 
possible. 
 
Introduction to choice sets without information  
The respondents are introduced to the different attributes connected to chilled chicken 
and the different attribute levels. To ensure that the respondents only focus on these 
two attributes and the price attribute, a statement was included to the effect that all 
other thinkable attributes connected to chilled chicken are alike, e.g. taste, freshness, 
shelf-life and nutrient content. 
 
Re 2. Choice sets without information Q1.  
The first 4 choice sets do not provide the respondent with any further information re-
garding animal welfare attribute or campylobacter – only that the choice is between 
outdoor-bred or indoor-bred chicken and a label stating the product is campylobacter-
free or no label.  
 
Re 3. Attitudinal questions regarding foods in general  
 
Q. 2 - 4: Difficulty in the choice sets 
The questions concerning how certain the respondents were in their choices provide 
us with the opportunity to exclude some of the respondents if they were too insecure 
in making their choices. Such questions have, in previous studies, been found to be 
very useful and to increase the efficiency of the estimates. 
 
Q. 3 Opt-out reasons 
In the choice set, as little focus as possible was placed on the opt-out alternative in 
order to limit the frequency of opt-out choices (hvad menes med det? At det er skre-
vet med småt eller ikke på forhånd beskrevet….?). However, if the respondents opt-
out then it is very important to know why they opt-out. Therefore, a range of ques-
tions was included for the respondents choosing the opt-out alternative. The first rea-
son is that it is important to identify potential protest bidders. If the respondents have 
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selected, as their reason for choosing the opt-out alternative, that they support animal 
welfare (Option 10) or campylobacter-free chickens (Option 11), but do not think that 
it is the consumer who should pay for this, they are recognized as protest bidder. This 
is because they gain utility from higher levels of animal welfare and lower levels of 
campylobacter-risk, but are not willing to pay anything for obtaining that gain 
(Mitchell & Carson 1989).   
  
Q. 5: The importance of the attribute 
The respondents are asked to identify which characteristic among animal welfare, 
health and price, they find most important. This is carried out to validate the consis-
tency between the respondents’ stated preferences (answers to Q5) and their observed 
behaviour (choices in the experiment). That is, if respondents find e.g. animal welfare 
to be the most important attribute, they have to value it highest in the choice sets. The 
argument for constraining the respondent to choose only one of the characteristics is 
because it would be very difficult to check for inconsistency if more than one charac-
teristic was ticked. 
 
Q. 6: Attitude towards food in general 
The main purpose of this question is to give an overall ranking of various attributes 
associated with food in general – including production system, campylobacter risk 
and price. Moreover, the questions regarding production system, campylobacter risk 
and price will give us yet another test for inconsistency. The question whether it is 
important or not that the product is produced organically, is based on a hypothesis 
that consumers that buy organic food constitute a homogenous group of consumers 
with regard to their attitudes towards food safety and animal welfare.  
 
Q. 7 & 8: Knowledge about kitchen hygiene 
These two questions concern the respondents’ present knowledge about kitchen hy-
giene – whether it can have an influence on the campylobacter risk or not and whether 
they consider their own kitchen hygiene to be good or poor. Thereby, the respon-
dents’ prior knowledge with regard to the attributes can be identified, in relation to 
the answers they gave for the 4 choice sets without information.  
 
Re 4. Choice experiment with information 
 
Q. 9: Introduction to the choice sets with information 
The “introduction to the choice sets with information” contains the same introductory 
information as the introduction to the choice sets without information – that is, budget 
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constraint, cheap talk, etc. There are 4 new choice sets. The attributes are described 
precisely as the choice sets without information – the only difference is in the intro-
ductory text before the choice task begins. 
 
One half of the questionnaires contain only expert information regarding the animal 
welfare attribute, and the other half of the questionnaires contain only expert informa-
tion regarding the campylobacter risk. Thereby, the value of the information to the 
respondents’ can be identified as the difference in willingness to pay due to the differ-
ent information levels: 1) No information, 2) Expert information on animal welfare 
and 3) Expert information on campylobacter. Inclusion of a sample that received in-
formation about both attributes would have been desirable in order to test additivity of 
information, but this was not possible within the budget of the survey. 
 
Choice set 5-8 with information 
With these choice sets, the data basis was obtained for estimating the consumers’ 
marginal willingness to pay for the attributes when information is included. Tests can 
identify whether attributes without or with information are different attributes or 
whether they are perceived as identical. If an information effect is apparent, then the 
attributes are perceived as different, whereas if information has no effect then the at-
tributes are considered identical. 
 
Re 5. Attitudinal questions and socio-demographics 
 
Q. 10-13: Difficulty, certainty in the choice sets and the importance of the attributes: 
animal welfare, health and price 
Follow-up questions regarding certainty in the choice experiment and questions re-
garding the importance of the attributes: animal welfare, health and price. The reason 
for including the questions regarding the importance of the attributes again, is to 
check whether inconsistency changes after information has been provided. 
 
Q. 14: The coherence between outdoor reared chickens and animal welfare and cam-
pylobacter, respectively 
The two questions regarding people’s knowledge about the causal connection be-
tween breeding methods and animal welfare and campylobacter-risk provide, besides 
a consistency check, an explanation of the choices the respondents have made in the 
choice sets. For instance, if they do not think that outdoor-bred chickens have higher 
welfare than indoor-bred chickens, then they might not have a higher willingness to 
pay for the animal welfare attribute. The same can be argued in the case of people’s 
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opinion and knowledge about the campylobacter-risk in outdoor versus indoor-bred 
chickens. Furthermore, it is very important to identify whether or not the respondents 
know the causal connection which really exists between breeding method, animal 
welfare and campylobacter-risk. If they are aware of this causal connection, then the 
respondents may think that some of the different alternatives are too unrealistic be-
cause they break with the existing causal connection. This may lead them not to an-
swer the choice sets or to answer in a biased manner. 
  
Q. 15:  Attitude towards food safety, environment and animal welfare 
The questions regarding the respondents’ attitude towards health and animal welfare 
can be divided into two categories – those which check for consistency and those used 
for answering hypotheses.  
 
a. I think there is too much hysteria surrounding the animal welfare issue  
b. I support animal welfare through my choice in food products  
c. I think that outdoor reared chickens taste better than indoor reared chickens  
d. Although infection by campylobacter can be prevented through maintaining good 
hygiene basics and correct food preparation practices, I do not want to have cam-
pylobacter bacteria in my kitchen  
e. I think there is too much hysteria surrounding the campylobacter issue  
f. I believe that the producers are responsible for supplying food products that carry 
no health risks for the consumers. 
g. If the authorities could ensure reliable labelling, I would be happy to pay extra for 
campylobacter-free chicken  
h. If the authorities could ensure reliable labelling, I would be happy to pay extra for 
increased animal welfare  
i. I believe that the authorities are responsible for carrying the costs of ensuring 
campylobacter-free chicken meat. 
j. I believe that the authorities are responsible for carrying the costs of increased 
animal welfare  
k. I believe that eating Danish food products carries no health risks 
 
The questions a and h (e and g) can be used for checking for consistency for the ani-
mal welfare attribute and the health attribute (campylobacter-risk), respectively. In 
example, if the respondents agree on question a they should have a lower willingness 
to pay for avoiding campylobacter-risk.   
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Questions f, i and j are used as checks for protest bits – these questions may be 
crossed-checked with question 3 (10) and 3(11), as mentioned before.  
 
Q. 16: Attitude towards information on foods 
One of the main purposes in the survey is to test whether expert information has an 
effect on consumer behaviour. Consequently, the respondent is asked how much they 
trust “our” source of expert information. This is very important in the context of risk 
perception. The questions are not used directly in the interpretation of the choice sets, 
however, besides testing whether or not the respondents trust the expert statements in 
the questionnaire. 
 
Q. 17-19: Beforehand knowledge 
These questions on prior knowledge to campylobacter and salmonella give us some 
knowledge about the respondents’ former knowledge and experience with the campy-
lobacter bacteria. If a respondent is familiar with campylobacter, she might not react 
so strongly to the expert information and the willingness to pay for reducing the cam-
pylobacter risk might be lower than another respondent’s willingness to pay. 
 
The questions on prior knowledge of salmonella might show that people who are fa-
miliar with salmonella transpose this acquaintance to campylobacter and, therefore, 
have a higher willingness to pay for reducing the campylobacter risk. 
 
Q. 20-21: Health 
This question regarding the respondents’ health provides information for the hypothe-
sis concerning the extent to which people who think their health is good may consider 
the real campylobacter-risk to be lower for them, then the campylobacter-risk which 
is stated in the choice sets. 
 
Q. 22-23: The respondent’s usual consumer behaviour. 
These questions are put in to identify the kind of chicken product the consumer usu-
ally buys. In the estimation procedure, the information is used to model the opt-out 
scenario for each respondent. 
 
Q. 24: Membership 
If the respondent has been a member of an organisation to improve animal welfare, 
this should explain a higher willingness to pay for the animal welfare attribute. This is 
not a hypothesis, because the variable “membership” is inextricably linked with the 
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animal welfare attribute. That is why the questions regarding membership are “only” 
used as a consistency check for the willingness to pay for animal welfare. 
 
Socio-economic questions 
Finally the socio-economic characteristics are identified. This is not carried out 
through the questionnaire, itself, because these exist as background knowledge from 
the internet panel from ACNielsen. The two primary purposes for including the se-
lected characteristics of the respondents are to 1) check the representativeness of the 
respondents and 2) to be able to perform sub-group analyses. 
 
It is expected that the respondents are representative because the survey is conducted 
with an ACNielsen online panel, which has already been selected to be representative. 
The sub-group analyses are performed to identify whether or not a difference exists 
between socio-demographic groups. 
4.3. Data 
4.3.1. Description of ACNielsen’s database 
Our data is based on a survey. Ideally, a survey would include the entire population 
such that everybody’s opinion is heard. This is typically not practical and a represen-
tative sample is heard instead. Samples can be representative with respect to different 
key factors (age, income, geography, political opinion, etc.) and the choice of key 
variables depends on the purpose of the analysis. In general, the larger the sample, the 
better the picture of the true population which can be obtained. There is a trade-off 
between choosing a sample that is representative with respect to many key variables 
and having a large number of respondents in each sub-group.  
 
The data collection procedure in this survey was conducted by ACNielsen, through 
their Internet panel. In the present section, the Internet panel of ACNielsen is de-
scribed, including how the panel is composed in relation to WebDenmark and the 
Danish population as a whole. In relation to this, the random sample from our survey 
is described, ie. who received the questionnaire, who responded and who was 
screened out due to protest bidding and inconsistent answers. The final sample of re-
spondents, which forms the basis for the further estimation in this survey, is described 
by comparing the sample with the composition of the Danish population as a whole. 
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The data’s composition of gender, age, personal income etc. is tested in relation to 
data from Statistics Denmark. The representativity estimates are based on chi-tests.   
 
The sample was obtained from ACNielsen’s online database of approximately 25,000. 
In Denmark, there are approximately 2.4 million private households, of whom 75% 
are “online”. The panel members are all in the age 15 to 99 years’ old, resident in a 
household with PC and they all have a private internet access. The distribution be-
tween the genders in the online panel is 52% women and 48% men.  
 
The online panel is representative with respect to the 75% of the Danish population 
that has internet access in their homes. We face a potential bias here: our goal is the 
estimate of consumer behaviour that is representative for Denmark as a whole, but the 
online panel only represents 75% of the population.  
 
For the present survey, a sample of the online panel was used rather than the entire 
web panel in the database. This could either improve or reduce the representativeness 
of our sample when measured against the distribution of the Danish population. The 
respondents in our survey were drawn from the online panel through a quota selection 
system. The quotas were created on the basis of gender and age, with the aim that the 
sample mirrors the distribution of gender and age apparent in the Danish population.  
 
The above-mentioned uncertainty is statistical uncertainty, related to how the sample 
is drawn. A survey is subject to a whole range of potential sources of uncertainty. 
There is uncertainty with respect to the quality of the answers, non-responses (biases 
due to respondents not answering the whole questionnaire) and statistical uncertainty. 
The effect and the extent to which statistical uncertainty influences our results will be 
clarified during the descriptive statistics below. 
4.3.2. Description of data 
8,008 individuals were invited to fill out the questionnaire, of whom 4,685 respon-
dents answered. This gives a response rate of 58.5 %. From the 4,685 answers, 581 
were incomplete. These answers were removed by ACNielsen and a dataset contain-
ing 4,104 respondents was received, corresponding to a response rate of 51.2 %. The 
general response rate of ACNielsen’s online panel lies in the range of 50 %. 
More specifically, protest answers (246 respondents) relate to the following reason for 
choosing the opt-out alternative: the respondent supports animal welfare (Q3, Option 
10) or campylobacter-free chickens (Q3, Option 11), but does not think that it is the 
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consumer who should pay for these attributes. This is recognised as protest answers 
because utility is gained from higher levels of animal welfare and lower levels of 
campylobacter-risk, but there is no willingness to pay for obtaining the gain 
 
Dominated answers were found for 121 respondents38. If a respondent chooses a 
dominated alternative in at least one out of the 8 choice sets, then the respondent is 
excluded. This corresponds to 3 %. Hence, these respondents failed our rationality 
test and are disregarded in the further analysis39.  
 
Moreover, respondents who answered that they usually purchase chicken for less than 
DKK 40 (650 respondents) or more then DKK 110 (14 respondents) were removed 
because their individual opt-out alternative cannot be included if the price is not 
within the same price-range as the other alternatives. Furthermore, 772 respondents 
answered that they could not remember their usual purchases. They are excluded from 
the analysis, again, because we cannot model their individual opt-out alternative, but, 
more importantly, because they are potentially unserious respondents. In the estima-
tion process, the results are revealed not to be particularly sensitive to elimination of 
these respondents (for a further discussion see the estimation chapter, Chapter 5). 
 
Hence, the dataset consists of 2,301 respondents for use in the further analyses. The 
descriptive statistics only include the respondents presented in the analysis – that is 
2,301 individuals – as these form the basis on which the following estimates are de-
rived and interpreted. Half of the questionnaires contained information regarding 
campylobacter (1,180 respondents) and the other half contained information regarding 
breeding method (1,121 respondents).  
 
The dataset can be divided into 2 datasets: Sample A is the dataset retrieved from re-
spondents given campylobacter information and Sample B is the dataset retrieved 
from respondents given breeding method information. These are further divided into 2 
datasets according to choices made before and after information is provided: choices 
                                                 
38 A dominant alternative is one where all attribute levels are better than in the other alternatives in 
the choice set. That is a product which is cheaper, labelled campylobacter-free and outdoor bred. If 
a respondent has chosen the dominated alternative instead of the dominant alternative, she/he is 
characterised as been inconsistent and are eliminated.  
39 It is assumed that animal welfare is better with outdoor breeding than indoor. If a respondent does 
not agree, then an alternative that we consider dominant is not necessarily dominant in his eyes. 
Hence, removal of such respondents could lead to an overestimated willingness to pay for outdoor 
breeding. Whether or not these dominated answers are represented by this group of respondents has 
not been checked.  
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without information about campylobacter (A1), with information about campylobac-
ter (A2), without information about breeding method (B1) and with information about 
breeding method (B2). The analyses are based on a sample of 2,301 respondents. This 
is the sample without protest answers and inconsistent respondents. Table 4.1, pro-
vides an overview over the data which has been included and excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
Table 4.1. Presentation of data (on respondent levels) 
 
  Sample A  
(Campylobacter) 
Sample B  
(Animal welfare) 
Total 
Number Text A1 A2 Sample 
A 
B1 B2 Sample 
B 
 
Respondents  2090 2014 4104 
Opt out  Protest 
answers 40 38 29 45 61 33 246 
   Below 40 
DKK*
 
  343  
 
 307 650 
 Above 
110 DKK*   5   9 14 
 Don’t 
know*   396   376 772 
Inconsistent  41 15 3 37 23 2 121 
In total  81 53 776 82 84 727  
Respondents 
in estimation 
 1180 1121 2301 
Source: Own calculations 
Notes:  
1) Protest answers cover respondents who choose the opt-out alternative because they do not think it is their 
responsibility to pay for animal welfare or food safety. The protest answers are summarised as follows: 
Respondents only stating a protest answer in A1 (40), respondents only stating a protest answer in A2 
(38) and respondents stating protest answers in both A1 and A2 are placed in the column “sample A”
(29). The same notations are used for Sample B. 
2) Respondents that have stated that they usually buy chicken below DKK 40 or above DKK110  are ex-
cluded from the analysis because our opt-out modelling does not allow that prices can take  other val-
ues than given in the choice sets (between DKK 40 and DKK 110 ). Respondents stating that they do 
not recall their latest purchases of chicken are excluded due to potential difficulties with regard to ra-
tionality. These variables are identical for A1 and A2 (and B1 and B2, respectively) as the respondents
are only asked once.  
3) Inconsistent answers include dominated choices. The same logic is used to present inconsistent answers 
as was used to present protest answers. That is, 41 answered inconsistently only in sample A1, 15 an-
swered inconsistently only in sample A2, and 3 answered inconsistently in both sample A1 and A2. 
Same logic applies for Sample B. 
 
 
 
Each of the 2,301 respondents answered 8 choice sets which produces a total number 
of 18,408 observations. In the estimations, observations from the same respondent are 
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treated as coming from 4 different respondents with identical socio-demographics and 
background information40. 
4.4. Representativeness with respect to socio-demographic factors 
First, the extent to which the sample can be compared to the data from Statistics 
Denmark is described. Next, the representativeness of the sample is tested by means 
of the chi test, below. 
 
χ2 – test 
A χ2 - test is a test concerning the independence between data. The test is based on the 
sum of quadratic deviations. The mathematical appearance of the test is as follows: 
 ( )∑∑
= =
−n
i
n
j ij
ijij
E
EA
1 1
2
   (4.1) 
 
Where Eij is the expected value of observation ij and Aij is the actual value of observa-
tion ij. The χ2-value is the probability that a value from the χ2 statistics (Malmberg 
1999), which is at least as large as the estimated χ2-value, could have been contained 
by a random draw, under an assumption of independence (Skovgaard et al. 1999:253; 
Excel 2003). A large value (e.g. χ2 = 10) indicates independence between data, and χ2 
= 0 indicates that the data being compared are identical. The number of parameters in 
the distribution are characterised as the degrees of freedom in the distribution. The χ 
test is widely used in statistical analyses. Examples of use of the chi test can be found 
in Hayes et al. (2002), Burton et al. (2004) and Mazzanti, M. (2003). 
 
Gender 
The data used in the survey, as well as by Statistics Denmark, include men and 
women in the age-group 18 - 99 years. Hence, gender in the two samples can be com-
pared without pooling any groups. The actual number of men and women in our sam-
ple is compared with the distribution of the number of men and women that would be 
expected in the Danish population. 
 
                                                 
40 That is, we do not use information that 1 respondent makes 4 choices to test whether variation 
within choices made by the same respondent is smaller than variation between choices made by dif-
ferent respondents. 
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Our sample has 47% women and 53% men whereas the general distribution is 49% 
women and 51% men. Whether these differences are statistically significant is re-
vealed by testing the hypothesis that the two samples have the same distribution. The 
test result is χ2 (1) = 4.8222. Thereby, the hypothesis is rejected and the data can be 
said to be significantly different at the *-level (5%-level). In short, the distribution of 
men and women in our sample is statistically different from the general gender distri-
bution in Denmark. When testing datasets A and B separately, however, the gender 
distribution within each sample was found not to differ significantly from the gender 
distribution in Denmark (the test is shown in Appendix C). 
 
Age 
The same groupings are used in our sample as by Statistics Denmark. As a result, the 
age distribution of men and women aged between 18 and 99 years can be compared 
directly. In Figure 4.1, the age distributions from our sample and in Denmark as a 
whole are presented. If our sample was completely representative, then the distribu-
tion of the Danish population could be used to forecast the distribution of our sample  
(in Figure 4.1 this is denoted the expected population)41  
 
Figure 4.1. The actual and expected age distribution of the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 For further explanations, see Appendix C.  
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With a test value χ2 (7) = 342.29 we can conclude that the data are significantly dif-
ferent from the general age distribution in Denmark at a ***-level (0,1% level). Look-
ing at the data more carefully reveals that the age group 67-99 years is underrepre-
sented in our sample. Furthermore, the age group 25-39 years is overrepresented. The 
questionnaire was sent out to a representative sample of the Danish population, but 
the older age groups are lost in the answering procedure. The questionnaire was sent 
out to 646 respondents in the age group 67-99 years, and with a response rate at 51.2 
%, 330 should have responded. However, only 79 were received and the reason may 
be the complexity of the questionnaire. Furthermore, the youngest group is also un-
derrepresented. This could be due to the lack of interest in the subject of food safety 
and food in general. The overrepresentation of the age group 25-39 years is poten-
tially due to their daily use of the internet or due to an increased interest of the subject 
food. The difference remains significant, however, even when these groups are re-
moved.  
 
A test of the age distribution in samples A and B reveals that the age distributions in 
both samples differ from the age distribution in the population as a whole (see Ap-
pendix C).  
 
Personal income 
The sample data cannot be compared directly with data from Statistics Denmark. 
Both datasets are based on gross income, but the data from Statistics Denmark ranges 
from the age of 15 years whereas the age range in our sample is 18 years and above. It 
is not possible to eliminate the age group 15-17 years from the dataset from Statistics 
Denmark. Therefore, the average income from Statistics Denmark is lower than in the 
present sample, due to an expectation that the youngest age group’s income is lower.  
 
Moreover, to unify the basis for comparison, the two highest income groups in our 
sample are pooled. In Figure 4.2, the income distributions from the sample and for 
Denmark as a whole are shown (see also Appendix C). 
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Figure 4.2. Actual and expected income distribution for the sample – excluding the 
                      age group 18-19 and 15-19 respectively 
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With a test value at χ2 (6) =  287.92, the two datasets are significantly different at the 
***-level. In the sample dataset, individuals with high or medium income are over-
represented, and individuals with low income are underrepresented. The overrepre-
sentation of high income groups can have an influence on the results such that the 
willingness to pay estimates could be overestimated.  
 
Where the age group 18-19 years is eliminated from the sample and the 15-19 years is 
eliminated from the data from Statistics Denmark, the comparability of the distribu-
tions improves, but the distributions themselves remain significantly different from 
each other. 
 
Furthermore, the distributions in the samples A and B were tested individually and 
similar results were found. Therefore, these are not presented in this paper. 
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Education 
The groupings in our sample are not totally comparable with the groupings used by 
Statistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark lists the highest education for age groups be-
tween 15 and 69 years, whereas our sample covers age groups between 18 and 99 
years. In the data from Statistics Denmark it is not possible to include individuals 
older than 67 and it is not possible to exclude the groups from 15 to 17 without ex-
cluding the age group 18-19 years.   
 
Moreover, to compare the data, two socio-demographic variables from the question-
naire (question Q7 and Q8 in the socio-demographic questions) have to be combined. 
The groups concerning primary school education in question Q7 is pooled with “none 
of these” in question Q8 to obtain one group of primary school educated respondents.  
 
Finally, breaking the education levels down into “basic vocational education” and 
“completed vocational education” does not correspond to the groupings in Statistics 
Denmark. In order to compare these groups with the groups from Statistics Denmark, 
the two groups are pooled to a single category “vocational”.  
 
The chi test reveals that the data are significantly different at a ***-level. The high 
significant of this result is due to the way the data are pooled and the fact that the 
sample from ACNielsen was not mailed to a representative sample regarding educa-
tion. A closer look reveals that highly educated (academic) respondents are over-
represented compared with the Danish population. This might also explain the over-
representation of the medium and high income groups.  
 
In Appendix C, the descriptive statistics for the divisions A and B are shown for the 
educational variable. Dividing the sample into these two groups does not change the 
conclusion – the educational distribution in the groups over represent academics and 
under represent other education types. 
 
County 
The sample can be directly compared with data from Statistics Denmark. With a test 
value at χ2 (14) = 153.48, the county distribution of the sample is significantly differ-
ent from the distribution of the Danish population.  
 
A closer look at the single counties, reveal that Copenhagen municipality is very 
much overrepresented and that Storstrøms County, Viborg County and North Jutland 
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County are underrepresented. If these Counties are removed, the remaining counties 
are still not distributed in a representative way (see Appendix C). 
 
Children 
The number of children living at home for the respondents in our sample can be di-
rectly compared with Statistics Denmark’s data. The basis is all men and women in 
the age 18 years or above. The distribution of children living at home is shown in 
Figure 4 in Appendix C.   
 
The test value χ2 (3) =  16.56, means that the distribution of children in our sample 
and SD?? are significantly different at the ***-level. From Figure 4 in Appendix C, 
the reason for this result could be the respective under- and overrepresentation of 
number of respondents with, respectively, 2 and 3 children. By pooling these two 
groups, the sample no longer differs significantly from the Danish population as a 
whole. The result of pooling the two groups is shown in Figure 4.3, below. 
 
Figure 4.3. Actual and expected distribution of the number of children of the re-
spondents in the sample when pooling two groups.  
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Summary of socio-demographic variables 
The resemblance between our sample and the Danish population was not overwhelm-
ingly satisfactory. In fact, gender and number of children in the household were the 
only two socio-demographic variables where the distributions are statistically compa-
rable with the distribution apparent in the Danish population. A lesson has been 
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learned with respect to choice of socio-demographic variables. As Statistics Denmark 
has the most comprehensive database for descriptions of the Danish population and 
activities and, another time, greater emphasis would be given to matching their group-
ings.   
 
In summary  our sample is overrepresented with respect to high income groups, aca-
demics, the age groups 30-60 and residents in Copenhagen. These are exactly the 
groups that could be expected to have higher willingness to pay for quality attributes 
of food products so the information will be used in the evaluation of the estimation 
results. The imbalance with respect to the respresentativeness of the sample is not so 
unusual, however. The same imbalance is found in Olsen et al. (2005); Hasler et al. 
(2005); Lundhede et al. (2005) and Ladenburg et al. (2005).  
4.5. Attitudes 
In this section the distribution of the attitudinal questions are put forward. The ques-
tions concern the attitude towards the importance of different food characteristics re-
lated to food safety and animal welfare, the source of information and consumer be-
haviour. The basis for the description is the 2,301 respondents, who all answered the 
questionnaire consistently and rationally, as described above. All distributions are 
shown as the percentage of the sample with the given attitude. The tables underlying 
the graphs are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present examples of the type of results produced by the question-
naire. Figure 4.4 demonstrates that more than 55% find that breeding method is im-
portant, less than 15% find it unimportant and that 30% are neutral. Figure 4.5 shows 
that just over 50% find it important that a chicken is campylobacter-free whereas only 
10% disagree (35% are neutral and the rest do not know). 
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Figure 4.4. Question 6: It is important that the product is campylobacter-free 
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The respondents state that important characteristics of the food they consume include 
low fat content, low campylobacter content, good animal welfare, domestic produc-
tion and the appearance of the product (Figure C5-10 in Appendix C, Question 6) and 
44% state that price is important. Also, 32% state it is important that the product is 
organic and 30 % of the respondents state that they purchase organic chickens as well 
as campylobacter-free chickens (Figure C6 and C37 Appendix C, Question 6 & 22). 
An interesting aspect is that whereas 70% of the respondents are aware that they can 
avoid campylobacter by good kitchen hygiene, 45% state that they would not wish to 
have campylobacter in their kitchen. This is despite the fact that contamination can be 
avoided with good kitchen hygiene (Figure C11 and C18, Appendix C, Question 7 & 
15). This indicates that consumers simply do not want to have campylobacter inside 
their homes.  
 
Most respondents agree with the statement that the outdoor breeding method is asso-
ciated with higher animal welfare, whereas respondents are insecure with respect to 
the influence of breeding method on campylobacter contamination (Figure C13 and 
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C14, Appendix C, Question 14). This indicates that respondents do not perceive the 
two attributes as being interrelated – which is an indication of non-multicollinearity. 
 
In general, the respondents consider the ongoing debate on animal welfare issues to 
be of great importance, whereas the debate on food safety issues as campylobacter 
seems to divide the population in two (Figure C15 and C19, Appendix C, Question 
15). Moreover, the respondents state that it is the responsibility of the producers to 
secure the higher animal welfare and safe food products (Figure C20, Appendix C, 
Question 15). If the government could ensure a credible label, 50-60% of the con-
sumers would be willing to pay more for a safer product from more animal-welfare 
oriented production (Figure C21 and C22, Appendix C, Question 15). 
 
The respondents state that only information from the government or public authorities 
is credible, whereas information from the producers/industry divides the population in 
two – one group trusts them and the other group mistrusts them (Figure C26-32, Ap-
pendix C, Question 16).   
 
Respondents are more familiar with salmonella than with campylobacter, 99.78 % 
were aware of salmonella, whereas only 84% were aware of campylobacter (Figure 
C33, Appendix C, Question 17 and 18). Almost one half of the respondents state that 
their knowledge of salmonella has influenced their answers regarding campylobacter 
(Figure C34, Appendix C, Question 19), which indicates that they might have diffi-
culties distinguishing between salmonella and campylobacter or have interpreted the 
food safety aspect as a whole – not as campylobacter and salmonella, respectively. 
This is, furthermore, supported when the respondents state whether or not they buy 
chickens labelled campylobacter-free. 30% of the respondents state that they buy 
chickens labelled campylobacter-free (Figure C38, Appendix C, Question 22). This 
share seems relatively large. Finally, the average market price for chickens bought by 
respondents was DKK 57. 
 
Finally, the respondents’ perception of their own health is dependent on their age – 
the older they are the greater they perceive the risk of getting infected with campylo-
bacter (Figure C39 in Appendix C).  
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5. Estimation of consumer behaviour 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, consumer behaviour is investigated based on the choice experiment 
data. The first four sections describe the estimation process. In Section 5.2, present 
preliminary non-parametric analyses of the relationship between the price attribute 
and the frequency of choice are presented. In Section 5.3, the case for use of the pro-
bit model and dummy coding is made. In Section 5.4, the econometric analysis con-
cerned with testing significance of explanatory variables and merging sub-samples is 
presented. The entire testing process, from the basic to the final model of consumer 
behaviour, involves seven models – all included in Section 5.4.   
 
The last three sections describe and discuss the results. In Section 5.5, the final and 
most important models are presented and commented upon. The results of the final 
models are stated in terms of willingness to pay estimates (whereas during the model-
ling process in Section 5.4, the marginal utilities of the attributes are considered). In 
Section 5.6, individual specific variables are included to obtain more detailed infor-
mation on differences in behaviour across consumer types. These include socio-
demographic characteristics, respondent characteristics and stated attitudes.  
5.2. Non-parametric analyses 
By means of non-parametric analyses, it is possible to assess how the frequency by 
which a chicken is chosen relates to the price levels of the chickens. This type of 
analysis provides an intuitive illustration of a simple demand curve for chicken meat, 
when the product is only described by its price (differences in the other attribute are 
not considered). Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the total cumulative number of times a 
chicken is chosen as a function of its price in the two samples – A and B. Sample A is 
the sample where information regarding campylobacter is provided, while Sample B 
is the sample with information of animal welfare provided. The cumulative number of 
choices before and after the information for each of the two samples is the same (ap-
proximately 4,500). This is due to the fact that each respondent has answered the 
same number of choice sets with and without information.  
 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate well that the demand for chicken decreases with increas-
ing price. Figure 5.1 illustrates the cumulative choices in sample A, before and after 
information regarding campylobacter is provided. Figure 5.2 shows cumulative 
choices in sample B, before and after information regarding animal welfare is pre-
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sented. Furthermore, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 illustrate how the choice of chicken is 
affected by information provision. Thereby, the graphs provide rough indications on 
whether information affects the consumer behaviour.  
 
Figure 5.1. Relation between price (in DKK) and frequency of chosen alternative 
for the respondents who received information regarding campylobac-
ter (sample A). 
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Figure 5.1 indicates that the choice of chicken does not change after information re-
garding campylobacter is given - this indicates that there is no information effect re-
garding campylobacter for a chicken that is only described by its price.    
 
Figure 5.2 reveals that provision of information regarding animal welfare has some 
effect on consumer behaviour as more respondents choose chicken at the higher price 
levels after information regarding animal welfare is given. Hence, Figure 5.2 indicates 
that the price is not the only factor that determines the choice of chicken – breeding 
information, at least, also affects the choice.  
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Figure 5.2. Relation between price (in DKK) and frequency of chosen alternative 
for the respondents who received information regarding animal wel-
fare (sample B). 
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The demand curves in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 also indicate that the choke price of 110 
DKK has not been set perfectly, as the maximum price of 110 DKK was chosen 
roughly 700 times, corresponding to a rate of 3%. Apart from, of course, an ideal 
situation, where the choke price is not chosen by any respondents, no exact limits ap-
ply for the percentage which is acceptable. As a rule of thumb, this should be less 
than 5% of the total number of choices. Hence, according to this rule of thumb, our 
maximum price can serve as an acceptable choke price. Furthermore, only 14 respon-
dents state that they usually buy chicken at prices above 110 DKK (cf. Table 4.1) 
which also indicates that our choice of maximum price is close to the choke price. In 
actual fact, a potentially more serious problem is that more than 15% of the respon-
dents state that they usually buy chicken below the minimum price of 40 DKK (see 
Table 4.1). This indicates that our minimum price is too high which might result an 
overestimated WTP.  
 
The above observations can also be formulated in terms of price sensitivity. Figure 
5.2 shows that the number of times a chicken at a certain price is chosen is more sta-
ble after information about breeding methods has been given than before. Hence, it 
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can be said that the choices are less sensitive to price change, after breeding informa-
tion is given. In general, small price sensitivities reflect that other attributes than the 
price are important (and vice versa, large price sensitivities represent preferences 
where price is an important attribute).  
 
These relationships between choice of chicken, prices and information provide simple 
overviews of the choice behaviours. This might be too simple an overview, as, by 
employing the choice experiment method, it is assumed that choice of food products 
is not based on a single factor (price). Consumer behaviour is a result of a complex 
decision process where a myriad of factors are taken into account – with or without 
the consumers being aware of the importance of the individual factors. These com-
plex patterns can be identified by engaging in statistical analyses that allow us to in-
clude multiple factors simultaneously. Thereby, the significance and magnitude of the 
effect that each of the individual factors has on consumer choice can be determined. 
This is carried out in the following sections. 
5.3. Choice of econometric model 
A random utility presentation of a discrete choice model is typically analysed using 
either a logit or a probit model. These include binary logit, multinomial (also denoted 
conditional logit), nested logit, mixed logit and probit42 models. Binary logit models 
are restricted to analyses of binary choices and allow only very restricted substitution 
patterns between alternatives. Their popularity in earlier discrete choice surveys is 
mainly due to the closed form solution of the probability density function. Over the 
last two decades, however, a rapid increase in the computational powers of computers 
and increased focus and research in discrete choice models has opened up for a much 
wider range of models that can be used to estimate more complex consumer behav-
iour. These can allow for heterogeneous consumers and more complex substitution 
patterns between alternatives. Today, simulation is an important tool in estimating 
discrete choice models as only the simplest models do not involve open integrals 
(Munizaga et al.  2000).  
 
Important properties of choice models 
In relation to consumer behaviour, it is found that an operational method for choosing 
an econometric model is based on its capability of including taste variations, flexibil-
                                                 
42 When referring to probit, multinomial probit is actually meant, as opposed to binary probit since 
the choice sets involve more than 2 alternatives. 
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ity in substitution patterns, and correlations across time as well as across alternatives 
(Train 2003). These properties are described, in turn, below.  
 
Random taste variation: In a standard logit model (binary, multinomial logit), it is 
implicitly assumed that preferences are identical for all consumers. Mathematically, 
this means that all individual specific variables “drop out” when utility differences 
between alternatives are calculated. Therefore, taste variations linked to observed, as 
well as unobserved variables, cannot be examined directly in a standard logit model. 
However, individual specific variables linked to observed variables might interact 
with alternative specific attributes – hence, by considering cross effects, identification 
can be made of how marginal utilities of an attribute depend on different individual 
factors. For example, interacting gender with the animal welfare attribute would gen-
erate information about the marginal utility of animal welfare as a function of gender. 
This is a simple approach that provides insight into the heterogeneity of consumers. 
Altogether, Holmes & Adamowicz (2003) mention three ways to modify the assump-
tion of identical consumers: 1) by including interaction effects with observed vari-
ables (as mentioned above) 2) by estimating a latent class model or 3) by using a ran-
dom parameter/mixed logit or probit model. In short, all the above-mentioned models 
can include taste variation when this is linked to observable variables (such as socio-
demographic variables), but only mixed logit and probit can include differences in 
tastes that are linked to unobserved characteristics (unobservable personal characteris-
tics). 
 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. A standard logit model requires independ-
ence between the ratios of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives of the avail-
ability of other alternatives. This is also formulated as the model exhibiting independ-
ence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Holmes and Adamovicz, 2003, Footnote 
17)43. Mixed logit and probit models do not exhibit independence of irrelevant alter-
                                                 
43 The restrictive nature of the IIA assumption is often illustrated by the red-bus/ blue-bus problem 
(Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1985). Consider a choice between going to work by car or with a blue bus. 
For simplicity, assume that the utility for the two means of transport and the probabilities are equal 
(to ½) such that the probability ratio is one (Pc/Pbb=1). Now a new bus is introduced, a red bus. 
One would expect this would not affect the probability of choosing the car, but that the probability 
of choosing a bus would be shared between the two types of buses ( 4
1== bbrb PP ).
e bus has to remain on
 However, 
when using a logit model, the probability ratio between the car and the blu e. 
The only probabilities where these ratios are one are when 31=== rbbbc PPP . This only reflects 
a real life situation if the bus colour matters. If the colours do not matter, a logit model would over-
estimate the demand for the two bus modes. 
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natives44. The property only causes problems when the individuals are faced with 
more than two alternatives in the choice sets (Train 1986; Freeman 1993). 
 
Correlation of unobserved variables. A standard logit model requires independence 
of unobserved factors (Train, 2003). Mixed logit and probit models allow unobserved 
factors to be correlated across choice sets or over time (panel data characteristics).45  
If the unobserved factors that affect decision-makers are independent over repeated 
choices then a standard logit can be used to examine panel data in the same way as 
purely cross-sectional data (Train, 2003, p. 55). In this respect, the standard logit 
models can be interpreted as the perfect models – in that, if all relevant variables are 
included successfully in estimation of the choice decision, then only white noise is 
left (Train, 2003, p. 39). However, if the researcher thinks that the unobserved portion 
of utility is correlated over alternatives, given the specification of the observed part of 
utility, then the researcher has 3 options: to use a different model that allows for cor-
related errors (for, example mixed logit or probit) 2) to re-specify the model 3) to use 
the logit under the present specification, considering the model to be an approxima-
tion (Train, 2003, p. 40).  
 
Choosing the probit model 
The choice of model in the present analysis is based on an assessment of 1) how im-
portant the above mentioned properties are in relation to our analysis, 2) the statistical 
fit of the models, and 3) how well the models capture the decision structure that the 
respondents seem to using.  
 
First, random taste variation was considered. As it was the intention to include only 
heterogeneity between consumers that is linked to observable variables, the random 
taste variation is not an important restriction. Second, the decision structure was as-
sessed and the nested logit and multinomial logit were compared. The statistical fits 
were very similar, so the models could not be distinguished on that criteria. The con-
                                                 
44 Luce (1959) considered IIA as an assumption of the logit model, which he used to derive the logit 
model from (Train 2003). In the later literature, the property of IIA has been seen as a resulting 
property of the logit model instead of an assumption of the model (Train 2003). 
45 Train (2003) p. 55. In a market research survey, respondents are often asked a series of hypotheti-
cal choice questions called stated preference experiments. For each experiment, a set of alternative 
products with different attribute levels is described, and the respondent is asked to state which 
product he would choose. A series of such questions is asked with varying attribute levels so as to 
determine how the respondents choice changes when the attribute level changes. The researcher, 
therefore, observes a sequence of choices by each respondent. Data that represents repeated choices 
just as these are called panel data. 
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sumers face 3 choices in each choice set (2 real alternatives and an opt-out). As re-
flection of a real shopping situation with a well-known good is aimed for, it is most 
likely that the characteristics of the two real alternatives affect a decision of whether 
to buy it or not. This means that a nested logit is not suitable46. Therefore, it was 
found that the decision structure that respondents can be expected to use is better cap-
tured by a multinomial logit than a nested logit. Thirdly, the IIA is addressed. The 
opt-out alternative was chosen 15% of the time (2,792 times out of 18,408), so it must 
be concluded that the presence of the opt-out alternative has influenced the choice be-
tween the two alternatives. This means that it cannot be assumed that the choices be-
tween the two real alternatives would have been the same if the op-out option had not 
been present. Therefore, it is not appropriate to use a standard logit due to the exhibi-
tion of IIA. Finally, the choice comes to one of a probit or mixed logit model. The 
probit model produced the best statistical fit – hence, this is the model chosen in the 
estimations. The underlying models and tests are found in Appendix G. An overview 
over the typical models used in discrete choice modelling is provided in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. Overview over econometric models and their relation to the preference 
structure 
 
Type of econometric model Restriction on the 
preference structure 
Comments 
Binary and 
multinomial 
logit 
Nested 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Probit 
Random taste variation 
can be linked to unob-
servable variables  
Heterogeneity across 
consumers can be 
captured 
No No Yes Yes 
Requires independ-
ence from irrelevant 
alternatives  
Strong restriction on 
consumers choice 
Yes Not IIA 
across 
nests 
No No 
Correlation of unob-
served factors  
Panel data structure 
can be captured 
No No Yes Yes 
Distribution of error 
term 
 Gumbel Gumbel Anything Normal 
 
 
 
                                                 
46If all alternatives are included simultaneously in the decision-making, and if the choice between 
alternative is not affected by introduction of additional alternatives, then a conditional logit is ap-
propriate. Let us consider our choice experiment where respondents are faced with choice sets that 
include real alternatives and an opt-out alternative. If the respondents only choose to opt-out to a 
status quo or to zero if the real alternatives are not attractive enough, then the real and the opt-out 
alternatives are to be considered as alternatives with equal substitution. If this is the case, a condi-
tional logit model can be used (Lauridsen 2005). 
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Choice of coding and opt-out 
A dummy coding scheme is chosen with an alternative specific constant describing 
the opt-out alternative (the choice between dummy and effect coding is discussed in 
Appendix D and E).  
 
The respondents stated in the questionnaire the kind of chicken they normally would 
buy and the price of this chicken. This information has been interpreted as the re-
spondents' own opt-out values which represents the chicken product they opt-out to 
(Appendix E).  
5.4. Estimating consumer behaviour  
The estimation procedure in this section takes us through seven models distinguished 
according to how attributes and information affect consumer choice. An overview of 
the models might ease the reading. Below, the main characteristics of the models are 
stated. 
 
1. Attributes with and without campylobacter information affect consumer choice 
(Sample A). 
2. Attributes with and without breeding information affect consumer choice (Sam-
ple B). 
3. Consumer choice is not affected by campylobacter information (Sample A). 
4. Consumer choice is affected by breeding information (Sample B).  
5. There are no differences between attributes without information (Samples A and 
B are merged) 
6. Description of consumer choice without distinguishing between information lev-
els (Samples A and B).  
7. Consumer choice depends on the joint effects of the attributes and breeding in-
formation (Samples A and B).    
 
The first 4 models are analysed separately in samples A and B. The last 3 models are 
analysed in the joined data set. Model 7 is the final model, but all 3 models in the 
joined data set are interpreted and discussed with respect to the willingness to pay 
estimates in Section 5.5.  
 
The econometric analysis of consumer choice is based on the choice of model in Sec-
tion 5.3. A multinomial probit model is used, using a dummy coding scheme with an 
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alternative specific constant describing the opt-out alternative. This model is used to 
estimate the main effects, as well as the interaction effects. 
5.4.1. The basic main effect model 
In the basic model, the attributes for animal welfare and food safety in the 4 datasets 
(A1, A2, B1, B2) are different attributes. In each of the 4 datasets 3 attributes are in-
cluded (animal welfare, food safety, and price) to test for main effects. For example, it 
is assumed that animal welfare actually covers 4 attributes, namely animal welfare 
with and without campylobacter information and animal welfare with and without 
breeding information. An overview of the explanatory variables (including 12 attrib-
utes and 4 alternative specific constants) in the four datasets is provided in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2. Overview over the explanatory variables in the basic model. 
 
 Sample A 
(campylobacter information) 
Sample B 
(breeding method information) 
Before in-
formation 
A1 
Breeding method without campylobacter 
information (s1ij)  
Campylobacter contents without campy-
lobacter information (s2ij) 
Prices without campylobacter information 
(s3ij) 
Alternative specific constant without cam-
pylobacter information (ASC1i) 
B1 
Breeding method without breeding informa-
tion (s7ij) 
Campylobacter contents without breeding 
information (s8ij)   
Prices without breeding information (s9ij) 
Alternative specific constant without breed-
ing information (ASC3i) 
After 
Information 
A2  
Breeding method with campylobacter 
information (s4ij)   
Campylobacter contents with campylo-
bacter information (s5ij)   
Prices with campylobacter information 
(s6ij) 
Alternative specific constant with campy-
lobacter information (ASC2i) 
B2 
Breeding method with breeding information 
(s10ij) 
Campylobacter contents with breeding in-
formation (s11ij)  
Prices with breeding information (s12ij) 
Alternative specific constant with breeding 
information (ASC4i) 
 
Note: The indices ij refer to individual i and alternative j. 
 
 
 
Our basic model is built upon the hypotheses:  
 
- H1 The attributes before and after receiving campylobacter information have sig-
nificant effects on the choice probability (the coefficients are significantly differ-
ent from zero) (Sample A) 
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- H2 The attributes before and after receiving breeding information have significant 
effects on the choice probability (the coefficients are significantly different from 
zero) (Sample B) 
 
The coefficients are estimated using a maximum likelihood approach. The estimations 
are carried out for the two datasets, A and B, separately as the datasets involve differ-
ent respondents. Testing the significance of attributes with and without information, 
on the other hand, can be performed within a sample. The model related to Sample A 
that is described in the formula (5.1), includes 6 attributes, 2 alternative specific con-
stants and an error term. Similarly, the model related to Sample B is described in 
(5.2): 
 
 
(Model 1) (5.1) 
ijii
k
kijkij ASCASCsU εβ +++= ∑
=
21
6
1
 
 
(
(Model 2) (5.2) 
k
ijiikijkij ASCASCsU εβ +++= ∑
=
43
12
7
 
where the first index k refers to attribute (k=1,..,12), second index i refers to individ-
ual (i=1,.., 18408), and third index j refers to alternative (j=1,.., 32). The attribute (skij) 
for attribute k and individual i in alternative j and the alternative specific constants are 
defined in Table 5.2. The error terms εij are jointly normally distributed. 
 
The two levels in each of food safety and animal welfare are dummy coded as 0 and 
1, respectively. For example, for the animal welfare attribute (that is for k=1,4,7,10), 
the dummy coding involves skij=1 if  animal welfare is characterised as ‘outdoor’ for 
individual i in alternative j and skij =0 if the animal welfare level is characterised by 
“indoor’’. Similarly, for food safety (k=2,5,8,11), skij =1 if food safety is “campylo-
bacter-free” for the i’s respondent in alternative j and skij =0 if the food safety level is 
“not labelled”. Thereby, in general, the coefficients are interpreted as additional utility 
above level 0. The price attribute is a discrete variable that can obtain 8 different val-
ues – it is modelled as a continuous variable. The ASC is interpreted as the value of 
everything that is not captured in the attributes, which can be interpreted as the 
(dis)utility of not choosing any of the two constructed alternatives provided (the mar-
ginal utility of opting-out, see also Appendix E).  
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The estimation results are summarised below in Table 5.4. The tests showed that all 
parameter coefficients are significant and the signs of the coefficients are all as ex-
pected (the price coefficient and the coefficient for the alternative specific constant 
are negative, the rest being positive), and that the hypotheses H1 and H2 can be ac-
cepted.  
 
If it is accepted that the hypotheses result in Model 1 (Sample A) and Model 2 (Sam-
ple B), then it is stated that food safety, animal welfare and price (all attributes con-
sidered with and without information) have significant effects on consumer choice.  
5.4.2. Effect of information  
The next step is to test whether some of the attributes are considered identical by con-
sumers. Samples A and B are kept separate. The aim is to test whether consumers dis-
tinguish between the attributes without and with campylobacter information in Sam-
ple A and whether they distinguish between attributes without and with breeding in-
formation in Sample B. Based on the preliminary non-parametric statistic analyses 
performed in Section 5.2, the following hypotheses are formed: 
• H3 The coefficients before and after receiving campylobacter information in 
Sample A are not distinguishable (campylobacter information does not affect the 
consumers’ choice). 
• H4 The coefficients before and after receiving information about production sys-
tems in Sample B are distinguishable (breeding information does affect the con-
sumers’ choice). 
 
These hypotheses can be tested through a t-test (Bech et al. 2004), using the Delta 
method described by Hanemann & Kanninen (1998). For Model 1 and Model 2, re-
spectively, the coefficients of the attributes with information, and without, are tested 
against each other. The t-test is a generalised form of the ordinary Students t-test, 
where the t-value is calculated as follows: 
 
2
2
2
1
21
ss
t
+
−= ββ                              
 
where s12 and s22 are the corresponding variance estimates. The test results are sum-
marised in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3. Tests for whether attributes are perceived identical with – and without 
information in samples A and B. 
 
 
Model 1: Sample A 
 
Model 2: Sample B 
 
  t-value significance t-value Significance 
     
Outdoor bred (with/without infor-
mation) -0.7125 Ns -8.8091 *** 
Campylobacter-free (with/without 
information)  1.6106 Ns 1.2848 Ns 
Price (with/without information) -0.0712 Ns -3.7142 *** 
ASC (with/without information) 0.7641 Ns -1.8653 * 
 
Note: For Sample A, information refers to campylobacter information whereas in Sample B, information refers 
t  breeding information. o
 
 
 
For the t-test in Sample A, Table 5.3 shows that there are no significant differences 
between the coefficients for attributes with campylobacter information, and without. 
This implies that there is no information effect with regard to campylobacter. In Sec-
tion 5.6, an attempt is made to identify potential underlying reasons for this.  
 
The above leads to the acceptance of H3 which gives the main effect model for Sam-
ple A with the attributes food safety, animal welfare and price (without distinction be-
tween whether or not campylobacter information has been provided). This is termed 
Model 3 in Table 5.4. 
 
For Sample B, who received information regarding breeding method, there are sig-
nificant differences between the coefficients for attributes with information and with-
out. More precisely, breeding information has a significant effect on marginal utility 
of animal welfare, but the marginal utility of campylobacter-free chicken is not af-
fected by animal welfare information. The animal welfare information also affects the 
price sensitivity as consumers become less price-sensitive after having received in-
formation concerning animal welfare. This can be interpreted as consumers placing 
less importance on the price attribute and more importance on animal welfare after 
information about animal welfare is provided. These results make intuitive sense. Fur-
thermore, the disutility of opting-out (captured by the ASC) becomes significantly 
lower when the information regarding animal welfare is given.  
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This leads to acceptance of H4, which gives the main effect model for Sample B with 
the attributes animal welfare, food safety and price (all attributes depend on whether 
breeding information has been provided). This is termed Model 4 in Table 5.4.  
5.4.3. Merging the two samples    
The next step is to compare the two samples, A and B. The datasets A1 and B1 (that 
is, attributes without campylobacter and breeding information, respectively) are only 
distinguished from each other by being two different random samples of the popula-
tion. It would be desirable to test the hypothesis that the coefficients for the two sam-
ples without information are identical. The hypothesis is supported by looking at 
Model 3 and 4 in Table 5.4 – it can be seen that the estimated coefficients before in-
formation is provided in Samples A and B are in the same range.  
• H5 The coefficients before information is provided about campylobacter (Sample 
A) are indistinguishable from coefficients before breeding information is pro-
vided (Sample B) (the two samples behave similarly). 
 
Before the tests can be carried out, however, it is important to check for scaling, 
which occurs if the models reflect different underlying scales (Ruby et al. 1998). If 
there are no scaling effects between the two samples, A and B, then we can join the 
datasets A1, A2, and B1 (i.e. attributes without campylobacter information, attributes 
with campylobacter information and attributes without breeding information, respec-
tively, are perceived by consumers in an identical manner.  
 
It is desirable to test the following general hypothesis: 
 
21: ββ =sH  and 21 σσ =  
 
The variance differences are estimated under the assumption of parameter equality, 
followed by testing the assumption of equality of the parameters. The scaling test also 
gives a tool to correct for a possible scaling effect, by identifying the scale parameter, 
which can be used as “correcting” factor. In this project, the scaling issue is of con-
cern when comparing the coefficients between Sample A and B (A and B1), and be-
tween the coefficients with and without information in Sample A (A1 and A2). The 
tests revealed that no scaling between the two samples exists, hence the Samples A 
and B1 can be joined. The scaling test is shown in Appendix F.  
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This leads to acceptance of H5. This results in a main effect model in the joint dataset 
with the attributes animal welfare, food safety, and price (all attributes depend on 
whether breeding information has been provided). This is termed Model 5 in Table 
5.4, where the estimate statistics are presented. Note that in Model 5, food safety 
without breeding information includes 3 attributes (“food safety without campylobac-
ter information”, “food safety with campylobacter information” and “food safety 
without breeding information”). Hence, Model 5 incorporates that information about 
campylobacter is not of importance to the consumer, and that provision information 
regarding animal welfare does have a significant effect on the probability of choosing 
a specific chicken product. Finally, the individuals become less price-sensitive and 
the disutility of opting out decreases when information regarding animal welfare is 
given. Model 5 can be written as: 
 
(5.3) 
ijii
k
kijkij ASCASCsU εβ +++= ∑
=
41
12,11,10,9,8,7
 
where the variables are defined in Table 5.2 
 
In short, Model 5 shows that food safety and animal welfare affect consumer choice 
and that animal welfare information affects tha valuation of these attributes. Model 5 
is the resulting main effect model. The willingness to pay estimates will be presented 
for this main effect model in Table 5.6, together with the willingness to pay estimates 
for Models 6 and 7 (see below).   
5.4.4. Main effects in the joint model without distinction between information 
levels  
It has been demonstrated that consumers’ perception of attributes change when breed-
ing information is provided. Hence, there is no statistical justification for setting out a 
main effect model which does not include differences in information given to the re-
spondent. Nevertheless, this model is included as a simple reference model of how the 
willingness to pay for food safety and animal welfare can be explained by the levels 
of these two attributes. 
 
- H6 The attributes food safety, animal welfare and price have significant effects on 
consumer choice (irrespective of whether information is provided). 
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The hypothesis is accepted which leads to Model 6, but it is seen from Table 5.4 that 
the statistical fit of Model 6 is not as good as of that of Model 5. Model 6 captures the 
effects of food safety, animal welfare and price on consumer choice (when the con-
sumers’ information levels are not known). The willingness to pay estimates for 
Model 6 will be presented as they provide an intuitive reference for the willingness to 
pay estimates that are established in the more detailed models (Model 5 and 7), see 
Table 5.6.  
5.4.5. Cross effects in the joint model  
The best main effect model is Model 5. Based on this model, cross effects are tested 
for. For example, this includes testing whether the willingness to pay for avoiding 
campylobacter depends on whether the chicken is raised indoors or outdoors. A 
model capturing the interaction between the two attributes, production system and 
campylobacter, is presented based on the following hypothesis:  
 
- H7 The coefficients for main as well as cross effects have significant effects on the 
choice probability.  
 
More specifically, the hypothesis is tested in the following model:  
 
 
(5.4) 
ijiiijijijij
k
kijkij ASCASCsssssU εβββ +++++= ∑
=
411110111,108778
12,11,10,9,8,7
where the main effects include food safety, animal welfare and price – all character-
ised with and without breeding information (as defined in Table 5.2), and the cross 
effects are defined as:  
• The cross effect s1ij s2ij is the joint effect of a chicken being raised outdoors 
and campylobacter-free without breeding information that individual i ob-
serves in alternative j. 
• The cross effect s10ij s11ij is the joint effect of a chicken being raised outdoors 
and campylobacter-free with breeding information that individual i observes 
in alternative j. 
 
Similar to the coding of the main effects, the cross effect is dummy coded with the 
factor skij=1 if the j’s alternative for individual i is outdoor and campylobacter-free 
whereas skij=0 in all other cases (campylobacter-free and indoor, not campylobacter 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 117
 
118 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 
and indoor, not campylobacter labelled and outdoor). Hence, the coefficients should 
be interpreted as the extra value of campylobacter-free and outdoor compared with 
the levels that are dummy coded as 0.  
 
Hypothesis H7 is accepted leading to Model 7 of cross effects as presented in Table 
5.4. The explanatory power of the models is very stable across models, with a slight 
increase from Model 5 to Model 7 (cf. Table 5.4). The willingness to pay estimates 
for the cross effect model are presented in Table 5.6. 
 
  
 
Table 5.4. Summery of estimated models (The standard deviations are written in italic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model    11 2 31 4 5 62 7 
 
Choice 
Sample 
A  
Sample 
B  Sample A 
Sample 
B  
Sample 
A+B 
Main effects 
without in-
formation 
distinction  
 
Sample 
A+B 
Main ef-
fect mode 
with in-
formation 
distinc-
tion  
Sample A+B 
Cross ef-
fects mode 
with informa-
tion distinc-
tion 
Outdoor bred (without information) 0.58      0.65 0.55 0.65 0.61 0.72 0.40
 0.03 0.030.03 0.03 0.019    
       
      
       
     
       
        
     
       
       
    
    
      
       
     
       
      
       
      
0.02 0.04
Outdoor bred (with information) 
 
0.61 1.09 - 1.10 0.49 - 0.49
0.03 0.04 0.04- 0.04 - 0.039
Campylobacter-free (without infor-
mation) 0.76 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.48
0.03 0.020.03 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.05
Campylobacter-free (with informa-
tion) 0.68 0.64 - - - - -
0.03 0.04 - - - - -
Outdoor bred AND campylobacter-
free (with information) 
 
- - - - - - 0.43 
- - - - - - 0.08
Price (without information) 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
0.001 0.0007
 
0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
Price (with information) 
 
-0.03 -0.03 - -0.03 0.005 - 0.005 
0.001 0.001 0.001- 0.001 - 0.001
ASC (without information) 
 
-1.78 -1.85 -1.85 -1.86 -1.88 -1.70 -1.87
0.15 0.140.163 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.11
ASC (with information) 
 
-1.93 -1.44 - -1.44
 
0.51 - 0.51
0.15 0.15 - 0.15 0.06 - 0.063
STD (opt-out) - - - - 2.12 2.06 2.07
  - - - - 0.11 0.11 0.10 
LRI 0.2725 0.27210.2706 0.2705 0.2711 0.2652 0.2719
N        
         
9440 8968 9440 8968 18408 18408 18408
Log L -7545 -7187 -7549 -7188 -14741 -14860 -14725
 
Note 1. For Model 1 and 3, information refers to campylobacter information whereas in Model 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, information refers to information 
regarding breeding method. 
2) In Model 6, we have not distinguished between information levels in defining attributes 3) All coefficients are significant 0.1% level 
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 5.5. Results on consumer behaviour   
It is now time to present, interpret and comment upon the results. The model that pro-
vides the best explanation of consumers’ willingness to pay for food safety and ani-
mal welfare is mainly characterised by that 1) it includes interaction between the at-
tributes 2) breeding information affects attribute values and 3) campylobacter infor-
mation does not affect attribute values.  
 
The utility of a given chicken product can be described as a linear combination of the 
attributes (breeding method, campylobacter risk, joint effect of breeding method and 
campylobacter risk, and price) and a normally distributed error term. More specifi-
cally, in the final cross effects model, the utility of alternative j for individual i can be 
written as follows (with the variable names as described in Table 5.5). 
  
 
(5.4 re-stated) 
ijiiijijijij
k
kijkij ASCASCsssssU εβββ +++++= ∑
=
411110111,108778
12,11,10,9,8,7
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Table 5.5. Explanatory variables in the resulting cross effects model. 
 
Variable 
name 
 
Variable description 
 
utility 
parameter
 
Description of coefficient 
s7ij 
 
Breeding method with-
out breeding informa-
tion  
β7 Marginal utility of a chicken being bred outdoors 
compared to indoors  when the chicken is not la-
belled (no breeding information) 
S8ij Campylobacter con-
tents without breeding 
information 
β8 Marginal utility of a chicken being campylobacter-free 
compared to not labelled when the chicken is bred 
indoors (no breeding information) 
s9ij
 
Prices without breed-
ing information 
β9 Marginal disutility of product price  (no breeding in-
formation) 
ASC1i Alternative specific 
constant without 
breeding information 
 Marginal utility of opting out (no breeding information) 
s10ij
 
Breeding method with 
breeding information  
β10 Marginal utility of a chicken being bred outdoors 
compared to indoors when the chicken is not labelled 
(with breeding information)  
s11ij
 
Campylobacter con-
tents with breeding 
information 
β11 
 
Marginal utility of a chicken being campylobacter-free 
compared to not labelled when the chicken is bred 
indoors (with breeding information) 
s12ij 
 
Prices with breeding 
information 
β12 
 
Marginal disutility of product price  (no breeding in-
formation) 
ASC2j Alternative specific 
constant with breeding 
information 
 
 
Marginal utility of opting out (no breeding information) 
s1ij s2i 
 
Outdoor bred and 
campylobacter-free 
without breeding in-
formation 
 
β7.8 
 
Marginal utility of a chicken being bred outdoors as 
compared to indoors when the chicken is campylo-
bacter-free in excess of the marginal utility of out-
doors compared to indoors when the chicken is not 
labelled (no breeding information) OR EQUIVALENT 
TO 
Marginal utility of a chicken being campylobacter-free 
as compared to not labelled when the chicken is bred 
outdoors in excess of the marginal utility of campylo-
bacter-free compared to not labelled when the 
chicken is bred indoors (no breeding information). 
 
s10ij s11ij
Outdoor bred and 
campylobacter-free 
with breeding informa-
tion 
β10,11 
 
Marginal utility of a chicken being bred outdoors as 
compared to indoors when the chicken is campylo-
bacter-free in excess of the marginal utility of out-
doors compared to indoors when the chicken is not 
labelled (with breeding information). 
Marginal utility of a chicken being campylobacter-free 
as compared to not labelled when the chicken is bred 
outdoors in excess of the marginal utility of campylo-
bacter-free compared to not labelled when the 
chicken is bred indoors (with breeding information). 
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 Up until this point, the results have been presented in terms of marginal contributions 
of the attributes to the overall utility of a chicken. The most important findings will 
now be highlighted in terms of the more intuitive measure, namely willingness to pay 
for the individual attributes. It should be kept in mind that differences in willingness 
to pay can be due to differences in the marginal utility OR differences in price sensi-
tivity. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind when interpreting willingness to 
pay estimates (and the marginal utilities upon which these are based) that they indi-
cate partial values “holding everything else equal”. 
 
The results are presented as averages across consumers – or as the behaviour of an 
average consumer. The average willingness to pay for two attributes of a chilled 
chicken are estimated as averages across all respondents, i.e. the willingness to pay 
for a chicken labelled campylobacter-free as compared to a chicken that is not la-
belled, as an indicator of preferences for food safety, and willingness to pay for a 
chicken from an outdoor production as compared to indoor, as an indicator of prefer-
ences for animal welfare. Furthermore, the extent to which these measures were af-
fected by introducing expert-based information to the respondents has been investi-
gated – once again as averaged effects across all respondents. In order to present the 
willingness to pay estimates as intuitively as possible, 3 important models of increas-
ing complexity are discussed. The willingness to pay estimates are presented in Table 
5.6. 
 
• Willingness to pay for animal welfare and food safety for an average consumer 
explained by main effects, when differences in information are disregarded 
(Model 6) 
• Willingness to pay for animal welfare and food safety for an average consumer 
explained by main effects, when differences in information are included (Model 
5) 
• Willingness to pay for animal welfare and food safety for an average consumer 
explained by main and cross effects when differences in information are in-
cluded (Model 7). 
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Table 5.6. Summery of the willingness to pay estimates in DKK  
 
  Simple main ef-
fect model with-
out information 
distinction 
Main effect 
model with in-
formation distinc-
tion 
Cross effect model 
with information dis-
tinction 
Outdoor bred  20 13 Animal welfare 
 Outdoor bred (with 
breeding information)  
25 
42 34 
Campylobacter-free  
22 16 
Food safety 
 
Campylobacter-free 
(with breeding infor-
mation) 
23 
26 19 
Outdoor bred AND 
campylobacter-free    43 
Both attributes 
 
Outdoor bred AND 
campylobacter-free 
(with breeding infor-
mation)  
  70 
 
Note: the willingness to pay estimates are calculated from the estimates in Table 5.4 by dividing the attrib-
ute coefficients with the price coefficients. The estimates are additional amounts for a chicken containing 
he given characteristics as opposed to not displaying the characteristics. t
  
 
 
Main effect model without information distinction 
An average consumer gains positive utility when buying an outdoor-bred chicken or 
when buying a campylobacter-free chicken. In monetary terms, the price premium for 
an average consumer has been estimated to be around 25 DKK for an outdoor-bred 
chicken (hereafter referred to as willingness to pay for animal welfare) as well as for 
avoiding campylobacter (hereafter referred to as willingness to pay for food safety). 
These estimates are based on choices when we do not distinguish between consumers 
with or without information about the attributes. 
 
Main effect model with information distinction  
The differences in information attributes are now incorporated. A main effect model 
is thereby obtained, in which the information effect can be tested. In short, it was 
found that information about animal welfare is of importance to the consumer – but 
not campylobacter information. Information provision regarding breeding methods 
almost doubles the utility of the animal welfare attribute, relative to no provision of 
information or provision of information regarding campylobacter. In monetary terms, 
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 this means that, without information, food safety and animal welfare are valued very 
similarly (around 20 DKK), but when breeding information is provided, the value of 
animal welfare doubles (42 DKK in Table 5.6) This increases the understanding of 
consumer behaviour as we find that the WTP for animal welfare is not just 25 DKK- 
it is 42 DKK when breeding information is provided and 20 DKK when information 
is not provided. Said differently, when consumers buy outdoor-bred chicken, they are 
willing to pay up to 22 DKK for breeding information.  
 
Food safety is not directly affected by breeding information, but an indirect effect is 
apparent through changes in the price sensitivity. Providing breeding information re-
duces consumers’ price sensitivity which can be interpreted as their placing less im-
portance on price and more emphasis on animal welfare after they learn more about 
the differences in the respective breeding systems. The lower price sensitivity causes 
a slight increase in the willingness to pay for food safety when breeding information 
is provided. 
 
The relative valuations of food safety and animal welfare are thus affected by breed-
ing information. Without breeding information, the willingness to pay for food safety 
and animal welfare are very similar. However, after breeding information is provided, 
the value of animal welfare is almost twice as high as that for food safety.  
 
Cross effect model with information distinction 
The best description of consumer behaviour is obtained when the effects of the two 
attributes are included jointly and when a distinction is made between attributes with 
and without breeding information. The willingness to pay for animal welfare and food 
safety should not, however, be analysed separately as these are interdependent.  
 
Interpreting cross effects 
First, the interactions effect when no breeding information is provided is examined. 
The average willingness to pay for an outdoor-bred chicken (without breeding infor-
mation) is found to be 20 DKK when interactions are not included. But – when inter-
actions are included – outdoor-bred willingness to pay becomes 13 DKK when the 
chicken has no campylobacter label and 43 DKK when the chicken is campylobacter-
free.  
 
Similarly, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter (without breeding in-
formation) is not simply 22 DKK – but 16 DKK when the chicken is raised indoors 
and 43 DKK when the chicken is raised outdoors.  
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 The direct sum of the WTP for food safety and animal welfare is 29 DKK, but the 
joint value of food safety and animal welfare amounts to 43 DKK. This means that 
there is an extra willingness to pay of 14 DKK per chicken above the willingness to 
pay for the individual attributes. This result has nothing to do with the effect of in-
formation as it is the case without breeding information which is being considered. 
The result is simply driven by the nonlinearity of consumers’ preferences for food 
safety and animal welfare.  
 
Second, the cross effect when breeding information is provided is examined. An aver-
age consumer is not just willing to pay 42 DKK for outdoor, compared with indoor,  
bred chickens – the average willingness to pay for an outdoor chicken is 34 DKK 
when there is no campylobacter label and 70 DKK when the chicken is campylobac-
ter-free. Moreover, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter when breeding 
information is provided is not simply 26 DKK – it is 19 DKK when the chicken is 
raised indoors and 70 DKK when the chicken is raised outdoors. 
 
Altogether, the willingness to pay without breeding information are 13 DKK for out-
door-bred, 16 DKK for campylobacter-free and 43 DKK for both attributes. With 
breeding information, the willingness to pay estimates are 34 DKK for outdoor-bred, 
19 DKK for campylobacter-free and 70 DKK for both attributes. A very clear indica-
tion of consumers’ preferences being non-additive in quality attributes is provided. 
This result should be investigated further in relation to other quality attributes, as 
well.   
 
Interpreting information effects 
With respect to information, the overall conclusions of the main effect and the cross 
effect models are the same – i.e. there is no effect from providing campylobacter in-
formation, but provision of information regarding breeding methods more than dou-
bles an average consumer’s utility of animal welfare. The demand for chicken is less 
price elastic after the information regarding breeding methods is received, which can 
be interpreted as price becoming less important in the consumer’s selection process 
after breeding method information is provided (see also Appendix C, Figure C42). 
The reduction in price elasticity due to provision of breeding information affects the 
willingness to pay for food safety due to the increased marginal rate of substitution.  
 
Note that the monetary value of information in the cross effect model differs from the 
value of information found in the main effect model, since the value of information 
depends on the level of animal welfare as well as the level of food safety. 
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 The value of breeding information when buying outdoor-bred chicken is not simply 
22 DKK as we found in the main effect model, but 21 DKK when the chicken’s cam-
pylobacter content is not known and 27 DKK when the chicken is campylobacter-
free. Similarly, when buying a campylobacter-free chicken that is bred indoors, the 
value of breeding information is 3 DKK, but when buying a campylobacter-free 
chicken that is outdoor-bred outdoors, the value of information is 27 DKK. 
 
Looking at the trade-offs between animal welfare and food safety, the results show 
that the trade-off between animal welfare and food safety is close to 1:1 before infor-
mation is provided. This indicates that consumers’ preferences for the two attributes 
are very similar before breeding information is provided. After breeding information 
is provided, the preferences for animal welfare are stronger than those for food safety 
(for the particular case studied).  
 
A summary of the price premiums are presented in Table 5.7, formulated as the over-
all price that the consumers state they are willing to pay for a standard chicken of 40 
DKK with the extra attributes. For example, an average consumer would be willing to 
pay 53 DKK for outdoor-bred chicken. This implies that the consumer is indifferent 
in relation to an outdoor-bred chicken at 53 DKK that is not campylobacter labelled 
and a chicken raised indoors at 40 DKK without campylobacter label. However, if the 
indoor-bred campylobacter-free chicken was sold at a price below 53 DKK, then that 
would be preferred. 
 
Table 5.7. Overview of estimated willingness to pay (in DKK) for a whole chilled 
chicken with specific attributes (from the resulting cross effects 
model). 
 
 Animal welfare Food safety Food safety and ani-
mal welfare 
Without breeding in-
formation 
53 (33%)  56 (40%) 83 (107%) 
With breeding infor-
mation 
74 (85%) 59 (47%) 110 (175%) 
Notes: 
1) We can only display willingness to pay estimates for 6 attributes as  the price is used as numeraire in the 
calculations. 
2) The ( %) capture the percentage price premiums that can be attributed to the specific attributes compared
o an indoor bred chicken that has not been controlled for campylobacter which costs 40 DKK. t
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 5.6. Consumer behaviour explained by personal characteristics  
The average measures of willingness to pay are examined in more detail by inclusion 
of respondent characteristics, e.g. socio-demographic variables and respondents’ 
stated attitudes towards animal welfare and food safety. Technically, this is carried 
out by including cross effects of the attributes (food safety and animal welfare), with 
the characteristics of the respondent in the statistical analysis. This makes it possible 
to identify the way in which consumers’ preferences vary across different groups and, 
furthermore, whether different groups are affected differently by the provision of ex-
pert information.47
5.6.1. Willingness to pay and personal characteristics 
The results are described intuitively in the text below and subsequently summarised in 
Table 5.8.  
 
WTP depends on the consumers’ perception of the relation between production 
system and campylobacter 
Consumers who do not believe that outdoor-bred chickens experience better animal 
welfare do not want to pay any price premium for an outdoor-bred chicken.  
 
Consumers who believe that an outdoor-bred chicken has a higher risk of having 
campylobacter, have a lower willingness to pay for animal welfare than people who 
do not think that an outdoor-bred chicken has a higher risk of having campylobacter. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the willingness to pay for food safety is not affected 
by whether the consumer believes outdoor-bred chicken to have a higher campylobac-
ter risk or not.  
 
WTP depends on attitude towards organic farming   
Consumers who prefer organic products are willing to pay more for animal welfare 
than those who have not stated that they prefer organic products. This relationship is 
as expected, because it is believed to be common knowledge that organic chickens in 
Denmark must have access to outdoor areas. Moreover, consumers who prefer or-
ganic products do not display a significantly different attitude towards food safety 
than other consumers.   
 
                                                 
47 Using this procedure, we only include taste variations linked to observed variables (see also Train, 
2003, p. 46). 
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 WTP depends on information towards kitchen hygiene 
Consumers who do not believe they can avoid a campylobacter infection by having 
good kitchen hygiene have a higher willingness to pay for food safety than consumers 
who do believe they can avoid campylobacter infections by having good kitchen hy-
giene. This result is consistent with a hypothesis where food safety is considered to be 
a quality of the final product that can be obtained either by securing food safety in the 
production process or by “decontamination” in the kitchen (campylobacter-free prod-
ucts are substitutes for good kitchen hygiene). An opposing behavioural hypothesis 
would be that people who have good kitchen hygiene are more concerned about food 
safety and, as such, are not willing to have campylobacter in the foodstuffs they use, 
even though campylobacter would not cause any risks due to their good kitchen hy-
giene. However, the latter hypothesis cannot be supported by our result.  
 
Furthermore, consumers who do not think campylobacter infections can be avoided 
through good kitchen hygiene have a lower willingness to pay for animal welfare, but 
these effects are not easily interpretable. 
 
WTP depends on confidence in Danish foods 
Consumers who state that they are afraid of consuming foods produced in Denmark 
have a higher willingness to pay for food safety than those who are not afraid of con-
suming foods produced in Denmark.  
 
WTP depends on attitudes towards how to support animal welfare and food 
safety 
Respondents who state that they support animal welfare through their everyday 
choice of foodstuffs have a higher willingness to pay for animal welfare than people 
who state that they do not support animal welfare through their choice of food. This 
result indicates consistency.  
 
Whether or not consumers think that it is the responsibility of the government to sup-
port animal welfare does not affect their willingness to pay for animal welfare.  
 
This result does not hold with respect to food safety. Consumers, who state that food 
safety is the responsibility of the government have a higher willingness to pay for the 
food safety attribute than those who have indicated that it is not the responsibility of 
the government. These consumers think that it is the responsibility of the government 
and, at the same time, are willing to pay more for a safer good. This finding indicates 
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 that where the government does not provide the safer product, these respondents are 
willing to carry the costs involved – up to a certain amount.  
 
WTP depends on taste of outdoor chicken 
In the introductory text in the questionnaire, it is explicitly stated that “apart from dif-
ferences in campylobacter levels, production systems and price, the chickens are iden-
tical with respect to taste, packaging, etc.” At the same time, the survey showed that 
respondents who feel that outdoor produced chickens taste better also have a higher 
willingness to pay for the outdoor-bred chicken. This indicates that part of the will-
ingness to pay for an outdoor-bred chicken is potentially not due to the better animal 
welfare (the public good element), but due to the greater enjoyment of the private 
characteristics of the good (better taste). There are two possible explanations to aid 
interpretation here. The result may indicate that the respondents do not read/-
remember the information provided in the questionnaire, with the result that the esti-
mated values obtained for animal welfare actually include a value for the better taste. 
Alternatively, the respondents’ answers can be interpreted as outdoor chicken in gen-
eral tasting better, which does not preclude that they still remember that in the choice 
experiments all other attributes – including taste – were considered equal. 
 
WTP depends on personal experience with campylobacter  
The willingness to pay for food safety is not affected by whether or not consumers are 
aware of campylobacter (or salmonella, for that matter) – but this result changes when 
respondents have had personal experience with campylobacter infection. Consumers 
who have, themselves, experienced a campylobacter infection, or who are familiar 
with somebody who has, have higher willingness to pay for food safety than respon-
dents without any experience with campylobacter infections.  
 
Consumers who state that awareness about salmonella has influenced their answers 
have a higher willingness to pay for food safety than consumers who state that their 
knowledge of salmonella did not affect their choice. This result indicates that, on av-
erage, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter is not affected by knowledge 
about salmonella. However, for a certain a group of consumers (those who specifi-
cally state that salmonella knowledge affects their choices), this knowledge does af-
fect their willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter.  
 
Furthermore, consumers who answered that knowledge about salmonella had an in-
fluence on their answers are less price sensitive. This can be interpreted as these re-
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 spondents placing less importance on the price attribute and more on the food safety 
(and animal welfare) attributes. 
 
WTP depends on health status 
Respondents who think of their own health as being poor and who, therefore, consider 
themselves as more vulnerable in relation to illness displayed a higher willingness to 
pay for food safety.  
 
WTP depends on gender and age 
Male respondents in our analysis have a higher willingness to pay for food safety than 
women. This contrasts with Buzby & Skees (1994), who find that male respondents 
have a lower willingness to pay for food safety. The authors argue that this is because 
males only consider the risk as a private matter – this is, the risk is only to themselves 
and not to their family as well, whereas women include the whole family in their risk 
assessment, explaining their apparent higher willingness to pay for food safety. Ott 
(1990), on the other hand, did not find any difference between men’s and women’s 
willingness to pay for food safety in a study concerning pesticide residue-free prod-
ucts. Our result is potentially biased due to the dataset not being representative – 
hence, a strong conclusion of the effect of gender cannot be made.  
 
The results show that consumers older than 50 years of age have a higher willingness 
to pay for food safety. This is in accordance with Hammit & Graham (1999), who 
found that age was positively related to the willingness to pay estimate, whereas this 
contrasts with Buzby & Skees (1994), who found that younger consumers were will-
ing to pay more for reducing risk than older consumers. Hayes et al. (1995) value 
food safety using a young group of respondents. Here, it is stated that a possible ex-
planation for the low willingness to pay estimates obtained for food safety might be 
due to a general lack of aversion to risk among younger people. This explanation is in 
accordance with the findings in the present survey. Older people may be more afraid 
of potential infection as they may become more susceptible and more vulnerable with 
age. The descriptive statistics in Appendix C demonstrate that this is the case – re-
spondents above 50 years, on average, feel that their health is in a poorer state than 
that of respondents below the age of 50. 
 
WTP depends on education and income 
In the present study, higher educated respondents have a higher willingness to pay for 
animal welfare than respondents with lower education. Similarly, Huang et al. (1999) 
found that people with a higher education had a higher willingness to pay for food 
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 safety. In contrast, however, Buzby & Skees (1994) found that less educated people 
were willing to pay more for food safety than those with a higher education and found 
no effect of educational level on the preference for food safety.  
 
The willingness to pay is found in other studies to depend on the respondents’ income 
level. Hammit & Graham (1999) found that income was positively related to the will-
ingness to pay for health protection, in the form of a risk reduction from dying in a car 
accident. This was also found by Misra et al. (1991) in a study concerning consumers’ 
willingness to pay for pesticide-free chilled produce, whereas Huang et al. (1999) 
found the opposite trend that consumers’ willingness to pay for food safety decreased 
with income.  
 
In the present survey, utility of food safety and animal welfare were not directly af-
fected by income levels. However, the respondents with the highest income level 
were less price sensitive than the low income groups. Furthermore, those who did not 
state their income level were least price sensitive, indicating that this group might rep-
resent the group with the highest income level. The level of income had no effect on 
the utility of the other attributes – animal welfare and food safety – but while the price 
sensitivity decreased with income, the willingness to pay for animal welfare and food 
safety increased with income. 
 
WTP depends on geography 
The relationship between willingness to pay and geographical distribution (rural ar-
eas, towns and cities with less than 50,000 inhabitants and towns and cities with more 
than 50,000 inhabitants). It was found that people who live in rural areas have a lower 
willingness to pay for food safety compared with respondents who lived in cities. Fur-
thermore, it was found that people who live in urban areas with up to 50,000 inhabi-
tants have a lower willingness to pay for animal welfare than respondents from rural 
areas and urban areas with more than 50,000 inhabitants, respectively. 
 
Test statistics of results on willingness to pay and personal characteristics 
Table 5.8 shows the effect on willingness to pay of including socio-demographic and 
attitudinal variables in the model. Table 5.8 shows the full model including all sig-
nificant interaction effects. The bold type parameters are the main effects, whereas 
the normal type parameters are the corresponding interaction effects – all tested at the 
5% significance level. 
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 The parameter values of the cross effects in Table 5.8 are to be interpreted as mar-
ginal value added relative to the main effect. In example, the marginal value added of 
an increase in the animal welfare attribute for respondents who do not believe that 
outdoor-bred chickens experience better animal welfare is -0.26. That is, utility for an 
outdoor-bred chicken for this group of consumers is 0.06 (=0.32-0.26), while the util-
ity for the remaining respondents who are neutral or believe that outdoor-bred chicken 
experience better animal welfare is the 0.32 illustrated by the value of the main effect. 
 
Table 5.8. Full model including interaction effects. 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err P-value 
    
Outdoor bred  0.319500 0.078700 <.0001 
 x Outdoor provides no better animal welfare -0.257600 0.079000 0.001 
 x Outdoor produces higher risk of campylobacter -0.130500 0.047800 0.006 
 x Preference for organic food 0.306600 0.042900 <.0001 
 x Campylobacter not avoided with good hygiene -0.201300 0.071000 0.005 
 x Buys food to support animal welfare 0.533300 0.044600 <.0001 
 x Outdoor tastes better  0.325300 0.038800 <.0001 
 x Food safety is producers' responsibility  -0.248900 0.046700 <.0001 
 x Food safety is government's responsibility  0.121500 0.023600 <.0001 
 x Higher education 0.099300 0.035100 0.005 
 x Town/city of up to 50,000 -0.131700 0.036300 <.0001 
  
Outdoor bred (information regarding breeding 
method given) 0.580400 0.070100 <.0001 
 x Men -0.236500 0.075500 0.002 
 x Buy food to support animal welfare 0.296600 0.085100 0.001 
  
Campylobacter-free 0.179200 0.069700 0.010 
 x Campylobacter not avoided with good hygiene 0.275900 0.072500 <.0001 
 x Afraid of consuming Danish food 0.179400 0.045900 <.0001 
 x Buys food to support animal welfare 0.103100 0.039400 0.009 
 x Knowledge of salmonella has influence 0.542500 0.037700 <.0001 
 x Poor health 0.195900 0.096000 0.041 
 x Ill due to campylobacter 0.272100 0.044700 <.0001 
 x Food safety is government's responsibility  0.121500 0.023600 <.0001 
 x Men 0.156800 0.037600 <.0001 
 x Rural areas -0.174600 0.057700 0.003 
 x Age 50+ 0.173900 0.038600 <.0001 
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Outdoor bred AND campylobacter-free 0.288000 0.115000 0.012 
Price -0.057400 0.001157 <.0001 
 x Preference for organic food 0.007625 0.001189 <.0001 
 x Campylobacter not avoided with good hygiene 0.009749 0.001818 <.0001 
 x Food = Support for animal welfare 0.018400 0.001197 <.0001 
 x Outdoor = better taste 0.008311 0.001240 <.0001 
 x Knowledge of salmonella = influence 0.006407 0.001045 <.0001 
 x Poor health 0.013100 0.002360 <.0001 
 x Men -0.002240 0.001052 0.033 
 x Age 50+ 0.008029 0.001071 <.0001 
  
Price (information regarding breeding method 
given) 0.006570 0.001710 <.0001 
 x Outdoor has better taste -0.006177 0.002345 0.008 
 x Ill due to campylobacte 0.012400 0.002383 <.0001 
  
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -3.137000 0.148200 <.0001 
  
ASC (information regarding breeding method given) 0.712000 0.090400 <.0001 
  
STD(opt-out) 3.150100 0.139700 <.0001 
LRI 0.3299   
N 18408   
Log L 13552      
 
5.6.2. The effect of information and personal characteristics 
Campylobacter information has been found not to affect consumer behaviour, 
whereas information regarding animal welfare has. In this section, potential underly-
ing reasons for this are explored. The effect of information is measured in relation to 
the willingness to pay: information has an effect on consumer behaviour if the will-
ingness to pay changes after the information is provided. 
 
Lack of effect with regard to campylobacter information 
Our first hypothesis was that the information provided did not have any effect be-
cause the respondents had the knowledge beforehand. As the campylobacter informa-
tion contained one part describing the illness and one part describing how to avoid 
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 being infected through good kitchen hygiene, the novelty factor for both had to be 
tested.  
 
As a proxy variable for whether new information about the illness was provided, the 
survey question of whether respondents had previous knowledge of campylobacter 
was used. If individuals with previous knowledge about campylobacter did not 
change willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter after receiving campylobacter 
information (but those without previous knowledge about campylobacter did change 
their willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter), then this would indicate that the 
merging of the two groups made the effect of information insignificant. No differ-
ences were found between the two groups of individuals with regard to the effect of 
campylobacter information. However, the test might be too imprecise to reveal 
whether information was new or not as it is not known what the respondents really 
mean by “being aware of campylobacter”. It would have been better to ask directly 
whether or not the information provided was new to them.  
 
The effect of respondents’ knowing that campylobacter infections could be avoided 
through good kitchen hygiene was tested. Again, we found no differences in the effect 
of information between the subgroups that knew about kitchen hygiene and those who 
did not. 
 
Another hypothesis is that, overall, the effect of campylobacter information was neu-
tral. That is, the description of the illness could increase the willingness to pay, 
whereas the description of kitchen hygiene could decrease the willingness to pay – 
thereby counterbalancing each other’s effect. Unfortunately, this hypothesis has not 
been able to be tested. In order to do so, the samples would have had to have been 
split, such that the 2 parts of the campylobacter information could have been provided 
separately. 
 
It was tested whether socio-demographic differences could be used to explain the lack 
of an effect from the provision of campylobacter information. Gender, educational 
level, income, residence, age and whether or not the respondents had children were all 
tested – but we found no differences across socio-demographic variables in relation to 
the effect of campylobacter information. 
 
Whether people who did not consider campylobacter a risk were less sensitive to in-
formation was investigated. Specifically, the questions of whether respondents per-
ceived campylobacter as a risk and whether they found the discussion of campylobac-
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 ter had become out of proportion were used. Again, we found no differences in rela-
tion to the effect of campylobacter information for these subgroups.  
 
The effect of animal welfare information 
Provision of the animal welfare information was found to have an effect. However, it 
has not been possible to identify the differences in terms of to whether the respon-
dents were provided with new information. The questionnaire contained a question 
regarding whether the respondents believed that chickens raised in outdoor systems 
have a higher welfare than chickens raised indoors, but this does not tell us whether 
the respondents knew the exact differences between breeding systems.   
 
A potential reason for the high effect of animal welfare information is because out-
door-bred chicken is described only in positive terms, but no direct follow-up ques-
tions have been posed either to support or reject this hypothesis.  
 
It was tested whether consumers who feel that the debate concerning animal welfare 
is too hysterical had reacted differently to animal welfare information than consumers 
who do not think the debate is too hysterical. Furthermore, use was made of the ques-
tion of whether the respondents thought that the animal issue was handled too super-
ficially to identify whether it would have an effect on the effect of animal welfare in-
formation. No significant differences in relation to the effect of animal welfare infor-
mation were found in either case 
 
The socio-demographic variables used to explain the effect of information were gen-
der, educational level, income, residence, age and whether or not the respondents had 
children. The only significant effect found was that men’s utility gain from receiving 
information regarding animal welfare was smaller than women’s – that is, men re-
sponded less to the information. The remaining effects were all insignificant, indicat-
ing that particular socio-demographic groups did not respond to information concern-
ing production systems differently.  
 
With respect to attitudinal characteristics, we found that respondents who support 
animal welfare through their choice of food had a higher utility of receiving informa-
tion about animal welfare. 
 
Respondents who stated that an outdoor-bred chicken tasted better were less price 
sensitive than those who did not think that an outdoor-bred chicken tasted better. But 
after they had received information regarding animal welfare, they became more price 
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 sensitive. This is potentially due to the reason that the information provided did not 
confirm better taste in an outdoor-bred chicken, so they became more aware of the 
price level.  
 
Respondents who have been ill or know someone who has been ill due to campylo-
bacter displayed a further decrease in price sensitivity after information regarding 
animal welfare was provided. This could indicate that they place less importance on 
price after receiving breeding information.  
5.6.3. Summery of personal characteristics 
The respondents seem to have acted reasonably consistently against expectations. In-
clusion of background variables revealed a significant variation across consumer 
groups – a variation which is not captured when only estimates of the average popula-
tion are used.  In short, the following results were revealed: 
 
Summary of results on willingness to pay and personal characteristics 
• Consumers who do not believe that outdoor-bred chickens experience better 
animal welfare do not want to pay any price premium for an outdoor-bred 
chicken. 
• Consumers, who believe that an outdoor-bred chicken has a higher risk of 
having campylobacter, have a lower willingness to pay for animal welfare. 
• Consumers who prefer organic products have a higher willingness to pay for 
animal welfare. 
• Consumers who do not believe they can avoid a campylobacter infection by 
having good kitchen hygiene have a higher willingness to pay for food safety  
• WTP does not depend on knowledge about campylobacter (or salmonella, for 
that matter) – but personal experience with campylobacter increases the will-
ingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter 
• Consumers who think of their own health as being poor have a higher will-
ingness to pay for food safety.  
• Men have a higher willingness to pay for food safety than women.  
• Higher education increases the willingness to pay for animal welfare. 
• Consumers in rural areas have lower willingness to pay for food safety – the 
same picture is not found for animal welfare. 
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 Summary of results on the effect of information and personal characteristics 
There where two main results from the hypothesis testing regarding the effect of in-
formation: 1) the information regarding animal welfare had a significant influence on 
the consumers’ behaviour and 2) the information regarding campylobacter did not 
have a significant influence on the consumers. The motives behind these conclusions 
have not been fully identified. One reason, which we have not been able to test for, is 
that the negative information on illness and the positive information on kitchen hy-
giene counterbalanced each others’ effect. This could also (partly) explain the positive 
willingness to pay for the animal welfare information, which is entirely positive. No 
significant variations were found across socio-demographic variables with regard to 
the influence of information. Another potential bias of the results is inherent in the 
design. The same people are asked to perform a choice task, before and after informa-
tion provision. This ensures that no differences other than information distinguish the 
two choice tasks. However, an element of “stubbornness” may arise, where respon-
dents do not want to be caught being inconsistent just because they receive informa-
tion. As a result, they may be relatively unwilling to change their behaviour, from one 
choice task to the next. 
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 6. Discussion and perspectives 
Our contribution 
The novelty in our research lies in the joint assessment of the demand for food safety 
and animal welfare – and in our direct focus on how information affects demand. 
Food safety and animal welfare are common attributes and consumers make trade-
offs between food safety, animal welfare and prices in their daily shopping for meat 
products. Nevertheless, a non-market approach has been used to estimate the respec-
tive values for these attributes as they are not traded individually and that, due to lack 
of information, the consumers are often not even aware of the trade-offs they make. 
Methodologically, a choice experiment method has been employed with integrated 
information provision, thereby adding to the very sparse literature on how information 
affects stated preferences. 
 
It was found that campylobacter information did not affect the willingness to pay for 
either food safety or animal welfare and that breeding information had a considerable 
effect on the willingness to pay for animal welfare, but only a slight indirect effect on 
food safety through changes in price sensitivity. Furthermore, a significant willing-
ness to pay for food safety and animal welfare was found and the values of the two 
attributes were found to be interrelated.  
 
Market implications of our results 
The results revealed an average willingness to pay for avoiding campylobacter in an 
outdoor-bred chicken of 43 DKK per chicken. Does that mean that the value of the 
Danish chicken market could be increased by 43 DKK for each chicken sold by fo-
cusing exclusively on outdoor-bred campylobacter-free chickens48? The answer has to 
be no as a range of elements should be considered before jumping to hasty conclu-
sions in this regard. 
 
Our results are created in a situation where a campylobacter-free chicken is readily 
available and accessible – and the consumer is instructed to focus on food safety, 
animal welfare, and price. This contrasts with a real shopping situation where these 
conditions are not necessarily present and where there is a myriad of trade-offs to be 
made. Furthermore, these trade-offs are sometimes not even known due to lack of in-
formation. For example, a salmonella-free chicken is not always labelled because it 
                                                 
48 Apart from the slight problem that today it is not possible to produce an outdoor bred campylo-
bacter-free chicken as there always are campylobacter in outdoors productions. 
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 might draw attention towards food risks associated with other products that are not 
labelled in this way. Hence, we have detected a willingness to pay for food safety and 
animal welfare under certain conditions, but as these conditions do not completely re-
flect a real-life shopping situation, the real value may have been overstated. 
 
Today, the price premium for a campylobacter-free chicken is only a few DKK per 
kg. A comparison with the willingness to pay that was displayed in the survey indi-
cates a great potential for increasing the market for campylobacter-free chickens. Fur-
ther research into why such a discrepancy exists would be very valuable. For exam-
ple, an interesting research topic would be how to exploit these opportunities given 
that labelling of products is also a trade-off between providing enough information on 
the one side and too much on the other, securing attention from the consumer.  
 
The respondents were asked to assess their next choice of chicken (a marginal valua-
tion task) – all future choices of chicken were not assessed. Therefore, if consumers 
were to consider the budgetary effects of paying 43 DKK more for not just the next 
chicken, but all chicken they buy in future, they might want to reduce their consump-
tion of (outdoor-bred campylobacter-free) whole chickens, buy other chicken prod-
ucts  or substitute chicken with other types of meat. Therefore, the aggregate market 
implications can be expected to be lower than the marginal effects.      
 
Another market implication of our results is that the non-linearity of attribute values 
indicates that there might be niche production opportunities in producing goods with 
specific bundles of characteristics – such as campylobacter-free chicken with im-
proved living conditions. Also, our results indicate that survival of these niche pro-
ductions might depend on information provision.  
 
A final comment on the market implications of our results is that consumers do not in 
fact determine demand – the supermarkets do. The demand from consumers has been 
estimated. However, in modern markets, consumers and producers seldom meet. Pro-
ducers are represented by producer organisations who coordinate production. Con-
sumers’ demand depends on what is available in the shops. Of course, retailers will, 
to varying degrees, try to satisfy consumer demand – but they also have their own 
agenda with regard to maximising their own profits. Therefore, consumers willing-
ness to pay has to go through a filter (i.e. preferences at the retail level) before they 
reach the producers (organisations). Hence, before the market implications of our re-
sults can be assessed, knowledge of how consumers’ stated behaviour is perceived by 
retailers/main supermarkets is required.  
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 Policy implications of our results 
From a policy point of view, a major difference between food safety and animal wel-
fare is that the externality element in food safety affects public health costs whereas 
there are no direct expenditures related to animal welfare. Therefore, the public eco-
nomic interest does not surface in such an outspoken way with respect to animal wel-
fare as with food safety.  
 
There are social costs associated with human infections of campylobacteriosis. Fur-
thermore, consumers have been found to assign value to avoiding campylobacter. 
These benefits must be weighed against the costs of producing campylobacter-free 
chickens in order to assess whether there is a positive social value of removing cam-
pylobacter risk from chicken.  
 
Our results indicate that there is a market for products with reduced food risks if la-
bels that allow consumers actually to choose campylobacter-free chicken are pro-
vided. No welfare gain in providing information about campylobacter was revealed. 
On the other hand, the results indicate a welfare gain in providing labels with regard 
to animal welfare and a substantial additional welfare gain in providing animal wel-
fare information was found that supports the labelling49. Willingness to pay varied 
across consumer types, but no systematic differences were found across consumer 
types in relation to how information affects the willingness to pay. Hence, no advice 
can be offered with regard to the targeting of information campaigns.  
 
Our results indicate that, given the right circumstances, consumers are willing to pay 
for food safety and animal welfare. But this is not the only way to secure provision of 
these attributes. Public authorities can affect the relative prices by issuing taxes on 
goods associated with food risks and/or subsidies on safe food products. Thereby, the 
public costs of food risks are internalised and the relative prices make it simpler (rela-
tively cheaper) for consumers to choose a low risk product. 
 
Shortcomings of our study 
A few shortcomings of our study can be mentioned which could be improved in fu-
ture research.  
 
Firstly, the issue of how campylobacter risks were eliminated was not addressed (ba-
sically, campylobacter risks can be reduced in primary production through decon-
                                                 
49 Provided that labelling and information costs are less than the differences in willingness to pay. 
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 tamination, or later through increased kitchen hygiene). It is, therefore, not known 
whether the consumer had any particular risk reduction methods in mind when they 
valued risk reduction. One might expect that risk reduction method is of significance 
in determining how consumers value risk reduction – this is investigated in an ongo-
ing project50.  
 
Secondly, information provision was carried out using a before and after evaluation of 
choice tasks. Information was provided to the same individuals as those who had just 
completed the first choice task. This might create a conservative measure of the effect 
of information as individuals might not want to appear inconsistent by changing their 
behaviour after information has been provided. An alternative approach would be to 
test attributes with and without information on two different samples. However, in 
this case, two things would change at the same time (population and information) and 
adjustments would have to be made for these differences – changes due to informa-
tion would have to be isolated from changes due to differences in population. 
 
Thirdly, sufficient caution was not exercised in the choice of sample. Hence, our 
sample is biased with an overrepresentation of high income, residents of the capital 
city area, etc – these biases indicate that the average willingness to pay values may 
have been over-estimated. 
 
Generalisation of our results 
The mixed results on the effects of expert-based information are not surprising in the 
light of the general literature on risk perception (Sunstein, 2002; Williams & Hammit, 
2001). Of course, the lack of effect from provision of campylobacter information can 
be attributed to the specific piece of information that was provided (only one type of 
campylobacter information was tested). It could also be related, however, to the fact 
that food safety is an attribute with private as well as public good characteristics. The 
lack of an effect from campylobacter information could indicate that consumers have 
strong beliefs about factors that affect their own health and that these beliefs are not 
easily changed. Animal welfare, on the other hand, is a pure public good. The more 
respondents who knew about the differences between production systems, the more 
they were willing to pay for improvements. This could indicate that consumers do not 
have strong prior beliefs about the public good and that their preferences towards 
                                                 
50 Ongoing research projects funded by the Danish research council are investigating just that (acro-
nyms DECONT and CAMPY, see www.dffe.dk ).  
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 public characteristics are more easily affected than their preferences towards private 
characteristics.  
 
The values of specific amounts of animal welfare and food safety have been estimated 
– and the effect of a particular type and amount of information provided. It is not sug-
gested that these results are generic, but we believe they are valuable inputs to the 
food safety and animal welfare debates. Generalisation of results is an important issue 
in stated preference studies. On one hand, the more specifically the subjects to be val-
ued are defined the easier it is for the respondent to assign a value. On the other hand, 
the more precisely the subjects are defined, the harder it is to generalise the results.  
 
For example, willingness to pay for free-range egg is a willingness to pay for better 
living conditions for an egg-laying hen. Carlsson et al. (2003) found a willingness to 
pay for eggs from free-range versus cage production corresponding to 6-8 DKK for 6 
eggs and Bennett (1996) and Bennett & Blaney (2003) found a willingness to pay for 
animal welfare related to 12 eggs equivalent to 4 - 9 DKK. Similarly, the willingness 
to pay for an outdoor-bred chicken is a willingness to pay for better living conditions 
for that particular chicken. Burgess et al. (2004) found a willingness to pay for im-
proved welfare for chickens, laying hens, dairy cows and pigs corresponding to be-
tween 20 and 30 DKK per animal. Carlsson et al. (2004b) found a willingness to pay 
for animal welfare related to the use of mobile abattoirs and the transportation of farm 
animals to slaughter houses for beef, pigs and chicken productions. Both studies 
found that willingness to pay for animal welfare depends on the type of animal in 
question. But how are all these measures related? A reasonable assumption is that 
consumers would consider animal welfare to be equally important for the egg-laying 
hen as for the broiler – but one hen can lay many eggs whereas a chicken can only be 
eaten once – so should the willingness to pay for a free-range egg take into account 
how many eggs a hen can produce? This is hardly the way the typical consumer val-
ues free-range eggs versus free-range broilers.  
 
Similar considerations can be made with respect to food safety. Hayes et al. (1995) 
found an average willingness to pay for reducing microbiological risks corresponding 
to 4-5 DKK per sandwich – and they found no distinction between different patho-
gens with different risk profiles and severity of illness. Furthermore, they found that 
the willingness to pay increased slightly after information about campylobacter was 
provided – and that the willingness to pay was not sensitive to the amount of risk re-
duction. In our study, food safety related to one whole chilled chicken was valued – 
i.e. a meal for 2-6 people. Does this mean that the willingness to pay for a chicken 
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 should be divided by 2-6 in order to be comparable with the willingness to pay for a 
chicken sandwich? Probably not, as it is not likely that consumers make these implicit 
calculations before they value food safety.  
 
A study by Goldberg & Rosen (2005) is of particular interest as they have examined 
the willingness to pay for reducing salmonella and campylobacter risks. Goldberg & 
Rosen (2005) investigated the willingness to pay for reducing salmonella and campy-
lobacter in chicken breasts by 0, 40 and 80%. They found willingness to pay estimates 
ranging from an equivalent of 0 to 50 DKK for various risk reductions using choice 
experiments and between 10 and 25 DKK using CVM, with the WTP for salmonella 
being a little higher than for campylobacter.  
 
Goldberg & Rosen (2005) found a nonlinear relation between WTP and risk reduc-
tion. For example, the WTP for a given reduction in salmonella as well as campylo-
bacter was smaller than the sum of the WTP for salmonella risk reduction and campy-
lobacter risk reduction individually. They identified this as an embedding effect. Also, 
Hobbs et al. (2005) found that the willingness to pay for the sum of attributes (food 
safety, traceability, farm information) was less than the sum of willingness to pay for 
individual attributes. They interpret this result as showing decreasing marginal will-
ingness to pay for attributes. 
 
Nonlinearity was also revealed in the present survey, but in the opposite direction. 
The sum of attributes provides an additional utility – not a reduction in utility. The 
differences in results may be explained by the differences in attributes. In Goldberg & 
Rosen (2005), the attributes salmonella and campylobacter are indistinguishable to 
many consumers – so they do not want to pay for the same reduction twice (our sur-
vey showed that for 42 % of the respondents stated that previous knowledge about 
salmonella affected their choices). In the present analysis, the attributes of animal 
welfare and food safety, on the other hand, represent two very different dimensions of 
quality and the provision of both leads the consumer to perceive the product as an “all 
round good”. Results from research on consumer behaviour towards organic products 
indicate that there may be an extra willingness to pay for a product containing a 
whole range of attributes (Wier et al., 2004).  
 
These examples are mentioned to highlight the difficulties faced when an attempt is 
made to generalise from the results. Nevertheless, there has been an increasing focus 
on research in how to transfer benefits (Arrow et al., 1993; Desvousges et al., 1992) 
The more building bricks that can be provided, the better the overall economic as-
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 sessment will be – case studies, therefore, provide important input. Further research in 
how to generalise results would, moreover, be highly valuable. 
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 Appendix A: The questionnaire 
Survey on buying habits, food safety and type of breeding 
The survey is part of a research project conducted by researchers at the Institute of 
Food and Resource Economics, the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University. 
 
The purpose of the project is partly to gain more insight into consumers’ buying hab-
its when purchasing chicken and partly to gain insight into attitudes towards food in 
general. 
 
There are two different types of chilled chicken at 1300 grams to choose between. 
Both types are free-range and produced in Denmark. They only differ with regard to 
type of breeding, campylobacter content and price. 
Difference in type of breeding: 
The first type of chicken has only been indoors (indoor breeding) 
The second type of chicken has also had access to outdoor areas (outdoor breeding) 
Difference in the control of campylobacter content: 
The first type of chicken is labelled “campylobacter-free”. Campylobacter-free chick-
ens are sold in a number of Danish supermarkets today. 
 
The second type of chicken has not been checked for campylobacter content. This 
means that the campylobacter content is unknown. 
 
Difference in the price for chickens 
 
Other: 
Apart from the differences already mentioned, the two types of chicken are identical.  
The quality, for example, meaning flavour, freshness, shelf-life, nutritional value, etc. 
are identical for the two types of chicken. 
 
Now imagine that you are in the shop where you usually do your shopping. You wish 
to buy one chilled chicken at 1300 grams. 
 
You have the same amount of money at your disposal that you normally have when 
you go shopping. Experience from similar surveys shows that some respondents dis-
play different behaviour when answering questionnaires than they would in real life 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 167
 situations. Before ticking the box next to your favoured choice, please imagine your-
self in an everyday shopping situation and consider whether or not you are willing to 
pay the price stated for each of the chicken products. 
 
You will now be presented with 4 independent shopping scenarios. For each shopping 
scenario please indicate by ticking the appropriate box which of the two types of 
chicken you would buy. You have a choice between chicken A and B. If you would 
not buy either of the two types of chicken, please tick the box “none of these”. 
 
 Shopping scenario 1 
Chicken A Chicken B 
Outdoor breeding Indoor breeding 
The chicken is not controlled for 
campylobacter The chicken is labelled “campylobacter-free” 
Unit price (DKK) 110 Unit price (DKK) 47  
I choose (tick one box only) 
A B None of these 
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 Q.2 Did you find it difficult to choose between the chicken products and/or did 
you for any of the above shopping scenarios choose the option “None of these”?  
(Tick one box only) 
 
(1) ? Yes I found it difficult, but did not choose ”None of these” (Go to Q3) 
(2) ? Yes I found it difficult and chose “None of these” (Go to Q3) 
(3) ? No I did not find it difficult, but chose “None of these” (Go to Q3) 
(4) ? No I did not find it difficult and did not choose ”None of these” (Go to Q4) 
(5) ? Do not know (Go to Q4) 
 
Q.3 What was your main reason for finding the choice task difficult to make 
and/or why did you choose the option “None of these”? 
(Tick one box only). 
 
(1) ? I could not relate to the information 
(2) ? I do not know what campylobacter is 
(3) ? There was not sufficient information for me to be able to make a choice 
(4) ? I do not buy chicken meat 
(5) ? I thought the chickens were too expensive 
(6) ? I normally buy other chicken products than whole chilled chickens 
(7) ? I did not understand the questions 
(8) ? I was not able to rank the priorities campylobacter content, type of breeding 
and price 
(9) ? I did not find the options realistic 
(10) ? I support outdoor breeding chickens, but do not believe that I, the consumer, 
should carry the cost  
(11) ? I support campylobacter -free chickens, but do not believe that I, the con-
sumer, should carry the cost 
(12) ?  Do not know   
 
Q.4 How certain are you about your choices in the above shopping scenarios? On 
a scale of 1-7, where 1 is very uncertain and 7 is very certain; please indicate 
your degree of certainty  
 
(1) ? 1 - Very uncertain 
(2) ? 2 – Fairly uncertain 
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 (3) ? 3 – A little uncertain 
(4) ? 4 – Neither certain nor uncertain 
(5) ? 5 – A little certain 
(6) ? 6 – Fairly certain 
(7) ? 7 Very certain 
(8)     ? Do not know    
 
Q. 5 To which of the following characteristics did you attach the greatest impor-
tance in the above shopping scenarios?  
 (Tick one box only) 
 
(1) ? Type of breeding 
(2) ? Campylobacter content 
(3) ? Price 
(4) ? I was not able to make a choice 
(5)     ? Do not know   
Q.6 Please indicate the degree to which the following statements represent your 
considerations when going shopping for yourself and possibly for your family. 
Please use a scale of 1 – 5, where 1 is completely agree and 5 is completely dis-
agree. 
 
 1 - Completely agree 
2 - 
Agree 
3 - Neu-
tral 
4 - Dis-
agree 
5 - 
Com-
pletely 
dis-
agree 
Do not 
know 
It is important that the price is 
low 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
It is important that the product 
is organic 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
It is important that the product 
is low-fat 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
The type of breeding used is 
important 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
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  1 - Completely agree 
2 - 
Agree 
3 - Neu-
tral 
4 - Dis-
agree 
5 - 
Com-
pletely 
dis-
agree 
Do not 
know 
It is important that the product 
appears tempting 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
It is important that the product 
is campylobacter-free 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
It is important that the product 
is produced in Denmark 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
It is important that the product 
is of good quality 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
 
 
Q.7 Do you believe it possible to avoid campylobacter by maintaining good hy-
giene basics in the kitchen and by using correct food preparation practices? 
 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No   
(3) ? Do not know    
 
Q.8 Do you think that your household maintains good hygiene basics in the 
kitchen? 
 
 (1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No   
(3) ? Do not know    
 
[Sample A is given information about campylobacter] 
Again you have to choose between two different chicken products that differ with re-
gard to type of breeding, campylobacter content and price. 
 
However, this time you will also be given some information about the campylobac-
ter bacteria. The information has been documented by The Danish Institute for Food 
and Veterinary Research. 
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 Campylobacter. Today, the campylobacter bacteria, especially found in poultry, are 
the most common cause of food poisoning. If you are infected with campylobacter, 
the following clinical picture may occur:  
 
Typical symptoms 
- general feeling of discomfort 
- severe diarrhoea 
- stomach ache 
- vomiting 
- fever 
 
After-effects 
- In rare cases, nerve damage may occur, causing temporary paralysis 
 
Permanent damage (may occur in rare cases) 
- arthritis 
- irritable bowel syndrome 
- chronic diarrhoea 
 
Your risk of infection 
If you choose a chicken product that has not been controlled for campylobacter con-
tent, your risk of campylobacter infection is 1 in 1000, or 0.1 per cent. If you choose a 
chicken labelled “campylobacter-free”, your risk of infection is 0. 
 
What you can do 
By taking sensible precautions in the kitchen, you will be able to avoid infection from 
campylobacter infected chickens. Campylobacter bacteria die when frozen or heat 
treated at more than 75°C. 
It is important:  
to keep raw and prepared food separate 
to wash hands, tools and cutting board thoroughly after contact with the meet 
to prepare the meat thoroughly either by frying or boiling and keep it refrigerated 
not to use the same tools for chilled and cooked meat.  
 
If you believe your standard of kitchen hygiene and food preparation to be just as 
good as the abovementioned recommendations, the risk of infection will be heavily 
reduced. 
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 Apart from the differences in type of breeding, campylobacter content and price men-
tioned above, the two types of chicken are identical. The quality, for example, mean-
ing flavour, freshness, shelf-life, nutritional value etc. is identical for the two types of 
chicken. 
 
[Sample B is given information about breeding methods] 
Again you have to choose between to different chicken products that differ 
with regard to type of breeding, campylobacter content and price. 
 
However, this time you will also be given some information about the type of breed-
ing. The information has been documented by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
 
Indoor breeding  
- The chickens are kept indoors al the time  
- Each chicken has less space than an A4 sheet 
- The light is kept on almost all the time day and night. This means that they eat most 
of the time and thus grow faster 
- It is not possible for the chickens to dust bathe 
- The life span of the chickens is approx. 6 weeks 
 
Outdoor breeding 
- The chickens also have access to outdoor areas 
-Each chicken has almost two A4 sheets indoors. Furthermore, each chicken has a liv-
ing space of 4 square metres 
- The circadian cycle of the chickens is based on daylight. The chickens thus grow at 
a normal speed 
- It is possible for the chickens to dust bathe 
- The life span is approx. 12 weeks 
 
Now imagine that you are in the shop where you usually do your shopping. You wish 
to buy one chilled chicken at 1300 grams. 
 
You have the same amount of money at your disposal that you normally have when 
you go shopping. Before ticking the box next to your favoured choice, please imagine 
yourself in an everyday shopping situation and consider whether or not you are will-
ing to pay the price stated for each of the chicken products. 
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 You will now be presented with 4 independent shopping scenarios. For each shopping 
scenario please indicate by ticking the appropriate box which of the two types of 
chicken you would buy. 
 
You have a choice between chicken A and B. If you would not buy either of the two 
types of chicken, please tick the box “none of these”. 
 
Apart from the differences in type of breeding, campylobacter content and price men-
tioned above, the two types of chicken are identical. The quality, for example, mean-
ing flavour, freshness, shelf-life, nutritional value etc. is identical for the two types of 
chicken. 
 
[Below, we provide an example of a choice set (each respondent receives 4 choice 
sets)] 
 
Q.9 Shopping scenario 1 
 
Chicken A Chicken B 
Outdoor breeding Indoor breeding 
The chicken is labelled ”campylo-
bacter-free” 
The campylobacter content of the chicken has 
not been checked 
Unit price (DKK) 97  Unit price (DKK) 64  
I choose (tick one box only) 
A B None of these 
   
 
 
Q.10 Did you find it difficult to choose between the chicken products and/or did 
you for any of the above shopping scenarios choose the option “None of these”?  
(Tick one box only) 
 
(1) ? Yes I found it difficult, but did not choose ”None of these” (Go to Q3) 
(2) ? Yes I found it difficult and chose “None of these” (Go to Q3) 
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 (3) ? No I did not find it difficult, but chose “None of these” (Go to Q3) 
(4) ? No I did not find it difficult and did not choose ”None of these” (Go to Q4) 
(5) ? Do not know (Go to Q4) 
 
Q.11 What was your main reason for finding the choice task difficult to make 
and/or why did you choose the option “None of these”? 
(Tick one box only). 
 
(1) ? I could not relate to the information 
(2) ? I do not know what campylobacter is 
(3) ? There was not sufficient information for me to be able to make a choice 
(4) ? I do not buy chicken meat 
(5) ? I thought the chickens were too expensive 
(6) ? I normally buy other chicken products than whole chilled chickens 
(7) ? I did not understand the questions 
(8) ? I was not able to rank the priorities campylobacter content, type of breeding 
and price 
(9) ? I did not find the options realistic 
(10) ? I support outdoor breeding chickens, but do not believe that I, the consumer, 
should carry the cost  
(11) ? I support campylobacter-free chickens, but do not believe that I, the con-
sumer, should carry the cost 
(12) ?  Do not know   
 
Q.12 How certain are you about your choices in the above shopping scenarios? 
On a scale of 1-7, where 1 is very uncertain and 7 is very certain; please indicate 
your degree of certainty  
 
(1) ? 1 - Very uncertain 
(2) ? 2 – Fairly uncertain 
(3) ? 3 – A little uncertain 
(4) ? 4 – Neither certain nor uncertain 
(5) ? 5 – A little certain 
(6) ? 6 – Fairly certain 
(7) ? 7 Very certain 
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 (8)     ? Do not know    
 
Q.13 To which of the following characteristics did you attach the greatest impor-
tance in the above shopping scenarios?  
(Tick one box only) 
 
(1) ? Type of breeding 
(2) ? Campylobacter content 
(3) ? Price 
(4) ? I was not able to make a choice 
(5) ? Do not know   
 
Q.14 Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether or not you agree 
with the following statements 
 (Tick one box only) 
 
 Agree Disagree Do not know 
The welfare of outdoor-bred 
chickens is better than that of 
indoor-bred chickens 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? 
Outdoor-bred chickens are 
more likely to be infected 
with campylobacter than are 
indoor-bred chickens 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? 
 
Q.15 Please consider the following statements about health and type of breeding. 
On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is completely agree and 5 is completely disagree, 
please indicate your degree of agreement  
 
 
1 - Com-
pletely 
agree 
2 - 
Agree 
3 - Neu-
tral 
4 - Dis-
agree 
5- Com-
pletely 
disagree 
Do not 
know 
I think there is too much hysteria 
surrounding the animal welfare 
issue 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I support animal welfare through 
my choice in food products 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
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1 - Com-
pletely 
agree 
2 - 
Agree 
3 - Neu-
tral 
4 - Dis-
agree 
5- Com-
pletely 
disagree 
Do not 
know 
I think that outdoor-bred chick-
ens taste better than indoor-bred 
chickens 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
Although infection by campylo-
bacter can be prevented through 
maintaining good hygiene basics 
and correct food preparation 
practices, I do not want to have 
campylobacter bacteria in my 
kitchen 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I think there is too much hysteria 
surrounding the campylobacter 
issue  
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I believe that the producers are 
responsible for supplying food 
products that carry no health risks 
for the consumers 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
If the authorities could ensure re-
liable marking, I would be happy 
to pay extra for campylobacter-
free chicken 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
If the authorities could ensure re-
liable marking, I would be happy 
to pay extra for increased animal 
welfare  
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I believe that the authorities are 
responsible for carrying the costs 
of ensuring campylobacter-free 
chicken meat. 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I believe that the authorities are 
responsible for carrying the costs 
of increased animal welfare  
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I believe that eating Danish food 
products carries no health risks 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
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Q.16 Please consider the following statements about information on food prod-
ucts. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is completely agree and 5 is completely disagree, 
please indicate your degree of agreement  
 
 
1 - Com-
pletely 
agree 
2 - Agree 3 - Neu-tral 
4 - Dis-
agree 
5- Com-
pletely 
disagree 
Do not 
know 
I have sufficient information when 
I buy food products 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the informa-
tion supplied by the Dan-
ish Institute for Food and Veteri-
nary Research  
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the product 
information supplied by the pro-
ducers 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the Ø-label (a 
label that shows that the article is 
an organic product produced un-
der control of the Danish authori-
ties) 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the informa-
tion supplied by the Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the informa-
tion supplied by the  Danish Con-
sumer Council, e.g. through the 
independent consumer magazine 
“Tænk” 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
I have confidence in the informa-
tive labeling of consumer goods 
(1) ? (2) ? (3) ? (4) ? (5) ? (6) ? 
 
Q.17 Prior to this survey, had you heard about campylobacter?  
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No 
(3) ? Do not know 
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 Q.18 Prior to this survey had you heard about salmonella? 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No (Go to Q24) 
(3) ? Do not know 
 
Q.19 Have your knowledge of salmonella influenced your responses in this ques-
tionnaire? 
 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No 
(3) ? Do not know 
 
Q.20 Are you at an increased risk of infection by campylobacter due to dimin-
ished health? 
 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No 
(3) ? Do not know 
 
Q.21 Have you or anyone you know of ever been ill from campylobacter?  
 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No 
(3) ? Do not know 
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 Q.22a What kind of chicken meat product do you usually buy? (Please tick one 
box in each line) 
 
  Organic chicken     ?                         Non-organic chicken    ?             Do 
not know  ?      
 
Q.22b 
 Chicken labelled campylobacter-free  ?  Chicken not labelled campylobacter-
free  ? Do not know   ? 
 
Q.23 What is the approximate price you usually pay for a chicken? 
 
Less than 40 DKK ? 
40 DKK ? 
47 DKK ? 
55 DKK ? 
64 DKK ? 
74 DKK ? 
85 DKK ? 
97 DKK ? 
110 DKK ? 
More than 110 DKK ? 
  Do not know ?  
Q.24 During the past 10 years, have you been a member of an organisation due 
to its aim to protect animal welfare? 
 
(1) ? Yes 
(2) ? No 
(3) ? Do not know 
 
Q.25 Are you employed? 
 
1. in a private company 
2. in a public institution  
3. Selfemployed 
4. Not employed 
5. Do not know 
 
This is the end of the questionnaire – thank you for your help 
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 [Furthermore, the following pre-data are available from ACNielsen] 
 
Q1: Gender 
Q2: Year of birth 
Q4: Number of people in the household 
Q5: Number of children under the age of 15 in the household 
Q6: Marital status 
Q7: Highest level of school related education obtained  
Q8: Highest level above school related education obtained (Basic vocational training, 
ONC (Ordinary National Certificate) level education, HNC (Higher National Certifi-
cate) level education, Bachelor’s level of education, Master’s or higher level of edu-
cation, Other, None) 
Q12: Total household income before tax 
Q13: Is it primarily you, who does the shopping in your household 
Q16: What kind of housing do you live in? 
Q19: What is your postal code? 
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 Appendix B: Literature review - Experiences from stated 
preference surveys of food safety and animal welfare 
In the vast amount of literature on economic valuation, we have identified studies 
concerning animal welfare and food safety, but few where the value of both attributes 
are estimated. The methods used to estimate willingness to pay for animal welfare and 
food safety include contingent valuation, contingent ranking, price auctions and 
choice experiments. We present these studies below in section B1. An overview over 
the studies is provided in table B1 (studies using and discussing choice experiments), 
Table B2 (studies using CE on food safety and animal welfare), and Table B3 (studies 
using revealed valuation methods other than CE on food safety and animal welfare). 
B1. Willingness to pay studies of animal welfare and food safety 
Animal welfare using CE  
Carlsson et al (2003) carried out CE on animal welfare, where WTP for free-
rangefree-range production of table eggs versus battery cage production was esti-
mated. The willingness to pay estimates for free-rangefree-range production was es-
timated to 10 SEK. Furthermore Carlsson et al. (2004a) complete a CE survey on 
animal welfare in relation to the transportation of farm animals to slaughterhouses 
versus the use of mobile abattoirs. The results indicate that consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for mobile abattoirs for beef and pigs but place a negative monetary 
value on mobile abattoirs in chicken production. The importance of animal welfare as 
a product quality attribute seems to be animal specific. The WTP for mobile abattoirs 
was between -3.15 SEK and 4.18 SEK dependent on the type of animal. 
 
Animal welfare using CVM  
Burgess et al.  (2004) valued consumers’ preference structure for improved animal 
welfare using two different methods; double bounded CVM and paired comparisons. 
They concluded that there is a WTP for improved welfare for chicken, laying hens, 
dairy cows and pigs. Furthermore, consumers make largely rational choices over al-
ternative farm animal welfare enhancing scheme, and the results are not sensitive to 
the elicitation method. Bennett (1996) used CVM to analyse consumers’ WTP for in-
creased animal welfare in egg production. He finds that the main aspects of livestock 
production that people are concerned about, are (listed in decreasing order); housing 
and confined living conditions, feed and medicine, livestock transport and livestock 
markets and then slaughtering process. Bennett (op cit) concludes that there is a sig-
nificant WTP to pay for increased animal welfare in Great Britain.  Bennet & Blaney 
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 (2003) use CVM to further elicit WTP for supporting legislation to phase out the use 
of battery cages for egg production in the European Union. They conclude that the 
estimated benefits of phasing out the use of battery cages outweigh the estimated an-
nual costs over a 12-year period.  
 
Food safety risk using CE and CVM 
Goldberg & Roosen (2005) used personal interview in local stores to perform CE. In-
formation on symptoms, incidence rates and associated foods were given to the re-
spondents prior to the choice tasks. Three attributes are included: risk reduction of 
salmonellosis, risk reduction of campylobacteriosis and price. Each attribute can ob-
tain three levels of health risk (current level which is 76 out of 100.000 for salmonella 
and 58 out of 100.000 for campylobacter51, 40% reduction, 80% reduction) and three 
price levels (10, 11 and 12 Euro/kg) Each questionnaire includes 8 choice sets (a 
choice set consists of choosing between alternatives A and B and an opt-out) and 3 
contingent valuation tasks – there are 6 blocks/sub samples. They find a positive WTP 
for risk reduction of both salmonellosis and campylobacteriosis of around 1.3 Euro 
for 40% risk reduction and 2 Euro for 80% risk reduction. The WTP is a little higher 
for salmonella than for campylobacter and a nonlinear relation between WTP and risk 
reduction is found. In example, the WTP for a given reduction in salmonella as well 
as campylobacter is smaller than the sum of the WTP for salmonella risk reduction 
and campylobacter risk reduction individually (this applies for 40% as well as for 
80%).  
 
Food safety and the effect of information using experimental auctions 
Hayes et al.  (1995) valued food safety in relation to food borne illness. This study is 
particularly interesting in the present context because the attributes are very similar to 
the survey we have done (cf. chapter 8 to 12). By use of experimental auction markets 
(auction for sandwiches) they evaluated the willingness to pay for safer food in rela-
tion to five different pathogens like salmonella, campylobacter, staphylococcus 
aureus, trichinella spiralis and clostridium perfringens. The respondents were given a 
test sandwich with unspecified risk of getting ill (a ‘normal’ sandwich). The respon-
dents were then offered an auction where they could buy stringently screened sand-
wiches with a risk of 1 in 100 million chance of suffering from the pathogen in ques-
tion from eating the sandwich. Hayes et al. (1995) conclude that the consumers un-
derestimate rather than overestimate the risk of food borne illness. They explain the 
results partly by the composition of respondents which were young adults whose ten-
                                                 
51 Based on number of registered human infections. 
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 dencies to underestimate risk are often apparent in their behaviour. And partly as a 
consequence of respondents lacking knowledge of the nature of food borne illness 
since infections from food borne pathogens typically displays symptoms similar to 
those of the flu which is why individuals do not realize they are suffering from a food 
borne pathogen rather than the flu. They also find that the pathogen specific values 
seem to act as surrogates for general food safety preferences. Further, the values of 
risk reduction were relatively stable across a wide range of risks indicating that re-
spondents rely on prior beliefs about risks.   
 
Finally, the respondents were given information about the risk of the sandwiches in 
terms of the probability and severity and asked to bid again. The information about 
the ‘normal’ sandwich was described as follow: “If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 
125.143 change that you will become ill from campylobacter”. And, the information 
about the screened sandwich was: “This food has been subjected to stringent screen-
ing for campylobacter. There is 1 in 100.000.000 change of getting campylobacterio-
sis from consuming this food”. Both products were further described by the symptoms 
of illness: “Symptoms are those of an intestinal disease with acute diarrhoea and se-
vere abdominal pains. Diarrhoea is preceded by brief fever and malaise. The actual 
individual chance of infection of campylobacteriosis is 1 in 114 annually. Of those 
individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 1000 will die annually. The average cost 
for medical expenses and productivity losses from a mild case of campylobacteriosis 
is $230”. Further, they analyse how consumers respond to changes in the risk of ill-
ness for one of the pathogens, salmonella. The response to a change in risk of illness 
from salmonella was evaluated by repeated auctions where the Salmonella risk was 
repeatedly decreased with a factor 10 from (1 in 13.7) to (1 in 1370000). Hayes et al. 
(1995) found that ínformation about the risk only increased the willingness to pay es-
timate slightly.   
 
Food related health risk of GMO’s using CE and CR  
Hu et al.  (2004) evaluated consumers’ tradeoffs between unknown risks on health 
and the environment (perceived risks associated with GM food) and perceived benefit 
associated with GM food such as richness of healthy vitamins and environmentally 
friendly production process. Initially in the survey, the respondent was asked to iden-
tify their preferred bread types. In the choice sets, respondents are choosing between 
their preferred bread types, a bread product with some new features and an opt-out 
alternative (none of the two bread types). Hu et al.  (2004) concluded that there is 
considerable diversity amongst consumers in risk attitudes towards GM food and 
willingness to trade off between risk and benefits depending on respondents’ personal 
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 characteristics such as gender, number of children in the household, education and 
age. The same idea of identifying consumers individual status quo choice by first elic-
iting the respondent’s own preferred brand and then use this as the individual baseline 
choice, is used in Kontoleon & Yabe (2003) on GM foods.  
 
Genetically modified goods and the GM market have been analysed in several other 
CE surveys. Burton et al.  (2004) evaluate consumers’ preferences regarding labelling 
of GM foods. Also, Carlsson et al. (2004c) analyse consumers WTP for labels and 
bans on using GM in animal fodder. The results show that consumers WTP is signifi-
cantly higher to ensure a total ban on the use of GM in animal fodder than for label-
ling. For other studies on GM food, see James et al.  (2003) and Kontoleon & Yabe 
(2003). 
  
Bjørner et al. (2004) estimated WTP for biodiversity, health and uncertainty in a CR 
study as effects on a decrease in the use of pesticides by the agricultural sector. As an 
indicator for the attribute biodiversity they use the population of birds in the arable 
land, while allergy is used as the health attribute. This health attribute entails long 
term effects as compared to the effects in the present study on pathogen infections 
that mainly cause short term effects. Among other results, Bjørner et al (op cit) in-
cluded an uncertainty interval around the expected change in number of allergy cases, 
and find that uncertainty about the effect on allergy increases the WTP for the health 
attribute by up to 21-53% as compared to the WTP estimates for changes in the health 
attribute without explicit mentioning of uncertainty.   
 
Food safety using experimental auction 
Canadians WTP for traceability, food safety and on farm production information for 
beef (and ham) sandwiches are elicited using experimental auctions in Hobbs (2002).  
The attributes are valued individually and together. She finds that a WTP for im-
proved food safety (unspecified) is 15-20% of the price of a base sandwich. Further, 
the willingness to pay for a sandwich including all attributes is less than the sum of 
the willingness to pay for the individual attributes which is argued to indicate a de-
creasing marginal willingness to pay for attributes.  
 
Hobbs (2005) also finds that, in Canada, information from federal government is the 
most trusted followed by information from an independent quality assurance firm 
whereas information from environmental and animal welfare groups as well as from 
processors and retailers was the least trusted. 
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 Table B1. Studies using and discussing choice experiment 
 
 
Author 
No. of CS 
and 
blocks 
No. of alter-
natives 
No. of attrib-
utes and lev-
els 
Econometric 
model 
Adamowicz, W.; Louviere, J. & M. 
Williams (1994): Combining re-
vealed and stated preference meth-
ods for valuing environmental 
amenities 
64 CS, 4 
blocks 
3 alterna-
tives per CS 
13 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
Multinomial 
logit 
Adamowicz, W.; Swait, J.; Boxall, 
P.; Louviere, J. & M. Williams 
(1997): Perceptions versus Objec-
tive Measures of Environmental 
Quality in Combined Revealed and 
Stated Preference Models of Envi-
ronmental Valuation 
32 CS, 2 
blocks 
3 alterna-
tives per CS 
6 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
Conditional 
logit 
Alfnes, F & K. Rickertsen (2004): 
Risk aversion in the consumer food 
market: an experimental study of 
consumer attitudes toward beef 
tenderness labelling 
- - - - 
Alpizar, F.; Carlsson, F. & P. Mar-
tinsson (2003): Using choice ex-
periments for non-market valuation 
- - - - 
Anderson, D. A. & J. B. Wiley 
(1992): Efficient Choice Set De-
signs for Estimating Availability 
Cross-Effects Models 
- - - - 
Anderson, S. P. & A de Palma 
(1991): Multi product firms: A 
nested logit approach 
- - - Nested logit 
Banzhaf, M.; Johnson, F. R. & K. E. 
Mathews (2001) : Opt-out alterna-
tives and anglers stated prefer-
ences 
- - - Conditional 
logit and 
Random Pa-
rameter logit 
Bateman, I. J; Carson, R. T.; Day, 
B.; Haneman, M.; Hanley, N.; Hett, 
T.; Jones-Lee, M.; Loomes, G.; 
Mourato, S.; Ôzdemiroglu, E.; 
Pearce, D.; Sugden, J. & J. Swan-
son (2002): Economic valuation 
with stated preference techniques, 
a manual 
 
- 3 alterna-
tives per CS 
7 attributes 
described by 
3-6 levels 
Multinomial 
logit and 
conditional 
logit 
Batsell, R. R. & J. J. Louviere 
(1991): Experimental analysis of 
choice 
- - - - 
Bech, M.; Sørensen, J. & J. Laurid-
sen (2005): Eliciting women's pref-
erences for a training program in 
breast self-examination: a conjoint 
ranking experiment. 
18 CS per 
respon-
dent 
2 alterna-
tives per CS 
4 attributes 
described by 
2-3 levels 
Ordered logit 
Bech, M.; Kjær, T., Lauridsen, J. & 
D. Gyrd-Hansen (2004): Hvad øn-
sker studerende af deres fremtidige 
job? Illustration af et diskret valg 
eksperiment 
- - - Random Ef-
fect probit 
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 Bennett, J. & V. Adamowicz (2001): 
Some fundamentals of environ-
mental choice modelling 
- - - - 
Bierlaire, M. (2001): A theoretical 
analysis of the cross-nested logit 
model 
- - - Cross 
Nested logit 
Blamey, R.; Louivere, J. J. & J. 
Bennett (2001): Choice set design 
- - - - 
Boxall, P. C.; Englin, J. & W. L. 
Adamowicz (2003): Valuing abo-
riginal artefacts: a combined re-
vealed-stated preference approach 
- - - Conditional 
logit and 
Mixed logit 
Boyle, K. J.; Holmes, T. P.; Teisl, 
M. F. & B. Roe (2001): A Compari-
son of Conjoint Analysis Response 
Formats 
- - 7 attributes 
described by 
2-3 levels 
Ordered 
probit, rank-
ordered logit 
and tobit 
Brownstone, D. & K. Train (1999): 
Forecasting new product penetra-
tion with flexible substitution pat-
terns 
- 3 alterna-
tives per CS 
14 attributes 
described by 4 
levels 
Probit and 
mixed logit 
Burton, M.; Rigby, D. & T. Young 
(2004): UK consumers, regulation 
and the market for GM food. 
 
- - 4 attributes 
described by 
3-7 lveles 
Mixed logit 
Carlsson, F.; Frykblom, P. & C. Lil-
jenstolpe (2003b): Valuing wetland 
attributes: an application of choice 
experiments 
60 CS, 15 
blocks. 4 
CS per 
respon-
dent 
3 alterna-
tives per CS 
7 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
Random pa-
rameter logit 
Carlsson, F.; Frykblom, P. & C-J. 
Lagerkvist (2004c): Using cheap-
talk as a test of validity in choice 
experiments 
- - - Random pa-
rameter logit 
Carlsson, F. & P. Martinsson 
(2003): Design techniques for 
stated preference methods in 
health economics 
- - - - 
Carson, R. T.; Louviere, J. J.; 
Anderson, D. A.; Arabie, P.; Bunch, 
D.; Hensher, D. A.; Johnson, R. M.; 
Kuhfeld, W. F.; Steinberg, D.; 
Swait, J.; Timmermans, H. & J. B. 
Wiley (1994): Experimental analy-
sis of choice 
- - - - 
Carson, R.; Flores, N. & N. Meade 
(2001): Contingent valuation: con-
troversies and evidence 
 
- - - - 
Caussade, S.; Ortúzar, J. de. O.; 
Rizzi, L. I. & D. A. Hensher (2005): 
Assessing the influence of design 
dimensions on stated choice ex-
periment estimates 
6 – 15 per 
respon-
dent 
3 – 5 alter-
natives per 
choice set 
3 - 6 attributes 
described by 2 
– 4 levels 
Multinomial 
logit and het-
eroskedastic 
logit 
Cummings, R. G. & L. O. Taylor 
(1999) : Unbiased value estimates 
for environmental goods: a cheap 
talk design for the contingent valua-
tion method 
 
- - - Probit 
DeShazo, J. R.; Cameron, T. A. & - - - - 
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 M. Saenz (2004): A test of choice 
set misspecification applicable to 
stated preference methods 
Foster, V. & S. Mourato (2002): 
Testing for consistency in contin-
gent ranking experiments 
3 CS 4 alterna-
tives per CS 
- Conditional 
logit and 
rank-ordered 
logit 
Garrod, G & G. Willis (1999): Eco-
nomic valuation of the environment. 
Methods and case studies 
- - - - 
Gyrd-Hansen, D. & J. Søgaard 
(2001): Analysing public prefer-
ences for cancer screening pro-
grammes 
 4 alterna-
tives per CS 
4 attributes 
described by 
5-6 levels 
- 
Haaijer, R.; Kamakura, W. & M. 
Wedel (2001): The ’no-choice’ al-
ternative in conjoint choice experi-
ments 
- - - Conditional 
logit and 
nested logit 
Hanley, N. ; Mourato, S. & R. E. 
Wright (2001): Choice modelling 
approaches: A superior alternative 
for environmental valuation? 
- - - - 
Hanley, N.; Wright, R. E. & G. Koop 
(2002): Modelling recreation de-
mand using choice experiments: 
climbing in Scotland 
- 3 alterna-
tives per CS 
6 attributes 
described by 
2-6 levels 
Nested logit 
and multi-
nomial logit 
Hensher, D.; Louivere,J. & J. Swait 
(1999): Combining sources of pref-
erence data 
80 CS, 5 
blocks 
- 18 attributes 
described by 
2-8 levels 
Multinomial 
logit 
Hensher, D. A. & A. J. Reyes 
(2000): Trip chaining as a barrier to 
the propensity to use public trans-
port 
- - - Mixed logit, 
multinomial 
logit and 
nested logit 
Heiss, F. (2002): Specification(s) of 
nested logit models 
- - - Nested logit 
Huber, J. & K. Zwerina (1996): The 
importance of utility balance in effi-
cient choice designs 
- - - - 
Hunt, G. L. (2000): Alternative 
nested logit model structures and 
the special case of partial degener-
acy 
- - - Nested logit 
Kontoleon, A. & M. Yabe (2003): 
Assessing the impacts of alterna-
tive ‘opt-out’ formats in choice ex-
periment studies: Consumer pref-
erences for genetically modified 
content and production information 
in food 
- - - Random pa-
rameter logit 
Kuhfeld, W. F. (2004): Marketing 
research. Methods in SAS 
- - - - 
Lancsar, E. & E. Savage (2003): 
Deriving welfare measures from 
discrete choice experiments: incon-
sistency between current methods 
and random utility and welfare the-
ory 
- - - Multinomial 
logit 
Louivere, J. J (2001): Choice ex-
periments: An overview of concepts 
and issues 
- - - - 
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 Louivere, J. J.; Hensher, D. A. & J. 
D. Swait (2000): Stated choice 
methods analysis and applications 
- - - - 
McIntosh, E. & M. Ryan (2002): Us-
ing discrete choice experiments to 
derive welfare estimates for the 
provision of elective surgery: Impli-
cations of discontinuous prefer-
ences 
- 2 alterna-
tives per CS 
3 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
- 
Paulrod, A. & T. Laitila (2004): 
Valuation of management policies 
for sport-fishing on Swedens Kai-
tum river 
20 CS, 5 
blocks. 4 
CS per 
respon-
dent 
- 9 attributes 
described by 3 
levels 
- 
Rowe, R. D; Schulze, W. D. & W. 
S. Breffle (1996): A test for pay-
ment card biases 
- - - - 
Ruby, M. C.; Johnson, F. R. & K. E. 
Mathews (1998): Just say no: Opt-
out alternatives and anglers stated 
preferences 
30 Cs, 2 
blocks 
3 alterna-
tives per CS 
7 attributes 
described by 
2-6 levels 
Random pa-
rameter logit 
and condi-
tional logit 
Ryan, M. & F. S. Miguel (2003): 
Revisiting the axiom of complete-
ness in health care 
- - 12 attributes 
described by 
2-3 levels 
- 
Ryan, M. & D. Skåtum (2004): 
Modelling non-demanders in choice 
experiments 
- 3 alterna-
tives per CS 
6 attributes 
described by 
3-8 levels 
Multinomial 
logit and 
nested logit 
Ryan, M. & S. Wordsworth (2000): 
Sensitivity of willingness to pay es-
timates to the level of attributes in 
discrete choice experiments 
13 CS, 2 
blocks. 6 
or 7 CS 
per re-
spondent 
3 alterna-
tives per CS 
6 attributes 
described by 
3-4 levels 
Random ef-
fect probit 
Schwabe, K. A.; Schumann, P. W.; 
Boyd, R. & K. Doroodian (2001): 
The value of changes in deer sea-
son length: an application of the 
nested multinomial logit model 
- - - Nested logit 
Scott, A. (2002): Identifying and 
analysing dominant preferences in 
discrete choice experiments: An 
application in health care 
- 2 alterna-
tives per CS 
4 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
- 
Swait, J. & J. Louviere (1993): The 
Role of the Scale Parameter in the 
Estimation and Comparison of Mul-
tinomial Logit Models 
- - - Multinomial 
logit 
Train, K. (1998): Recreation de-
mand models with taste differences 
over people 
- - 8 attributes Random pa-
rameter logit 
and condi-
tional logit 
Verboven, F. (1996): The nested 
logit model and representative con-
sumer theory 
- - - Nested logit 
Wen, C-H. & F. S. Koppelman 
(2000): The generalized logit model 
- - - Nested logit 
  
 
 
 
 
 
190 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 
  
Table B2. Studies using CE  on food safety and animal welfare 
 
 
Author No. of CS and blocks 
No. of al-
ternatives 
No. of attrib-
utes and lev-
els 
WTP es-
timate 
Econometric 
model 
Stated preference method – choice experiment 
Bennett, R. (1995): 
The value of farm a
mal welfare 
ni-
- - - - - 
Burton, M.; Rigby, D. 
& T. Young (2004): 
UK consumers, regu-
lation and the market 
for GM food. 
- 3 per CS 4 attributes 
described by 
3-8 levels  
Status quo as 
opt out  
- Mixed logit 
Carlsson, F.; Fryk-
blom, P. & C. J. 
Lagerkvist (2003): 
Farm animal welfare – 
testing for a market 
failure. 
- 3 per CS 4 attributes 
described by 
2-3 levels 
8-10 
SEK for 
6 eggs 
from 
free-
range 
hens52
Random pa-
rameter logit 
(mixed logit) 
Carlsson, F.; Fryk-
blom, P. & C-J. 
Lagerkvist (2004a): 
Consumer benefits of 
labels and bans on 
genetically modified 
food – An empirical 
analysis using choice 
experiments 
- 2 per CS 8 attributes 
described by 
2-5 levels 
No opt out 
5-20 
SEK for 
chicken 
meat not 
geneti-
cally 
modified 
and 3-8 
for eggs 
not ge-
netically 
modi-
fied53
Random pa-
rameter logit 
(mixed logit) 
Carlsson, F.; Fryk-
blom, P. & C. J. 
Lagerkvist (2004b): 
Consumer willingness 
to pay for farm animal 
welfare – transporta-
tion of farm animals to 
slaughter versus the 
use of mobile abat-
toirs. 
- 2 per CS 7 attributes 
described by 
2-3 levels 
-3.15-
4.18 
SEK for 
use of 
mobile 
slaugh-
ter 
houses
54
Random pa-
rameter logit 
(mixed logit) 
Goldberg, I. & 
Roosen, J (2005): 
Measuring consumer 
willingness to pay for 
a health risk reduction 
of salmonellosis and 
campylobacteriosis 
8 CS and 3 
CVM  
- 3 attributes 
described by 
3 levels 
1.3-2 
euro for 
reducing 
campy-
lobacter 
and sal-
monella 
in 
chicken 
breasts 
Conditional 
logit and  di-
chotomous 
choices 
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 Hu, W.; Hünnemeyer, 
A.; Veeman, M.; 
Adamwicz, V. & L. 
Srivastava (2004): 
Trading off health, en-
vironmental and ge-
netic modification at-
tributes in food 
32 divided 
into 4 
blocks, 8 
CS per re-
spondent 
- 4 attributes 
described by 
2-4 levels 
-2.46—
1.66 $ 
for GM 
modified 
products, 
-0.25-
1.39 $ 
for the 
health 
attribute 
and -
1.49-
1.88 $ 
for the 
environ-
mental 
attrib-
ute55. 
Conditional 
logit 
James, S. & M. Burton 
(2003): Consumer 
preferences for GM 
food and other attrib-
utes of the food sys-
tem 
28 CS di-
vided into 3 
blocks 
3 per CS 6 attributes 
described by 
3-11 levels 
12-22 $ 
per 
week56
Conditional 
logit 
Kontoleon, A. & M. 
Yabe (2003): Assess-
ing the impacts alter-
native ‘opt-out’ for-
mats in choice ex-
periment studies – 
Consumer prefer-
ences for genetically 
modified content and 
production information 
in food 
- - - - Random pa-
rameter logit 
(Mixed logit) 
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Table  B3. Studies using revealed valuation methods other than CE on food safety 
and animal welfare 
 
Author Method WTP estimate 
Revealed preference methods 
Alm, K. (2004): In what way is consumers’ definition of 
animal welfare related to the consumption? 
 - 
Bennett, R. M. (1996): Willingness-to-pay measures of 
public support for farm animal legislation 
CVM, dichoto-
mous choice 
0.43£ for 12 eggs 
when cages is 
banned57
Bennett, R. M. & R. J. P. Blaney (2003): Estimation 
benefits of farm animal welfare legislation using the con-
tingent valuation method 
CVM 0.90£ per dozen 
eggs and median 
WTP at 0.45£58
Bjørner, T. B.; Hauch, J. & S. Jespersen (2004): Biodi-
versity, health and uncertainty – a contingent ranking 
study 
Contingent 
ranking 
213-203 DKK per 
household for a one 
percent increase in 
the population of 
birds. Positive will-
ingness to pay for a 
reduction in allergy 
cases.  
Burgess, D.; Hutchinson, W. G.; McCallion, T. & Scarpa, 
R. (2004): Choice rationality in stated preference meth-
ods applied to farm animal welfare improvements 
CVM, paired 
comparisons 
2.1-2.95 £59 for an 
animal welfare im-
provement 
Hamilton, S. F.; Sunding, D. L. & D. Zilberman (2003): 
Public goods and the value of product quality regula-
tions: the case of food safety 
CVM, in person 
surveys and vot-
ing behaviour 
?? 
Hayes, D. J.; Shogren, J. F.; Shin, S. Y. & J. B. Klieben-
stein (1995): Valuing food safety in experimental auction 
markets 
Experimental 
auction market 
integrated infor-
mation provision 
0.30-0.70 $ per meal 
for reducing microbi-
ological risks – WTP 
increases slightly 
after information 
about campylobac-
ter. WTP is not sen-
sitive to amount of 
risk reduction, 
Hayes, D. J.; Fox, J. A. & J. F. Shogren (2002): Experts Second price - 
and activists: how information affects the demand for 
food irradiation 
auction 
Rozan, A.; Stinger, A. & M. Willinger (2004): Willingness Second price 
-
 proce-
- 
to pay for food safety: an experimental investigation of 
quality certification on bidding behaviour 
auction, Becker
DeGroot-
Marschak
dure  
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 B2. The effect of expert based information on consumers’ WTP for food safety 
and animal welfare  
There is a lot of literature on the topics risk perception, information, and consumer 
behaviour, and we will not go into the large field of qualitative, sociological studies 
on risk perception here. However, some of these studies points out some important 
results regarding information provision and risk perception, indicating that public au-
thorities play a key role in information provision regarding credence goods, as public 
information is generally trusted (Nayga et al., 2002; Banerjee and Solomon, 2003, 
Hobbs, 2005). For issues subject to public concern, the government may have an in-
centive to provide information to consumers by e.g. financing information campaigns, 
consumer education, promoting and certifying labels, etc. Information such as expert 
advice based on scientific risk assessment is central in this regard. Sunstein (2002) 
and Williams & Hammitt (2001) suggest a disparity between consumer risk percep-
tion and scientific risk assessment and points at a need for improving the understand-
ing of how consumers create their risk perception, to what extent it is influenced by 
expert-based information provision and how risk perception affects actual demand. 
Uncertainty with respect of food quality and safety hinders consumers attempt to 
match food choices with preferences, and food quality and safety issues have received 
intensive mass media coverage in the recent years. This has led consumers and agri-
food chain stake holders to change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. There has 
also been a growing interest, not only in the role and mechanisms of information, but 
also in the evaluation of the various techniques and vehicles for spreading informa-
tion. Much effort has been devoted to evaluating the effects of advertising and media 
coverage of food quality and safety issues, investigating the role of trust and credibil-
ity of information sources and analysing consumer interest in and use of available in-
formation cues. Verbeke (2005)60 found that information provision can be successful 
only if it meets the informational needs of the target audience. The provision of ever 
more and too detailed information entails the risk of information overload, resulting 
in consumer indifference or loss of confidence. Instead, segmentation and targeted 
information provision are proposed as potential solutions to market failure from in-
formation symmetries.  
 
Much of today’s information about food quality and safety can be classified as risk 
information that aims at reducing consumers’ uncertainty when making purchasing 
decisions. Current failures of risk information to achieve its goals may stem from 
gaps in understanding the relationship between individual perceptions, information 
processing and behaviour (Langford et al 199961). Research has shown that the public 
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 tends to misjudge relative food risks, at least when compared with expert opinions 
(Lazo et al., 200062 and Hansen et al., 200363). Providing (Marette et al 199964) or 
withholding (Mazzocchi et al 2004b food quality or safety information to consumers 
may result in considerable welfare effects.  
 
Mangen et al. (2005)65 discuss a variety of intervention measures in the chicken meat 
chain to reduce campylobacter infections. Of interest in the present context is that 
they include intervention measures at the consumer level because a widespread dis-
semination of campylobacter or other food borne pathogens via the hand and work 
surfaces during the preparation of meals have been demonstrated in several studies 
(Gorman et al, 200266 and Humphrey et al, 200167). They evaluate two existing in-
formation campaigns focusing on increasing kitchen hygiene and home freezing, re-
spectively, to change consumer behaviour. They estimate the yearly costs of each 
campaign to be 0.75-1.5 Euro. Unfortunately, they do not assess the benefits of the 
information campaigns but simply claim that they are important instruments. 
 
An increasing number of markets based and valuation studies have been performed on 
how advertising and public information affects consumer behaviour and consumers’ 
preferences (cf. Smed & Denver, 2005). Bonnet & Simioni (2001) 68 used scanner 
data to estimate WTP for food quality, more specific consumer responses to origin 
labelling. Grunert (200569) lists some CVM studies on food quality, discuss comsum-
ers’ price perception and habitual purchasing, and conclude that this plays a big role 
in food purchasing. He also points at the risk of repeating former trade-off’s in pur-
chase choices, and at the importance of reference prices for the stated WTP.    
 
Smed and Jensen (2005)70 investigate how media coverage of food safety crisis af-
fects consumer behaviour in favour of safe products, and assess how consumers react, 
how long their preferences are influenced, and whether all consumers are influenced 
in the same way. More precisely, the study investigates the impact of negative press 
coverage of salmonella in eggs on the demand for pasteurised eggs. Hence, the focus 
is on a products that may be positively influenced by negative publicity abut another 
product. They find that the effect varies considerably across consumer groups. Most 
responsive to permanent news (news about the death of two people) are aged people, 
households located outside the capital and consumers with medium to low education. 
At the same time all households exhibit a positive trend in consumption of pasteurised 
eggs. The results are found using econometric analysis on media index.  
 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 195
 Only a few quantitative studies using a stated preference approaches are found that 
address the issue of how information affects consumer behaviour (Hayes et al,2002 
and Rozan et al.,2004). These two studies use price auctions as valuation method (see 
appendix A4). Hayes et al.  (2002) analyse how information affects the demand for 
irradiation of food. Through a repeated trial second price auction for pork sandwiches, 
the respondents’ willingness to pay for information is estimated. The respondents 
were provided with impartial information and then asked to join the auction. After bid 
rounds 1-5, the respondents were provided with different kinds of information. Scien-
tific evidence is mainly favourable towards irradiation while advocacy groups stress 
risk related to irradiation. One group was provided with only positive information, 
one group with negative information and one group with both positive and negative 
information. Hayes et al.  (2002) conclude that negative information dominates posi-
tive information.  
 
Rozan et al.  (2004) use a three step price auction (second price aution) procedure to 
analyse how newly released information about food safety affects consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for certified food products (checked for heavy metal contents) versus 
non-certified products (unknown content of heavy metal). Respondents are asked to 
state their purchase price for a familiar non-certified product, for example an apple. 
Hereafter information about a food safety indicator (cadmium content) is provided 
and the respondents are told that the product evaluated initially is of unknown quality. 
Further the respondents are informed about health risks. Lastly, a certified product 
satisfying public health standards is presented. The respondents are again asked to bid 
for both products, certified and non-certified. Rozan et al.  (op cit) conclude that new 
information that is damaging for non-certified products induce a decrease in the buy-
ing price for non-certified products but not a significant increase in buying price for 
certified products.  
 
Hamilton et al.  (2003) use CVM to estimate WTP for long term effect on health and 
environmental quality from absence of pesticide residues in food. They find that edu-
cation, gender, household food expenditure, income and ethnicity affect the WTP for 
the food quality attribute ‘pesticide-free’. They also examine respondents support for 
government regulation of pesticide residues by examination of voting choice behav-
iour. They find that the voting behaviour and the willingness to pay estimate may be 
quite different. That is, some people do not support the pesticide regulation even 
though they express a high willingness to pay (that is, they value pesticide free food, 
but also the future freedom of choice), and some people do the opposite (do not value 
the pesticide free food, but value the increased level in environmental quality). Thus 
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 willingness to pay and referendum choices are not the same which means that mar-
ket– and political behaviour may differ depending on their personal characteristics 
 
 
Table B4. Literature on risk perception, information and consumer behaviour 
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Rowe, G. & G. Wright (2001): Differences in expert and lay judgments of risk: Myth 
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Siegrist, M. (2000): The influence of trust and perceptions of risks and benefits on the 
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 Appendix C: Descriptive statistics 
Below the details and illustrations of the descriptive statistics that are described in 
chapter 4 are put forth. First, we present the socio-demographics and the tests for 
whether they are representative for the Danish population. The socio-demographics 
include gender, age, personal income, education, county, and children. Second, we 
present graphs over the attitudinal distributions. They are presented in chronological 
order according to the question numbers in the questionnaire (see Appendix A). 
 
Gender 
 
Figure C1. Actual and expected gender distribution 
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Table C1.  Actual and expected gender distribution for the whole sample. 
 
 The sample (A+B) Statistics Denmark – exp. Population 
 Act. population Percent Population Percent Exp.population 
Men 1074 0.467 2.059.069 0.490 1127 
Women 1227 0.533 2.146.219 0.510 1174 
In total 2301  4.205.288  2301 
 
  χ2 (1) = 4.8222. 
 
 
 
In table C2 and C3 the gender distribution of the two splits is compared with SD. The 
hypothesis that the gender distribution in split A is identical to the gender distribution 
id SD has a χ2(1)=1.91659. That is, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. This shows that 
there is some sort of obliquity between the two splits, which levels out when the two 
splits are separated. The change in significant level can partly be explained due to the 
degrees of freedom does not change with the change in sample size, from the total 
sample to sample A and B respectively. Similarly for sample B, the χ2 (1) = 2.978264 
shows that we can accept the hypothesis that the data are not significantly different.   
 
 
Table C2. Actual and expected gender distribution for Sample A . 
 
 Split A Statistics Denmark – exp. Population 
 Act. population Percent Population Percent Exp.population 
 Men 554 0.469 2.059.069 0.490 578 
 Women 626 0.531 2.146.219 0.510 602 
 In total 1180  4.205.288  1180  
 
  χ2(1) = 1.91659 
 
 
 
 
200 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 
  
Table C3.  Actual and expected gender distribution for sample B. 
 
 A. split Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. population Percent Population Percent Exp.population 
Men 520 0.464 2.059.069 0.490 549 
Women 601 0.536 2.146.219 0.510 572 
In total 1121  4.205.288  1121  
 
  χ2 (1) = 2.978264 
 
 
 
Age 
 
Table C4.  Actual and expected age distribution in 8 different classes for the whole 
sample. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. Population 
 Act. population Percent Population Percent Exp. Population  
18-19 36 0.01 117239 0.028 64 
20-24 141 0.06 292541 0.070 160 
25-29 205 0.08 345714 0.082 189 
30-39 530 0.23 798106 0.190 437 
40-49 508 0.22 771629 0.183 422 
50-61 595 0.25 892435 0.212 488 
62-66 207 0.09 278502 0.066 152 
67-99 79 0.03 709122 0.169 388 
In total 2301  4.205.288  2301 
 
  χ2 (7) = 342.29 
 
 
 
In tables C5 and C6 the dataset is split into A and B. 
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Table C5.  Actual and expected age distribution in 8 different classes for Sample A. 
 
 Sample A Statistics Denmark – exp. Population 
 Act. opulation Percent Population Percent Exp. Population  
18-19 20 0.017 117239 0.028 33 
20-24 74 0.063 292541 0.070 82 
25-29 92 0.078 345714 0.082 97 
30-39 271 0.230 798106 0.190 224 
40-49 271 0.230 771629 0.183 217 
50-61 292 0.247 892435 0.212 250 
62-66 112 0.095 278502 0.066 78 
67-99 48 0.041 709122 0.169 199 
In total 1180  4.205.288  1180 
 
  χ2 (7) = 165.83. The hypotheses can be rejected (***) and the data can be said to be significant different. 
 
 
 
Table C6.  Actual and expected age distribution in 8 different classes for Sample B. 
 
 Sample B Statistics Denmark – exp. Population 
 Act. opulation Percent Act. population Percent Act. Population 
18-19 16 0.014 117239 0.028 31 
20-24 67 0.060 292541 0.070 78 
25-29 113 0.101 345714 0.082 92 
30-39 259 0.231 798106 0.190 213 
40-49 237 0.211 771629 0.183 206 
50-61 303 0.270 892435 0.212 238 
62-66 95 0.085 278502 0.066 74 
67-99 31 0.028 709122 0.169 189 
In total 1121  4.205.288  1121 
   
  χ2 (7) = 184.26. The hypotheses can be rejected (***) and the data can be said to be significant different. 
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 Personal income 
 
Table C7.  Actual and expected income distribution for the whole sample. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. 
Population 
 Act. popu-
lation 
Per-
cent 
Act. popu-
lation 
Per-
cent 
Population Per-
cent 
Exp. 
Popu-
lation 
Under 100.000         227 0.099 227 0.103 806062 0.186 410 
100.000-149.999 202 0.088 202 0.092 814278 0.188 414 
150.000-199.999 216 0.094 216 0.098 569099 0.131 289 
200.000-249.999 335 0.146 335 0.152 610936 0.141 311 
250.000-299.999 395 0.172 395 0.179 551126 0.127 280 
300.000-399.999 482 0.209 482 0.218 592426 0.136 301 
400.000-499.999 191 0.083 349 0.158 396540 0.091 202 
500.000 or more 158 0.069      
Do not know 95 0.041      
In total 2301  2206  4.340.467  2206 
 
  χ2 (6) = 474.09 
 
 
 
With a chi value at 474.09 the two data are significantly different at the ***-level. In 
the data individuals with high or medium income are overrepresented, and individuals 
with low income are underrepresented. A partly explanation of this is that the distri-
bution from Statistics Denmark include 15-17 years, with increase the representation 
of low income groups. 
 
In table C8 the age group 18-19 years has been eliminated from the sample and the 
15-19 years has been eliminated from the data from Statistics Denmark. The distribu-
tions now are a bit better, but still significant different from each other. 
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Table C8.  Actual and expected income distribution for the sample – excluding the 
age group 18-19 and 15-19. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. popu-
lation 
 Act. 
Popu-
lation 
Per-
cent 
Act. 
Popu-
lation 
Per-
cent 
Population Per-
cent 
Exp. Popu- 
lation 
Under 100.000 201 0.089 201 0.092 433529 0.115 251 
100.000-149.999 201 0.089 201 0.092 711768 0.189 412 
150.000-199.999 216 0.095 216 0.099 518923 0.138 301 
200.000-249.999 335 0.148 335 0.154 579724 0.154 336 
250.000-299.999 395 0.174 395 0.181 536063 0.143 311 
300.000-399.999 482 0.213 482 0.221 585522 0.156 339 
400.000-499.999 191 0.084 349 0.160 395520 0.105 229 
500.000 or more 201 0.089      
Do not know 201 0.089      
In total 2265  2179  3.761.049  2179 
 
  χ2 (6) = 287.92 
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 Education 
 
Figur C2.  Actual and expected educational distribution for the sample. 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
P
rim
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
G
ym
na
si
um
V
oc
at
io
na
l 
S
ho
rt
ac
ad
em
ic
(<
 3
 y
ea
rs
)
M
ed
iu
m
 
A
ca
de
m
ic
(3
-4
 y
ea
rs
)
Lo
ng
ac
ad
em
ic
(>
 5
 y
ea
rs
)
O
th
er
s
Actual population
Expected population
 
 
 
 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 205
  
Table C9.  Actual and expected educational distribution for the sample. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popu-
lation 
Percent Act. Popu-
lation 
Percent Act. population 
Primary school 139 0.060 1.257.350 0.330 759 
Gymnasium 60 0.026 232727 0.061 141 
Vocational  612 0.266 1.368.425 0.359 826 
Short academic (< 3 years) 265 0.115 160200 0.042 97 
Medium  Academic (3-4 
years) 665 0.289 479902 0.126 290 
Long academic (> 5 years) 386 0.168 199174 0.052 120 
Others 174 0.076 113455 0030 68 
In total 2301  3.811.233  2301 
  
 χ2 (6) = 2137 
 
 
 
Table C10.  Actual and expected educational distribution for Sample A. 
 
 Sample A Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popu-
lation 
Percent Act. popu-
lation 
Percent Act. population 
Primary school 67 0.057 1.257.350 0.330 389 
Gymnasium 32 0.027 232727 0.061 72 
Vocational  322 0.273 1.368.425 0.359 424 
Short academic (< 3 years) 132 0.112 160200 0.042 50 
Medium  Academic (3-4 
years) 360 0.305 479902 0.126 149 
Long academic (> 5 years) 171 0.145 199174 0.052 62 
Others 96 0.081 113455 0.030 35 
In total 1180  3.811.233  1180 
 
  χ2 (6) = 1051 
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 Table C11.  Actual and expected educational distribution for Sample B 
 
 Sample B Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Primary school 72 0.064 1.257.350 0.330 370 
Gymnasium 28 0.025 232727 0.061 68 
Vocational  290 0.259 1.368.425 0.359 402 
Short academic (< 3 
years) 133 0.119 160200 0.042 47 
Medium  Academic (3-4 
years) 305 0.272 479902 0.126 141 
Long academic (> 5 
years) 215 0.192 199174 0.052 59 
Others 78 0.070 113455 0.030 33 
In total 1121  3.811.233  1121 
   
   χ2 (6) = 1119 
 
 
 
County 
 
Figure C3.  Actual and expected county distribution for the sample. 
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 Table C12.  Actual and expected county distribution for the sample.  
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Fredericks-
burg/Copenhagen mu-
nicipality 285 0.124 467945 0.117 270 
Copenhagen 417 0.181 450017 0.113 260 
Fredericksburg 177 0.077 271726 0.068 157 
Roskilde 122 0.053 174948 0.044 101 
West Zealand 117 0.051 223015 0.056 129 
Storstrøm 66 0.029 194540 0.049 112 
Bornholm 10 0.004 31856 0.008 18 
Funen 184 0.080 350530 0.088 202 
Southern Jutland 85 0.037 183473 0.046 106 
Ribe 92 0.040 162111 0.041 94 
Vejle 145 0.063 260302 0.065 150 
Ringkøbing 91 0.040 197460 0.050 114 
Aarhus 270 0.117 485118 0.122 280 
Viborg 68 0.030 168415 0.042 97 
North Jutland 172 0.075 363522 0.091 210 
In total 2301 1 3.984.978 1 2301 
 
   χ2 (14) = 153.48 
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Table C13.  Actual and expected county distribution for the sample without Copen-
hagen, Storstrøm, Viborg and North Jutland municipalities. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. population ercent Act. population Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Fredericks-
burg/Copenhagen mu-
nicipality 285 0.181 467945 0.167 263 
Fredericksburg 177 0.112 271726 0.097 153 
Roskilde 122 0.077 174948 0.062 98 
West Zealand 117 0.074 223015 0.079 125 
Bornholm 10 0.006 31856 0.011 18 
Funen 184 0.117 350530 0.125 197 
Southern Jutland 85 0.054 183473 0.065 103 
Ribe 92 0.058 162111 0.058 91 
Vejle 145 0.092 260302 0.093 146 
Ringkøbing 91 0.058 197460 0.070 111 
Aarhus 270 0.171 485118 0.173 273 
In total 1578 1 3.984.978 1 1578 
 
  χ2 (14) = 23.14 
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 Children 
 
Figure C4. Actual and expected distribution of the number of children of the re-
spondents in the sample. 
 
 
 
Table C14. Actual and expected distribution of the number of children of the re-
spondents in the sample.  
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. population 
1 child 337 0.146 549943 0.138 318 
2 children 378 559444 323 
105 
In total  
0.164 0.140 
3 or more chil-
dren 0.046 222672 0.056 129 
No children 1481 0.644 2.652.986 0.666 1532 
2301  3.985.045 2301 
 
   χ2 (3) = 16.56 
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Table C15. Actual and expected distribution of the number of children of the re-
spondents in the sample when pooling two groups. 
 
 The sample Statistics Denmark – exp. population 
 Act. popula-
tion 
Percent Act. popula-
tion 
Act. population 
0.146 0.138 
Percent 
1 child 337 549943 318 
2 or more children 483 782116 
No children 0.644 0.666 
  
0.210 0.196 452 
1481 2.652.986 1532 
In total  3.985.045  
 
   χ2 (2) = 5.06 
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 Description of data with respect to attitudes 
 
Figure C5. Question 6: It is important that the price is low 
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Figure C6. Question 6: It is important that the product is or-
ganic 
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 Figure C7. Question 6: It is important that the product is low-fat 
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Figure C8. Question 6: It is important that the product appears 
tempting 
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Figure C9. Question 6: It is important that the product is produced in 
Denmark 
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Figure C10. Question 6: It is important that the product is of good qual-
ity 
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Figure C11. Question 7: Do you believe it is possible to avoid campoly-
bacter by maintaining good hygiene 
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Figure C12. Question 8: Do you think that your household maintain good 
hygiene basics in the kitchen? 
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Figure C13. Question 14: The welfare of outdoor-reared chickens is 
better than that of indoor-reared chickens 
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Figure C14. Question 14: Outdoor-reared chickens are more likely to be in-
fected with campylobacter than are indoor-rear3ed chickens 
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Figure C15. Question 15: I think there is too much hysteria surrounding the 
animal welfare issue 
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Figure C16. Questions 15: I support animal welfare through my choice in food 
products  
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 Figure C17. Question 15: I think that outdoor-reared chickens taste better than 
indoor-reared chickens 
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Figure C18. Question 15: Although infection by campylobacter can be pre-
vented through maintaining good hygiene basics and correct 
food preparation practices, I do not want to have campylobacter 
bacteria in my kitchen.  
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 Figure C19. Question 15: I think there is too much hysteria surrounding the 
campylobacter issue  
 
4,26
20,17
32,33
24,86
12,91
5,48
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
35,00
Completely
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Completely
disagree
Do not
know
%
 
 
 
Figure C20. Question 15: I believe that the producers are responsible for 
supplying food products that carry no health risks for the con-
sumers 
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Figure C21. Question 15: If the authorities could ensure reliable marking, I 
would be happy to pay extra for campylobacter-free chicken 
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Figure C22.  Question 15: If the authorities could ensure reliable marking, I 
would be happy to pay extra for increased animal welfare 
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 Figure C23. Question 15: I believe that the authorities are responsible for 
carrying the costs of ensuring campylobacter-free chicken 
meat.  
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Figure C24.  Question 15: I believe that the authorities are responsible for 
carrying the costs of increased animal welfare 
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 Figure C25. Question 15: I believe that eating Danish food products carries 
no health risks  
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Figure C26. Question 16: I have sufficient information when I buy food prod-
ucts 
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Figure C27. Question 16: I have confidence in the information supplied by 
the Danish Institute for Food and Veterinary Research 
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Figure C28. Question 16: I have confidence in the product information 
supplied by the producers 
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Figure C29. Question 16: I have confidence in the Ø-label (a label that 
shows that the article is an organic product produced under 
control of the Danish authorities)  
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Figure C30. Question 16: I have confidence in the information supplied by 
the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
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Figure C31.  Question 16: I have confidence in the information supplied by 
the Danish Consumer Council, e.g. through the independent 
consumer magazine “Tænk” 
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Figure C32. Question 16: I have confidence in the informative labelling of 
consumer goods 
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Figure C33. Question 17 and 18: The respondents former knowledge about 
respectively campylobacter and salmonella 
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Figure C34. Question 19: Has your knowledge of salmonella influenced your 
responses in this questionnaire? 
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Figure C35. Question 20: Are you at an increased risk of infection by cam-
pylobacter due to diminished health? 
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Figure C36. Question 21: Have you or anyone you know of ever been ill 
from campylobacter? 
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Figure C37. Question 22A: What kind of chicken meat product do you 
usually buy?  
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Figure C38. Question 22B: What kind of chicken meat product do you 
usually buy?  
 
29,25
20,30
50,46
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
Labelled
campylobacter-free
Non labelled Do not know
%
 
 
 
 
228 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 
 Figure C39. Question 20 and age: Respondents’ opinion of their on health 
(yes: bad, no: good) dependent of their age 
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Figure C40. Question 23: What is the approximate price you usually pay 
for a chicken? 
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Figure C41. Question 5 and 13: To which of the following properties did you attach 
the greatest importance in the above shopping scenarios? 
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 Appendix D: Coding 
An important issue in the discrete choice modeling is how to code the qualitative ex-
planatory variables. The main reason for testing different coding schemes in the pre-
sent context is to find the best way to include the opt-out alternative. The complete 
analysis of how the opt-out is modeled is shown in appendix E. All the estimated 
models below are based on the conditional logit model. The estimated parameters for 
two coding schemes - dummy coding and effect coding – are presented. 
 
Dummy coding  
Dummy coding of campylobacter-free and outdoor (with zero valued opt-out)  
All qualitative attributes are coded 0 or 1, where 1 indicates the appearance of the at-
tribute level described (Louviere et al. 2000).  
 
Figure D.1. Data setup - dummy coding of attributes – no alternative specific con-
stants for the opt-out alternative 
 
Id Alt outdoor  campylobacter-free price optout choice
1 1 1 0 110 0 0 
1 2 0 1 47 0 1 
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 47 0 0 
1 2 1 1 74 0 1 
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 97 1 0 
1 2 1 0 55 1 0 
1 3 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 64 0 0 
1 2 1 0 40 0 1 
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Notes: Alt 1 and alt 2 are real alternatives, alt 3 is the opt-out alternative defined with zero values. Optout
specifies whether the respondent have chosen the optout alternative, i.e. alt 3. 
 
 
 
A problem with dummy coding, as we see it, is when the opt-out alternative is mod-
eled with zero levels. Then STATA/SAS can not distinguish between the 0-level for 
the opt-out alternative and the ‘0’ in one of the two ‘real’ alternatives (Alt 1 and 2). 
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 So the opt out alternative can not be distinguished from an alternative without campy-
lobacter labels and from indoor production. 
 
Dummy coding (with ASC and zero valued opt-out)  
A possible solution to correct for this problem include an alternative specific constant 
(ASC) for the opt-out alternative (a new dummy variable ‘optoutvar’). This variable 
will explain the effects not included in the original attributes – the average effect of 
omitted variables (Louviere et al. 2000). An ASC is also used by Paulrud & Laitila 
2004, Kontoleon & Yabe 2003, Ruby et al. 1998.  
 
Figure D.2. Data setup - dummy coding of attributes and the opt-out alternative 
 
 
Id Alt outdoor campylobacter-free price choice Optoutvar Optout
1 1 1 0 0 110 0 0 
1 2 0 1 0 47 0 1 
1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 47 0 0 
1 2 1 1 0 74 0 1 
1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 97 1 0 
1 2 1 0 0 1 55 0 
1 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 0 64 0 
1 2 1 0 0 40 0 1 
1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Notes: Alt 1 and alt 2 are real alternatives, alt 3 is the opt-out alternative defined with zero values. We note 
that in the main analysis, the opt-out alternative is defined with person specific values. The optoutvar is in-
cluded in the main analyses.  
 
 
 
Another way to correct for the problem is to create two ASC’s, one for each real al-
ternative. This is not shown here, but an estimation run has been completed – see the 
estimation later in this section (This coding has been used by Adamowicz et al. 1997). 
 
The choice between different coding schemes are only based on models using a con-
ditional logit model, because this is the most simple and least time consuming model 
to use. 
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 Table D1 shows results from the setup where we have dummy coded the ‘opt-out’ and 
the two attributes ‘outdoor’ and ‘campylobacter-free (c.f. figure D2). 
 
Table D.1. Results from the estimation procedure using dummy coded variables 
for the separate data sets with and without information 
 
Sample A 
Without campylobacter in-
formation 
With campylobacter in-
formation 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
          
Outdoor bred  0,646079
0,7576650
0,031240 0,6805696 0,0305280 
Campylobacter-free 0,928247 0,032984 0,0315953 
Price -0,039225 0,001032 -0,0360747 0,0009796 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -2,482728 0,074391 -2,4247620 0,0720471 
LRI 0,2225 0,2099  
N 7696  7696  
Log L -6574  -6681   
Sample B  
Choice 
Without animal welfare in-
formation 
With animal welfare infor-
mation 
          
Outdoor bred  0,6840166 0,0324562 1,3221860 0,0358754 
Campylobacter-free 0,8549176 0,0340624 0,6986461 0,0343959 
0,2278
Price -0,0414757 0,0010816 -0,0316932 0,0009633 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -2,6425310 0,0771924 -1,5394870 0,0720216 
LRI  0,2273  
N 7252  7252  
Log L -6153   -6157    
 
 
Effect coding  
 
Effect coding ((with ASC and zero values opt-out) 
Instead of coding the attributes as dummy variables, they can be effect coded accord-
ing to Louviere et al. (2000). All qualitative attributes are coded -1 or 1, where 1 indi-
cates the appearance of the attribute level described. Adamowicz et al. (1994) pre-
sents the differences in the two coding schemes. He argues that when using dummy 
coding, the ASC confounds with the effects of interest. This is not the case when us-
ing the effect coding scheme, which orthogonalizes the attribute effects to the con-
stant. Furthermore he concludes that ‘either coding scheme should produce the same 
estimates up to a positive linear transformation’. As shown later, choice of coding 
system only affects the coefficients of the ASC. Though the effect coding scheme 
gives rise to problems in calculating the confidence intervals (Bech 2005). 
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Figure D.3. Data setup – effect coded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id Alt outdoor Campylobacter Optoutvar price optout choice
1 1 1 -1 0 110 0 0 
1 2 -1 1 0 47 0 1 
1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 -1 -1 0 47 0 0 
1 2 1 1 0 74 0 1 
1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 -1 1 0 97 1 0 
1 2 1 -1 0 55 1 0 
1 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 -1 1 0 64 0 0 
1 2 1 -1 0 1 40 0 
1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
 
Table D2 shows result from the setup, where we have effect coded the opt-out and the 
attributes ‘outdoor’ and ‘campylobacter-free (c.f. figure D3). 
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Table D.2. Results from the estimation procedure using effect coded variables for 
the separate data sets with and without information  
     
Sample A 
Without campylobacter in-
formation 
With campylobacter in-
formation 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,323040 0,015620 0,3402848 0,0152640 
Campylobacter-free 0,464124 0,016492 0,3788325 0,0157977 
Price -0,039225 0,001032 -0,0360747 0,0009796 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -3,269891 0,075494 -3,1438800 0,0726536 
LRI 0,2225   0,2099
N 7696  7696  
Log L -6574   -6681   
Sample B     
Choice 
Without breeding informati-
on With breeding information 
     
Outdoor bred  0,3420083 0,0162281 0,6610931 0,0179377 
Campylobacter-free 0,4274588 0,0170312 0,3493230 0,0171979 
Price -0,0414757 0,0010816 -0,0316932 0,0009633 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -3,4119980 0,0787549 -2,5499030 0,0702828 
LRI 0,2278  0,2273  
N 7252  7252  
Log L -6153   -6157    
 
 
Comparing dummy and effect coding  
Comparison of Table D1 and Table D2 shows that the coefficients for the effect 
coded attributes (table D2) are halved compared with the dummy coded attributes (ta-
ble D1). This is due to the range between the coded level-values (effect coded there 
range is 2, dummy coded the range is 1). Therefore the coefficients in the effect coded 
model have to be corrected (multiplied with 2) when the estimates are to be inter-
preted (when marginal rates of substitution are interpreted, no correction is needed) 
(Bech 2005).  
 
The choice between the different coding schemes is not discussed much in the litera-
ture. Louviere et al. (2000) provides an easy statement towards the issue. They state 
that it is ‘largely up to the analyst’ to make the choice between dummy – and effect 
coding. Adamowicz et al. (1994) states that the only difference in the coefficient val-
ues between the two models after the correction, is the coefficient value for the alter-
native specific constant (the opt-out-variable), which explains the remaining effects 
(and/or the ‘noise’) not explained by the identified attributes.  
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 As ASC is not used to calculate the willingness to pay estimates and because the fits 
of the models are not affected by the choice of coding scheme – we choose the 
dummy coding scheme.  
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 Appendix E: Opt-out 
The objective of this appendix is to argue why and how we include opt-out in the data 
estimation. First, we discuss how the opt-out alternative is interpreted (modelled). 
Second, we discuss how the value of an opt-out option is identified. We present 4 ap-
proaches of including an opt-out option. 
 
Why? 
Opponents of including an opt-out option in the choice sets state that the respondents 
are given a too easy way out, when they are faced with difficult choice situations 
(Luce 1998). Proponents of including an opt-out option in the choice sets state that 
including an opt-out alternative is necessary in order to obtain welfare measures that 
are consistent with economic theory (Bateman et al. 2002; Adamowicz & Boxall 
2001). Furthermore they state that the results will be overestimated (Boyle et al., 
2001) if the respondents are not given an opt-out opportunity, because they can be 
forced to an alternative they do not want, thereby placing a positive willingness to pay 
on an alternative where they in fact should have placed zero value. Another possibil-
ity could be to include an opt-out option in the choice sets and then following remove 
the opt-out responses in the estimation phase. Thereby, respondents are not forced to 
choose an alternative that they really rather would be without. However, this proce-
dure raises another problem as important information might be lost when throwing 
away all opt-out choices.  
 
Ruby et al. (1998) concludes that it depends on the situation which ‘opt-out variant’ 
to use. They state that if the respondents are used to purchase the good in question, 
their ‘own’ opt-out values should be included. But if they are not used to purchase the 
good or if there are very limited real substitutes present, the respondents should opt-
out to a ‘no-purchase’ alternative without their ‘own’ opt-out values. 
 
In our choice experiment, the opt-out alternative was chosen 15% of the times hence, 
important information might be lost if we do not include the respondents who have 
opted out in the estimations. Considering the pros and cons, we have decided to in-
clude the op-out in the choice sets as well as in the statistical analyses – even though, 
the inclusion of opt-out gives rise to complications in the analysis (Kontoleon & Yabe 
2003).  
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 How? 
In our questionnaire we ask respondents to state which kind of chicken-product they 
usually buy. That is, whether they by organic or not organic (this is the closest we can 
get to outdoor/indoor productions) and whether they buy chicken labelled campylo-
bacter-free or not, and at what price. These answers are used to characterize the opt-
out alternative instead of the zero-values in table E3. The respondents now choose be-
tween two alternatives and a status quo product – the product they usually buy.  
 
In the underlying questionnaire, respondents opt-out to ‘none of these two’. This opt-
out formulation was chosen in order to extract as little attention as possible to the at-
tributes before the choice tasks. The back side of the chosen procedure is that we have 
no information concerning the opt-out alternative – in particular, the opt-out alterna-
tive is not described by any attributes (or attributes levels). To remedy this problem, 
the respondents are asked (after completing the choice tasks) to express their usual 
purchase of chicken products. These answers are used in the estimations below by us-
ing the individual-specific values of the attributes as opt-out values. 
 
Different approaches to include the opt-out are now set forth and examined – these 
include  
1. setting all attributes equal to zero in the opt-out option,  
2. using the respondents own values as opt-out values,  
3. including an alternative specific constant and 
a. setting all attributes equal to zero in the opt-out option  
b. using the respondents own values as opt-out values. 
 
We will present these 4 approaches to include an opt-out. The models are estimated 
using dummy coding of the variables – including dummy coding of the opt-out option 
- as described in appendix C). For further discussions about the choice between dif-
ferent coding schemes see appendix D.  All opt-out models are estimated using a pro-
bit model and the models are estimated on the two data sets, A and B - including only 
main effects. As the question of how to include the opt-out option in the estimations 
had to be answered very early in the estimation process, the estimations are based on 
models other than the final model (main effects only and including attributes with and 
without campylobacter information as well as with and without breeding informa-
tion). 
 
 
 
 
238 Information, risk perception and consumer behaviour, FOI 
 Setting all opt-out values equal to zero  
When valuing a change, e.g. an environmental change, the opt-out alternative is typi-
cally a status quo situation, with specific levels of the describing characteristics (Ol-
sen et al. 2005; Lundhede et al. 2005; Hasler et al. 2005). This is more or less easy for 
issues relating to the environment, which mostly can be seen as a static situation to-
wards the group of respondents in contrast to a shopping situation, where each indi-
vidual can decide which product to purchase. Because of this, the solution of setting 
the opt-out alternative as a fixed status quo situation with fixed attribute levels for the 
entire sample will be erroneous for a large part of the respondents. A solution to this 
could be to set all attribute levels equal to zero for the opt-out alternative.  
 
 
Table E.1. Results from the estimation procedure using zero values for the levels 
of the opt-out alternative in the separate data sets with and without in-
formation 
 
Sample A 
Without campylobacter in-
formation 
With campylobacter informa-
tion  
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,737400 
0,872800 
-0,010400 
0,2215 
0,028100 0.7551 0.0278 
campylobacter-
free 0,028800 0.7711 0.0282 
Price 0,000408 -0.009099 0.000406 
LRI  0,2164  
N 4720 
Without breding information 
 4720  
Log L -4037   -4063   
Sample B With breeding information  
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,772700 0,029100 
0,000420 
 
1,1555000 0,0315000 
campylobacter-
free 0,806300 0,028900 0,6915000 0,0309000 
Price -0,010200 -0,0129000 0,0004520 
LRI 0,2153 0,2610  
N 4484  4484  
Log L -3866   -3641    
 
 
The problem with this solution in our context is how to understand the zero levels for 
the attributes animal welfare and food safety? The 0-level for the price attribute is 
straight forward. If you do not buy the product you do not pay any money. But what 
is a 0-level for the animal welfare attribute and the food safety attribute?  
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 Person specific opt-out values  
In some questionnaires, the respondents are asked to state their usual choice of prod-
uct before the choice experiments are made. In the actual choice tasks, the respon-
dents are instructed to think of the product they usually buy when they opt-out. How-
ever, the researcher can not be certain that the respondents have this usual product in 
mind, when choosing between alternatives. Such approach was used by Ruby et al. 
(1998) and by Kontoleon & Yabe (2003). The argument for incorporating the respon-
dents ‘own’ opt-out value is to mimic the actual choice situations faced by the indi-
viduals as closely as possible (Batsell & Louviere 1991) and to achieve as much in-
formation as possible about the opt-out alternative.  
 
In our choice experiment, we use the scenario description to emphasize that the re-
spondents are to imagine that they would like to purchase a whole chilled chicken. 
Our intentions are that when they opt-out, it should be to another chicken – which we 
expect to be the chicken they usually buy. This would support including the respon-
dents own opt-out values. However, we have not been able to test whether the re-
spondents were thinking of the opt-out as intended.  
 
In our design, the respondents are asked to state their usual choice of chicken, when 
purchasing a whole chilled chicken, after the ordinary choice experiment is per-
formed. Therefore, the respondent is not really faced with a choice situation with 
three alternatives. Instead, we try to mimic a choice situation with 3 choices in the 
preceding estimation process. Table E3 shows the estimations using personal opt-out 
values. 
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Table E.2. Results from the estimation procedure using the respondents own 
values for the opt-out alternative in the separate data sets with and 
without information 
 
Sample A 
Without campylobacter infor-
mation 
With campylobacter infor-
mation 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  
Campylobacter-free 
0,526700 0,024000 0,5777000 0,0241000 
0,589600 0,025600 0,5567000 0,0258000 
Price -0,017300 0,000591 -0,0170000 0,0006120 
LRI 0,2126  0,2162  
N 
Sample B 
4720  4720  
Log L -4083   -4064   
Without breeding information With breeding information 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err 
 
Coefficients Std. Err 
    
Outdoor bred  0,593300 0,024800 0,9385000 0,0343000 
Campylobacter-free 0,573700 0,026000 0,5491000 0,0325000 
Price -0,018700 0,000641 -0,0181000 0,0007170 
LRI 0,2254  0,2360  
N 4484  4484  
Log L -3816   -3764    
 
 
As can be seen from the tables above (E1 & E2), the parameter estimates changes. 
The magnitude of the change can really be seen when we calculate the willingness to 
pay estimates. In example, for sample B – the animal welfare attribute decreases from 
DKK 76 when opt-out values are zero to DKK 32 when respondents’ own opt-out 
values are included. This reduction in willingness to pay is due to an increase in the 
value that respondents place on the price attribute in the opt-out alternatives. That is 
without the respondents own values the ‘observed’ value of the price parameter was 
zero, whereas with the respondents own values it has increased from zero to DKK 40 
or above. 
 
Incorporating the value of the opt-out option through an alternative specific con-
stant  
If we are not only interested in how an opt-out option affects the valuation of the real 
attributes but also in the value of opting out per se, then a solution is to include one or 
more alternative specific constants for the opt-out alternative. An alternative specific 
constant will explain the effects not included in the original attributes – the average 
effect of omitted variables (Louviere et al. 2000). Furthermore Louviere et al. (2000) 
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 argue that models without an alternative specific constant will not predict well in an 
existing market because it is not possible to include and identify all explanatory vari-
ables, which then are caught in the alternative specific constant. An ASC is also used 
by Paulrud & Laitila 2004, Kontoleon & Yabe 2003, Ruby et al. 1998.  
 
An alternative specific constant explains the remaining effects (and/or the ‘noise’) not 
explained by the identified attributes. In particular, as breeding methods and campy-
lobacter levels are not the most important factors in consumer’s choice of chicken 
product, we need some way to confine ‘the remaining determinants of choice of 
chicken’ in order to capture noise that is not related to the attributes we are interested 
in. This can be done by including an ASC. The direct interpretation of this variable is, 
the respondents’ utility for not buying any of the two chickens presented in the choice 
set (Louviere et al. 2000). A negative ASC parameter indicates that the respondents 
have preferences for the two alternatives, and therefore do not obtain utility from opt-
ing out of the ‘game’.  
 
Using an alternative specific constant to capture the opt-out value however, does not 
solve the problem that we do not know what the respondents opt-out to, due to the 
formulation of the opt-out alternative we chose in the choice experiment (“non of 
these”). In particular, we are interested in what values of campylobacter and animal 
welfare attributes and prices the respondents opt-out to – in this respect, the alterna-
tive specific constant is not precise enough to provide values of the opt-out option. 
 
By including both the ASC and an explicit opt-out option, we hope to provide a 
model where the effects of each factor can be identified with as little noise as possible 
– because the ASC captures the explanatory power that is not explained by the attrib-
utes – neither in the two real choices nor in the opt-out option. First, we model the 
opt-out values as zero’es and then as personal opt-out values.  
 
ASC and zero valued opt-out  
Table E3 shows the results of the estimation procedure when an ASC is included and 
the opt-out option is modelled as zeros. The effect of including an ASC can be seen 
by comparing Table E1 with Table E3. Table E3 shows that the LRI improves from 
around 0.2 to 0,27 in relation to the model presented in table E1, which indicates a 
better model fit when the ASC and zero opt-out values are used. 
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Table E.3. Estimation using ASC and zero values for the opt-out for  the separate 
data sets with and without information 
 
Sample A 
Without campylobacter informa-
tion With campylobacter information 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,5900000 0,0326000 0,6174000 0,0326000 
Campylobacterfree 0,7972000 0,0342000 0,6942000 0,0335000 
Price -0,0290000 -0,0288000 0,0010790 0,0010500 
Alternative Specific 
Constant (ASC) -2,0210000 0,1483000 -2,2658000 0,1785000 
LRI 0,2754  0,2765  
N 4720  4720  
Log L -3.757   -3.752   
Sample B 
Without animal welfare informa-
tion With animal welfare information 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,6394000 0,0340000 1,1361000 0,0377000 
Campylobacterfree 0,7076000 0,6559000 0,0340000 0,0364000 
Price -0,0287000 0,0010700 -0,0232000 0,0011100 
Alternative Specific 
Constant (ASC) -2,0303000 0,1529000 -1,3171000 0,1792000 
LRI 0,2704  0,2756  
N 4484  4484  
Log L -3.594   -3.569    
 
 
ASC and inclusion of the respondents own (opt-out) values 
Table E4 shows the results of the estimation procedure when an ASC is included and 
the opt-out option is modelled as personal values. The effect of including an ASC can 
be seen by comparing Table E4 with Table E2.  The fit of the different models are not 
much different depending on how the opt-out values are computed – they vary from 
0.20 without the ASC to around 0.27 with the ASC. Hence, because of the reasonable 
assumption behind the argument presented by Ruby et al. (1998), and because of the 
slightly increased  fit of the model, the respondents ‘own’ opt-out values, an ASC are 
incorporated in the modelling and estimation procedures.  
 
The direct interpretation of the ASC is, the respondents’ utility for not buying any of 
the two chickens presented in the choice set (Louviere et al. 2000). The ASC parame-
ter is negative, indicating that the respondents have preferences for the two alterna-
tives, and therefore do not wish to opt-out from the ‘game’. 
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 Table E.4. Results from the estimation procedure using the respondents “own”  
opt-out values and an ASC  for the separate data sets with and without 
information 
 
Without campylobacter infor-
mation 
Coefficients 
Sample A With campylobacter information 
Choice Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,5822000 0,0330000 0,6072000 
Price 0,0010710 0,0010370 
-1,8888000 0,2045000 -1,7888000 0,1981000 
0,0325000 
Campylobacterfree 0,7655000 0,0354000 0,6718000 0,0340000 
-0,0309000 -0,0302000 
Alternative Spe-
cific Constant 
(ASC) 
LRI 0,2683  0,2767  
N 4720  
Without breeding information 
4720  
Log L -3.794   -3.751   
Sample B With breeding information 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,6396000 0,0338000 1,1248000 
0,2932000 
0,0385000 
Campylobacterfree 0,6822000 0,0349000 0,6582000 0,0377000 
Price -0,0300000 0,0010630 -0,0259000 0,0010750 
Alternative Spe-
cific Constant 
(ASC) -1,4560000 0,1603000 -1,8900000 
LRI 0,2696  0,2725  
N 
  
4484  4484  
Log L -3.598   -3.584  
 
 
In Table E5, the two datasets are merged according to appendix F. As the final model 
in Table E5 shows the disutility of opting out decreases when respondents receive 
breeding information. When merging the two datasets the effect of an ASC becomes 
visible.   
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Table E.5. Comparison of the probit model with and without alternative specific 
constants (ASC) and with individual opt-out values 
 
  With an ASC Without an ASC 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err Coefficients Std. Err 
     
Outdoor bred  0,398700 0,044100 0,5284000 0,0196000 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,488900 0,038900 0,2526000 
ns 
0,104000 0,000105 
0,0268000 
Campylobacter-free 0,482100 0,043700 0,5102000 0,0186000 
Campylobacter-free (with breeding infor-
mation) - - - - 
Outdoor bred AND campylobacter-free 0,425300 0,079900 0,0758000 0,0275000 
Outdoor bred AND campylobacter-free 
(with breeding information) - - - - 
Price -0,030400 0,000591 -0,017400 0,000304 
Price (information regarding breeding 
method given) 0,004620 0,001050 - 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -1,865300 0,106000 - - 
ASC (information regarding breeding 
method given) 0,506300 0,062700 - - 
STD(opt-out) 2,068400 - 
LRI 0,2719  0,2211  
N 55224  55224  
Log L -14725   -15751    
 
 
As can be seen from the above table E5, the model without alternative specific con-
stants is quit different from the model with constants. The price parameter with in-
formation regarding the breeding method is no longer significant, when the alternative 
specific constants are not included. If we take a closer look at the coefficients of the 
parameters, they show something else. The utility of the animal welfare - and the 
campylobacter attributes increases when the ASC is omitted, and at the same time the 
respondents’ gets less price sensitive, which leads to an increase in the willingness to 
pay estimates for the to main effects. The reason for these changes in the utility is 
partly due to a positive correlation between the price attribute and the alternative spe-
cific constant which is 0,442. This positive correlation describes that the proportion of 
disutility by opting out which is not caught in the other attributes is partly depending 
on the price. So when the alternative specific constant is removed, the expression no 
longer takes the disutility of opting out into account or the extra utility you obtain just 
by choosing one of the generic alternatives. Because the alternative specific constant 
is correlated with the price attribute, the utility of choosing one of the generic alterna-
tives is expressed through the price attribute, resulting in the less elastic price coeffi-
cient. Moreover the log-likelihood drops resulting in a 20% decrease in the LRI. This 
indicates that the models are better explained when an alternative specific constant is 
included. 
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 Appendix F: Merging data sets – test for scaling 
To test whether the two samples are alike, a scaling test is completed. This further-
more gives a tool to correct for a possible scaling effect. A scaling effect occurs be-
cause the models may reflect different underlying scales (Ruby et al. 1998) (We recall 
that only the joint samples are intended to be sent out to a representative part of the 
population – hence, there is a risk that the samples A and B are not representative in-
dividually). In our analysis, the scaling issue is of concern when we want to merge 
effects that are not significantly different. That is, as campylobacter information does 
not significantly change the values of the attributes, we want to merge the data sets 
A1 and A2. And, as we expect that samples without information A1 and B1 are iden-
tical, we want to merge these too.  
 
The basis for a scaling test is taken in the following probability models: 
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t be separately
effect of ea
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, hence when 
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To test for scaling, the scale factor differences have to be isolated before comparing 
the parameters. The problem is though, that the scaling factor cannot be identified in 
any particular set of empirical data. But instead the ratio of the scale factor of one 
data set relative to another can be identified by normalizing one of them to the value 
of 1 and then defining a range of values of the other scale factor, within which we ex-
pect the log likelihood function to be maximized (Swait & Louviere 1993). Because 
of this, the variance differences are estimated under the assumption of parameter 
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 equality, followed by testing the assumption of equality of the parameters. In general 
we wish to test the following hypothesis: 
 
211 : ββ =H  and 21 σσ =  
 
This can be done using a two stage Chow test: 
 
 A) βββ == 211 :AH  
 B) σσσ == 211 :BH  
 
During the test of hypothesis A) the scale factors are permitted to differ between data 
sets. If A) cannot be rejected, hypothesis H1B is tested. Both sub-hypotheses can be 
tested using the following likelihood ratio statistics: 
 
 Re. A) ( )[ ]212 LLLA +−−= σλ  
 Re. B) [ ]σλ LLpB −−= 2  
 
Where the Lσ is the log likelihood value corresponding to the model with the point 
estimate σ2 value and L1 and L2 correspond to the log likelihood values for the sepa-
rate models for sample 1 and 2. The Lp correspond to the log likelihood value for the 
joined model for sample 1 and 2 without taken any notice of the scale factors. The 
sub-hypothesis A) is tested with (k+1) degrees of freedom, where k is the total num-
ber of parameters in each model (for sample 1 and 2). The sub-hypothesis B) is tested 
with only one degree of freedom (the test statistic is asymptotically chi-squared dis-
tributed). Below the two hypotheses are tested using both a conditional logit model 
and a multinomial probit model. The datasets, which are to be joined, are the campy-
lobacter split with - and without information (table F1) and the two splits: ‘campylo-
bacter information’ and ‘animal welfare information’. For the last mentioned dataset, 
it is only the data before the information was given, which we will join with the other 
split (table F2). 
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 Table F.1. Log likelihood values for the models with and without campylobacter 
information and the results of the hypothesis tests using a multino-
mial probit model 
Lσ L1 L2 λA sig. Lp λB  
  
sig 
-7548,5501 -3793,9569 -3750,7161 7,7542 Ns ns -7549,2059 1,3115 
 
 
Because both hypotheses cannot be rejected (A and B), the overall hypothesis can 
also not be rejected, and the two data sets A1 and A2 can be joined without worrying 
about scaling. 
 
 
Table F.2. Log likelihood values for the models for campylobacter (with - and 
without information) and for animal welfare without information and 
the results of the hypothesis tests using a multinomial probit model 
  
Lσ L1 L2 λA sig. Lp λB  sig 
-11150,6229 -7549,2059 -3597,9244 6,9851 Ns -11151,1400 1,0343 ns 
 
 
Because both hypotheses cannot be rejected (A and B), the overall hypothesis can 
also not be rejected, and the two samples A1 and B1 (Campylobacter information and 
breeding information – before the information was given) - can be joined without 
worrying about scaling.  
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 Appendix G: Choice of econometric model 
The choice of econometric model is of great importance, due to the different underly-
ing assumptions and characteristics in the different models. We have tested how well 
our data could be fitted with the typical models used in discrete choice modelling 
(multinomial logit, nested logit, mixed logit, and probit). In section G1, the models 
are presented and described briefly. In section G2, the different econometric models 
are used to estimate the parameters in our case study, ending up with an evaluation of 
the respective models. Finally in section G3, the efficiency of the chosen model is 
evaluated with respect to the optimal number of repetitions when simulating the prob-
abilities.  
G1. Description of econometric models 
Standard logit models 
Multinomial logit 
In general, the standard logit models (binary, conditional, and nested) are character-
ised by random components that are independent identically distributed (iid) follow-
ing a Gumbel or type 1 extreme value distribution. In a binary choice situation, where 
the error terms are iid extreme value distributed, we can easily find the choice prob-
ability as the difference between two extreme value variables is distributed logistic 
(Train, 2003, p. 39). As the choice probabilities are independent, the formal closed 
form expression of the logit probability that individual i chooses alternative n between 
J alternatives is given as: 
 
∑
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   (Choice probability for conditional logit model)(G1) 
   
There are several limitations linked to the conditional logit model. First, the condi-
tional logit model can only incorporate taste variations with respect to observed vari-
ables (as observations linked to demographic characteristics), but not taste variations 
connected to unobserved variables (as taste variation just because people have differ-
ent preferences), see Train (2003). Second, the conditional logit model assumes pro-
portional substitution across alternatives, when a new alternative is introduced. This 
leads to the property of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The property 
of the IIA can be illustrated by the ratio of the logit probabilities of alternative i and k: 
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As seen in the above equation, the probability ratio only depends on alternative i and 
k. That is, the relative probability of two options being selected are unaffected by the 
introduction or removal of other alternatives (Train, 2003; Alvarez & Nagler, 1998).  
 
Finally, the conditional logit model assumes no correlations of unobserved factors 
over time. This can be a severe assumption if there are dynamics in the observed fac-
tors, then there might be expected to dynamics in the unobserved factors as well 
(Train, 2003). In particular it means that standard logit models cannot be used to ana-
lyse panel data when unobserved factors are correlated over time (Train, 2003, p. 
101). 
 
Once the parameter estimates have been obtained (using a maximum likelihood pro-
cedure), the willingness to pay estimate can be derived. For the linear model, the will-
ingness to pay is obtained using the following equation (Parsons & Kealy, 1992). 
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Consider a choice situation with more than 3 alternatives. If all alternatives are in-
cluded simultaneously in the decision making and if the choice between alternative is 
not affected by introduction of additional alternatives, then a conditional logit is ap-
propriate. Let us consider our choice experiment where respondents are faced with 
choice sets that include real alternatives and an opt-out alternative. If the respondent’s 
decision to opt-out depends on the attractiveness of the real alternatives then the three 
alternatives are to be considered as alternatives with equal substitution and a condi-
tional logit model can be used (Lauridsen 2005).  
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 Multinomial logit models are used to analyse the value of changes in the length of 
deer hunting seasons in Schwabe et al. (2001) and for estimating recreational values 
in Hanley et al. (2002). 
 
Nested logit  
A nested logit model is appropriate when the set of alternatives faced by a decision 
maker can be partitioned into subsets, called nests (Train, 1986). This model is based 
on the assumption of sequential decision-making. Consider a choice experiment 
where respondents are faced with choice sets that include an opt-out alternative. If re-
spondents choose their most preferred alternative using a two-step decision rule, i.e 
first, they decide whether to ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’, and next, given that opt-in was the 
chosen nest, the respondents make a choice between the ‘real’ alternatives, this is 
called a nested process. If the respondents follow this sequential decision rule, then 
the specific composition of the ‘real’ alternatives has no influence for the choice be-
tween opt-in and opt-out (Lauridsen, 2005).An advantage of the nested model is that 
the zeros of the opt-out attributes are no longer treated as real levels, because they 
now are captured in a different nest (Haaijer et al,. 2001). This has the important im-
plication that the specific modelling of the opt-out alternative does not influence the 
marginal utility estimates of the attributes in the ‘real’ alternatives.  
 
Another advantage of the nested logit model is that the assumption regarding the IIA 
is not exhibited between the nests, but only within each nest (Train, 2003). That is 
within a nest, the nested logit models require unchanged proportional substitutions 
between alternatives when additional alternatives are introduced. However, the nested 
logit model can capture a situation where substitutions between nests are affected by 
introduction of other alternatives. 
 
The nested logit model is limited by the same restriction as the conditional and binary 
logit models in that it can only incorporate taste variations with respect to observed 
variables (Train, 2003).  
 
In reality, the researcher typically does not know whether the respondents apply the 
above mentioned sequential decision rule so the argumentation should rather be 
turned upside down: If the researcher has some indications that a sequential decision 
rule is applied (maybe through focus group interviews or previous analyses) or if the 
econometric analyses show that nested logit provides the best data fit – then the re-
searcher can conclude that the decision structure is sequential.  
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 The choice probability of individual n choosing alternative i in nest k using a nested 
logit model can be formally written (in a closed form) as 
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         (Choice probability for a nested logit model) (G4) 
 
where k=1,.. , K defines nests B1,……,BK
λk defines the degree of independence in unobserved utility among al-
ternatives in nest k 
 V  is the observed utility for individual n by choosing alternative j 
 
 
nj
  
Multinomial probit (MNP) 
The probit models are characterised a normally distributed error term as opposed to 
the logit models Gumbel distributed error term. The probit models have yet not been 
used that often because of the computational requirements during the simulations 
process, even though they have existed since the late 1920s (Thurstone 1927). Haus-
man & Wise (1978) introduces the general specifications and aspects of choice behav-
iour in relation to the probit model described by Thurstone (1927).  
The multinomial probit model is an extension of the binary probit model, which can 
handle multiple choices as well. The multinomial probit model relaxes all the restric-
tion mentioned in chapter 3 – it allows taste variations, correlation of unobserved fac-
tors over time and the IIA property. The relaxation of the IIA property is caused by 
the multinomial probit model’s ability to allow for correlation between the error terms 
for the different choices (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998). This makes it a very attractable 
model (as also the mixed logit model). Train (2003) argues that the only limitation of 
the model is that all the unobserved components are assumed normal distributed. But 
as mentioned above there are some computational challenges because the choice 
probability is an integral with an open form, which has to be estimated through simu-
lation (Train, 2003).  
 ( ) ( )∫ ≠∀+>+= nnnjnjninini dijVVIP εεφεε   
               (Choice probability for a probit model) (G5) 
  
 
Where  
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 • I: an indicator for whether the statement in parentheses holds 
• εni : the unobserved part of the utility for individual i by choosing alternative 
n 
• Φ(εn) : The normal density of εn 
Mixed logit models 
 
where Lni(β) is the logit probability for a given parameter value β and f(β) is a density 
function for the parameters. Assuming as above that utility is linear in attributes, the 
mixed logit choice probability can be written as 
 
A probit model is used in Bolduc (1999) to model the choice of transport to the morn-
ing peak journey to work in Santiago. For further reading regarding the probit model 
see Munizaga & Alvares-Daziano (2001), Nijkamp et al.  (2004), Ben-Akiva et al. 
(1997), Bolduc et al. (1996) and Chen & Cosslett (1998). 
 
The main characteristic of the model is that the researcher can specify the distribution 
of the different variables and their error-components. Therefore, the mixed logit 
model can approximate any random utility model (McFadden & Train, 2000).The 
mixed logit model is a mixture of different models, but with starting point in the con-
ditional logit model (Brownstone & Train, 1999). In example, the mix could be of the 
conditional logit model and the multinomial probit model.  
 
The term mixed logit stems from the statistics literature, where the weighted average 
of several functions is called a mixed function, and the density that provides the 
weights is called the mixing distribution. Mixed logit is a mixture of the logit function 
evaluated at different β’s with f(β) as the mixing distribution (Train, 2003, p. 139). 
That is, a mixed logit model is any model whose choice probabilities can be ex-
pressed as 
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Where 
• xni is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative i and the observed 
part of the utility for individual n by choosing alternative i Vni = β’xni  
• f(β) can be any density function  
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 Mixed logit can be derived under a variety of behavioural assumptions – each deriva-
tion provides a particular interpretation (Train, 2003, p. 138). A random coefficient 
model (or random parameter logit) is used to describe a model where the mixing re-
lates to the factors whereas a mixed logit with error component is used to describe a 
model where mixing is related to the error terms. 
 
The mixed logit model averts the three limitations of the conditional logit model, by 
allowing for taste variation, correlation over time and relaxation of the property of the 
IIA. Hence, the mixed logit model has many advantages. The only disadvantage of 
the mixed logit model is that it is based on Monte Carlo simulation methods (Ben-
Akiva & Lerman, 1985), which can be very time consuming due to the computational 
challenge of the simulation (SAS, 2005).   
 
Examples of random parameter logit models (mixed logit) can be found in Train 
(1998) where mixed logit is used to evaluate anglers’ choice of fishing sites, in Paul-
rud & Laitila (2004) mixed logit is used to analyse anglers’ preferences for the attrib-
utes of the Kaitum River in Sweden; and in Carlsson et al. (2003b) mixed logit is used 
to value wetland attributes.  
G2. Underlying probability structure 
Which of the econometric models to use, depends on the statistical fit of the models, 
the underlying decision structure and, whether or not the property of the Independ-
ence from Irrelevant Alternatives exits in the data set? The tests of which econometric 
model to use, are performed in the joined dataset (A and B) with attributes with and 
without information about breeding method (where the attributes without breeding 
information includes no information and information regarding campylobacter). The 
‘fit’ criterion presented by Louviere et al. (2000), states that a likelihood ratio index 
(LRI) between 0.1 and 0.2 indicates an acceptable model, whereas a fit between 0,2 
and 0,4 is an indicator of a model with an extremely good fit. 
 
Estimation with nested logit 
In the following estimation procedure the nested logit model is used. Furthermore the 
attributes are coded as dummy variables (as shown in Figure D1, appendix D), and 
the respondents ‘own’ opt-out values are included. Table G1 shows the statistical es-
timations using nested logit.  
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 Table G1. Estimation using nested logit and the respondents ‘own’ opt-
out values (dummy coded) 
 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err P-value 
   
Outdoor bred  0,727685 0,022352 0,000 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,524307 0,043991 0,000 
Campylobacter-free 0,874157 0,021424 0,000 
Campylobacter-free (with information) -0,156403 0,043351 0,001 
Price -0,038984 0,000705 0,000 
Price (with breeding information) 0,008499 0,001328 0,000 
LRI 0,2604   
N 18408  
Log L 
 
 
-14957     
   
 
 
Estimation with conditional logit 
The conditional logit model gives a reasonable Likelihood Ratio Index, and the signs 
of the coefficients are all as expected. The statistical estimations using conditional 
logit model is shown in Table G2. 
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Table G2. Estimation using conditional logit and the respondents ‘own’ 
opt-out values (dummy coded) 
Std. Err
 
Choice Coefficients P-value 
      
Outdoor bred  0,677774 0,020614 0,000 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,518908 0,043991 0,000 
Campylobacter-free 0,793565 0,021424 0,000 
Campylobacter-free (with breeding informa-
tion) -0,115004 0,043351 0,008 
Price -0,035878 0,000705 0,000 
Price (with breeding information) 0,006582 0,001328 0,000 
ASC -1,240270 0,032713 0,000 
ASC (without breeding information) 0,123141 0,053270 0,021 
ASC (with breeding information) 0,501011 0,055401 0,000 
LRI 0,2677  
N 
Log L 
18408  
-14809    
 
  Note: ASC is an alternative specific constant. with or without campylobacter information 
 
 
 
Comparing G1 and G2, reveals that the estimated coefficients from nested logit and 
conditional logit are very much alike. The nested logit model gives a little lower Like-
lihood Ratio Index than the conditional logit model.  
 
Estimation with mixed logit 
A mixed logit model can be defined with different distributions for different parame-
ters and their error components. We tried to fit our data with lognormal as well as 
normal distributions for parameters and error components.  
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Table G3. Results from the estimation procedure using mixed logit and 
the respondents ‘own’ opt-out values (dummy coded). The 
price parameter without breeding information is normally dis-
tributed, while the rest are gumbel distributed. 
Choice Std. Err
 
Coefficients P-value 
MEAN  
Outdoor bred  
0,001521
0,140800
0,733900 0,022700 <,0001 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,561800 0,047000 <,0001 
Campylobacter-free 0,900500 0,024900 <,0001 
Campylobacter-free (with breeding information) -0,121600 0,046900 0,010 
Price -0,042600 0,001026 <,0001 
Price (with breeding information) 0,007811 <,0001 
ASC  -1,367200 0,036900 <,0001 
ASC (without breeding information) 0,057100 0,014 
ASC (with breeding information) 0,556400 0,059200 <,0001 
  
STD. DEV. OF COEFFICIENTS  
 
Price 0,025100 0,001477 <,0001 
LRI 0,2709  
N 18408  
Log L -14745    
 
  Note: ASC is an alternative specific constant. with or without campylobacter information 
 
 
 
The parameters in Table G3 are divided into two parts – ‘Mean’ and ‘Standard Devia-
tion’. The ‘Standard Deviation’ WTP estimates can be interpreted as the variation in 
marginal utilities (and willingness to pay) in the population (Revelt & Train, 1998). ). 
In table G4 the distributions are reversed compared to the model in table G3. There-
fore, the parameters in the next model are all normally distributed with the exception 
of the price attributes and the opt-out variables which are Gumbel distributed.  
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Table G4. Estimation using mixed logit and the respondents ‘own’ opt-out 
values (dummy coded). The price parameters and the opt-out 
variables are gumbel distributed , the other parameters are 
normally distributed. 
P-value 
 
 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err
MEAN 
Outdoor bred  0,677800 0,020600 <,0001 
<,0001 
<,0001 
-0,035900 0,000705
 
- 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,519300 0,044000
Campylobacter-free 0,793600 0,021400
Campylobacter-free (with breeding information) -0,114800 0,043400 0,008 
Price <,0001 
Price (with breeding information) 0,006573 0,001329 <,0001 
ASC -1,240200 0,032700 <,0001 
ASC (without breeding information) 0,123100 0,053300 0,021 
ASC (with breeding information) 0,500900 0,055400 <,0001 
 
STD. DEV. OF COEFFICIENTS 
 
Outdoor bred  -0,016000 0,078100 0,838 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 0,020900 0,149300 0,889 
Campylobacter-free -0,013600 0,054600 0,803 
Campylobacter-free (with breeding information) 0,038600 0,109300 0,724 
Price - - - 
Price (with breeding information) - -
LRI 0,2677  
N 55224  
Log L -14809    
 
  Note: ASC is an alternative specific constant. with or without campylobacter information 
 
 
 
The price parameter is significant, but as can be seen, the standard deviations of the 
normal distributed parameters are all insignificant, which indicates that there is no 
taste variation between individuals.  
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 Assuming that parameters are normally distributed implies that some estimated share 
of the population has positive coefficients for the given parameters and some have 
negative coefficients. In particular, the price parameter is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed in G3. Hence, some respondents have positive coefficients for the price pa-
rameter, which seems quite unrealistic. A solution to the above problems with the es-
timates from the different mixed logit models can be to define the price parameters to 
be log-normally distributed. Thereby, by definition the price parameters can not be 
negative (Train 2003). The rational for doing this is that we assume the sign of the 
price parameter to be the same for all respondents (Train, 2003). Since the log-normal 
distribution is defined over the positive range and price is expected to have a negative 
coefficient for all respondents, the negative of price enters the model (Train 2003) and 
we try to redefine the price variable just with inverse signs. 
 
The parameters in the log-normal distribution for β include the mean (b) and standard 
deviation (s) of the log(β). Because of this the estimates have to be converted so they 
are on the ‘pure’ β-form. This is done the following way: Median: , mean: ( )bexp( )( )2exp 2sb + ( ) 1exp 2 −× smean and standard deviation:  (Revelt & Train 
1998). Table G5 shows the statistical estimation of mixed logit using a lognormal dis-
tribution for the price parameter. The coefficients in the table are converted from the 
log (β) to β in order to be interpretable as coefficients for β. 
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Table G5. Results from the estimation procedure using mixed logit and 
the respondents ‘own’ opt-out values (dummy coded). The 
price parameters are re-signed and log-normally distributed. 
 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err P-value 
    
Outdoor bred  5,554900 0,185900 <,0001 
Outdoor bred (with breeding information) 4,011400 0,130400 <,0001 
Campylobacter-free 6,286900 0,181700 <,0001 
Campylobacter-free (with breeding information) - - - 
Price 0,382580 0,000000 <,0001 
Price (with breeding information) 0,401979 0,250496 <,0001 
ASC -2,886300 0,000000 <,0001 
ASC (with breeding information) 1,501400 0,000000 
0,014 
LRI .   
N 18408   
Log L -36743     
 
  Note: ASC is an alternative specific constant. with or without campylobacter information 
  The Price coefficients are converted from log- to non-log, which is why there are no standard deviation.  
 
 
 
As the above table shows, the coefficients values change dramatically when using the 
log-normal distribution of the price parameters. Remember that the price parameters 
are re-signed which explains the positive sign of the parameters. Even though the pa-
rameters are strongly significant, the overall fit of the model is very poor. The maxi-
mum log-likelihood value for this model is below the initial log-likelihood value (L0). 
This gives a Likelihood Ratio Index below zero, which is outside the definition of the 
ratio, which must lie between 0 and 1 (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).  
Estimation with multinomial probit 
The multinomial probit model has a normally distributed error component and does 
not exhibit the IIA. In the following model the first and the second choices are nor-
malized, which imposes an additional restriction that the following correlation pa-
rameters are zero (ρ32 = ρ21 = 0). Furthermore the covariance matrix is specified from 
the Hessian matrix. 
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Table G6. Results from the estimation procedure using a multinomial 
probit model and the respondents ‘own’ opt-out values (dummy 
coded). 
Choice Coefficients Std. Err P-value 
    
Outdoor bred  0,612300 0,019000 0,000 
Outdoor bred (information regarding breeding 
method given) 0,490000 0,039100 0,000 
Campylobacter-free 0,696600 0,017700 0,000 
Campylobacter-free (information regarding breed-
ing method given)    
Price -0,030500 0,000591 0,000 
Price (information regarding breeding method 
given) 0,004737 0,001055 0,000 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) -1,880500 0,108200 0,000 
ASC (information regarding breeding method given) 0,509500 0,063700 0,000 
STD(opt-out) 2,117900 0,107100 0,000 
LRI 0,2711   
N 18408   
Log L -14741      
 
 
As can be seen from the above table G6 for the multinomial probit estimates, the es-
timates looks reasonable. The signs are as expected. Furthermore the likelihood ratio 
index is higher then any of the other estimated models. The same parameters are sig-
nificant as in the other models, except from the parameter for campylobacter-free af-
ter breeding information was given, which is insignificant.  
 
This means that using a probit model, the willingness to pay for avoiding campylo-
bacter is not affected directly by information regarding breeding methods, but only 
indirectly through the change in price sensitivity. Whereas using a nested or condi-
tional or mixed logit, the breeding information does influence the willingness to pay 
for avoiding campylobacter. As there are no intuitive  arguments for why the willing-
ness to pay for avoiding campylobacter should be affected by  information given re-
garding animal welfare. So from this point of view, the insignificance of this attribute 
is acceptable. 
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 Based on the ‘fit’ criterion, the mixed model with a log-normally distributed price pa-
rameters is clearly excluded. The rest of the presented models all have acceptable fits.  
 
Underlying decision structure 
The next criterion is related to the decision structure of the underlying model. In the 
section regarding the econometric model, the different decision structures are de-
scribed. It all depends on when the respondent decides to opt-out – is it before he/she 
examines the characteristics of the two other alternatives/products, or is it after.  
 
The decision structure implicitly assumed in a nested logit model is that the consumer 
performs a sequential choice: First, the consumer chooses whether to opt-out or not, 
and second, if the consumer chooses to buy a chicken, then characteristics of the two 
real alternatives are considered. The conditional logit model on the other hand, im-
plicitly assumes that the consumer decides whether to opt-out after looking at the 
characteristics of the two real alternatives. If the consumers opt-out in our choice ex-
periment, then they might opt-out to their normal chicken product. This indicates the 
choice task involves 3 similar products and therefore they opt-out because of the 
characteristics of the two other alternatives. Only 10% of the respondents who have 
chosen to opt-out do not eat chicken or do not buy the presented chicken product so 
for the remaining 90% of the respondents, a conditional logit is most appropriate. All 
together, we find that decision structure assumed in conditional logit provides a better 
description of the respondents’ choice tasks than the nested logit model might do. The 
mixed logit and the probit models do not place any restrictions on the decision struc-
ture so they are both acceptable according to the decision structure criterion. 
 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
The last criterion depends on whether or not the property of the Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives exits in the data set. To test for this property Hausman & 
McFadden (1984) suggested that if a subset of the choice set truly was irrelevant with 
respect to the other alternatives, omitting it from the model would not lead to incon-
sistent estimates. They used the previous specified Hausman Test to test for IIA 
(Hausman, 1978). 
 
To complete the test, two different models are estimated – one model which repre-
sents the full model including the opt-out alternative – and one model where the opt-
out alternative is excluded. The parameter coefficients from these two different mod-
els are then compared to each other, and under the IIA assumption they should be a 
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 like (the null hypothesis). If this is not the case, the IIA property is violated. Below in 
table G7 the results from the Hausman Test are shown. 
 
Figure G7. Results from the completed Hausman Test – using a condi-
tional logit model. 
 
 
 Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B) 
Sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
Choice without opt-out full model Difference S.E. 
     
Outdoor bred  0,7288206 0,6777742 0,0510464 0,0106695 
Outdoor bred (information 
regarding breeding method 
given) 0,6651631 0,5189083 0,1462548 0,0287074 
Controlled and labeled cam-
pylobacter-free 0,9036810 0,7935647 0,1101164 0,0140782 
Controlled and labeled cam-
pylobacter-free (information 
regarding breeding method 
given) -0,1029960 -0,115004 0,0120081 0,0310479 
Price -0,0374133 -0,035878 -0,001535 0,0005858 
Price (information regarding 
breeding method given) 0,0074933 0,0065820 0,0009113 0,0010390 
     
chi2(6)  (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
 135,17    
Prob>chi2  0,0000        
 
 
In Table G7, the coefficients from the two models are compared, and the result shows 
that they are not identical. The very small p-values indicate that the difference be-
tween the parameter values is strongly significant, and because of that, that the Inde-
pendence from Irrelevant Alternatives property is violated. Hence the conditional 
logit model will give biased estimates, and therefore the remaining models to consider 
is the mixed logit - and the multinomial probit model. As mentioned above, when us-
ing the mixed logit model, the standard deviations of the normal distributed parame-
ters are insignificant, which biases the model. Therefore, the mixed logit model is 
dropped and the multinomial probit model is chosen.  
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 G3. The number of simulations  
The probit model is estimated through a number of simulation procedures. These 
simulation procedures can be quite time consuming, and because of this we have an 
incentive to make the simulation procedure as efficient as possible by reducing the 
number of repetitions. When using the PROC MDC in SAS, the default is 200 repeti-
tions/simulations. As can be seen from the below table 21, this takes 7,77 minutes. In 
the literature different ranges of the number of repetitions are used.  Munizaga & Al-
varez-Daziano (2001) uses values from the range 5 to 1000 repetitions, whereas Chen 
and Cosslett (1998) used values from 10 to 2000 repetitions and Brownstone & Train 
(1999) used respectively 50 and 125 repetitions. The important aspects for the com-
parison of models estimated by different number of repetitions are CPU time, log-
likelihood values and the number of iterations (Munizaga & Alvarez-Daziano 2001). 
Rendtel & Kaltonborn (2004) shows, that their ML estimation is biased when using 
10 repetitions, but when increasing the number of repetitions to 100, the bias de-
creases considerably. Chen & Cosslett (1998) argues that 2000 repetitions are appro-
priate. These very different recommendations indicate that it depends on the exact 
survey, how many repetitions the simulation procedure requires.  
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Table G8. The final main effect probit model estimated by different num-
ber of repetitions (the values in (italic) are standard errors to 
the above variables)*. 
 Number of repetitions 
N 5 10 25 50 75 100 
Outdoor bred  0,6255 0,6127 0,6149 0,6118 0,6125 0,6123 
 (0,0191) (0,0190) 
0,4905 
0,7068 
-0,0305 
(0,0011) 
(0,1087) 
(0,0191) (0,0190) (0,0190) (0,0190) 
Outdoor bred (information re-
garding breeding method given) 0,4925 0,4937 0,4911 0,4905 0,4900 
 (0,0391) (0,0392) (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0391) 
Campylobacter-free 0,7005 0,6991 0,6972 0,6968 0,6966 
 (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) 
Price -0,0305 -0,0307 -0,0305 -0,0305 -0,0305 
 (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) 
Price (information regarding 
breeding method given) 0,0049 0,0048 0,0048 0,0047 0,0047 0,0047 
 (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) 
Alternative Specific Constant 
(ASC) -1,9810 -2,0046 -1,9015 -1,9050 -1,8884 -1,8805 
 (0,1152) (0,1172) (0,1099) (0,11) (0,1087) (0,1082) 
ASC (information regarding 
breeding method given) 0,5293 0,5302 0,5139 0,5130 0,5105 0,5095 
 (0,0661) (0,0668) (0,0642) (0,0643) (0,0639) (0,0637) 
STD(opt-out) 2,2310 2,2477 2,1414 2,1437 2,1258 2,1179 
  (0,1135) (0,1154) (0,1087) (0,1076) (0,1071) 
       
N° Iter. 16 18 18 18 
 
-20224 
0,4862 2,0812 
3,9642 
    
0,2705 0,2709 
     
LR-test -5,862 
sig. *** * 
17 17 
      
LL -14720 -14755 -14736 -14745 -14740 -14741 
LL0 -20239 -20225 -20223 -20223 -20223 
Real Time 0,3345 1,1307 3,4107 4,2088 
CPU Time 0,2678 0,4710 1,0775 1,9987 3,0553 
   
LRI 0,2727 0,2714 0,2711 0,2711 
  
45,365 -24,795 12,907 4,849 2,553 
*** *** * ns  
 
  *Note: the attribute “campylobacter-free – with information” is left out due to being insignificant. 
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Table G8 (continued): The final main effect probit model estimated by dif-
ferent number of repetitions (the values in (italic) are standard 
errors to the above variables).  
 
N 200 250 500 750 1000 2000 
Outdoor bred  0,6118 0,6117 0,6118 0,6116 0,6117 0,6117 
 (0,0190) 
0,4901 0,4899 0,4899 
(0,0391) 
0,6966 0,6965 
-0,0305 
(0,0006) (0,0006) 
0,0047 0,0047 0,0047 
(0,0011) 
-1,8812 
    
(0,0190) (0,0190) (0,0190) (0,0190) (0,0190) 
Outdoor bred (information 
regarding breeding method 
given) 0,4901 0,4899 0,4899 
 (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0391) 
Campylobacter-free 0,6966 0,6965 0,6964 0,6964 
 (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) (0,0177) 
Price -0,0305 -0,0305 -0,0305 -0,0305 -0,0305 
 (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) (0,0006) 
Price (information regarding 
breeding method given) 0,0047 0,0047 0,0047 
 (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0011) 
Alternative Specific Constant 
(ASC) -1,8863 -1,8858 -1,8821 -1,8826 -1,8815 
 (0,1086) (0,1086) (0,1082) (0,1083) (0,1083) (0,1082) 
ASC (information regarding 
breeding method given) 0,5103 0,5104 0,5097 0,5098 0,5099 0,5097 
 (0,0639) (0,0638) (0,0637) (0,0638) (0,0638) (0,0637) 
STD(opt-out) 2,1238 2,1234 2,1185 2,1195 2,1199 2,1189 
  (0,1074) (0,1074) (0,1071) (0,1072) (0,1072) (0,1071) 
   
N° Iter. 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
-20223 
80,9103 
79,9288 
0,2710 
 
      
LL -14743 -14743 -14742 -14743 -14743 -14.742 
LL0 -20223 -20223 -20223 -20223 -20.223 
Real Time 8,2067 10,8945 20,9440 30,6612 49,2273 
CPU Time 7,7692 9,9182 19,7140 29,3307 39,4838 
       
LRI 0,2710 0,2710 0,2710 0,2710 0,2710 
      
LR-test -0,506 -0,947 0,596 -0,362 -0,142 - 
sig. ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  -  
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 Table G8 shows the estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation procedure us-
ing different number of repetitions in the simulation procedure. The number of itera-
tions is rather stable between 16 to 18. The CPU time range from below one minute 
up to above one hour, and from figure G1 it shows that the relation between the num-
ber of repetitions and the CPU time is linear.  
 
Figure G1.  The CPU time as a function of the number of repetitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally to decide the number of repetitions to use a likelihood ratio test is conducted 
cf. to Chen & Cosslett (1998). The reference point (log-likelihood) is the log-
likelihood value for the estimation with 2000 repetitions. From table G8, it shows that 
when estimating with 100 repetitions there are no significant difference between the 
two log-likelihood values. Because of this the most efficient number of repetitions to 
use during the simulation procedure is 100 repetitions which have been used in the 
further analyses. 
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